Assessment of Opportunities and Considerations for the Palestinian-Israeli Cooperation Program

Final Version
July 1992

Prepared for the U.S. Agency for International Development under contract number PDC-5451-I-05-1027-00.

Joseph Montville
James Packard Winkler
David Altus Garner
Melanie Wihelm
Mohammad Abu-Nimer
Hugo van der Merwe

DAI

7250 Woodmont Avenue, Suite 200, Bethesda, Maryland 20814

TABLE OF CONTENTS

SECTION I
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Both Congress and the Administration have shown interest in fostering cooperation and mutual understanding between Palestinians and Israelis through a broad range of humanitarian, educational, and cultural activities. In order to promote cooperation, A.I.D., in collaboration with the Department of State and the U.S. Information Agency, needs to clarify the objectives of "fostering cooperation and mutual understanding" in the Palestinian-Israeli context. A successful program also requires a well-articulated set of criteria for selecting among potentially fundable activities to accomplish those objectives.

A.I.D.'s Near East Bureau contracted Development Alternatives, Inc. (DAI) to conduct an analysis of experience with fostering cooperation between Palestinians and Israelis. DAI's team conducted the following tasks:

- Produced a preliminary report that reviewed published and unpublished experience with fostering cooperation and mutual understanding, focusing on case studies in the region. The report served as background material for a workshop.

- Organized and facilitated a workshop attended by experts in ethnic conflict, representatives of nongovernmental organizations currently involved in cooperation efforts, and U.S. policy makers engaged in establishing guidelines for the Palestinian-Israeli Cooperation Program to identify appropriate objectives, guidelines, and criteria for the program.

This report summarizes the findings and recommendations for the Palestinian-Israeli Cooperation Program that resulted from the literature review, case studies, and workshop. Section One summarizes the major conclusions and discussions of the workshop. Section Two provides an overview of the concepts of cooperation, an analysis of four specific case studies on Palestinian-Israeli cooperation, and criteria for assessing the impact of cooperation activities.

Most observers agree that some sort of rapprochement between Palestinians and Israelis living in the West Bank and Gaza is desirable; however, opinions on the means and methods by which that rapprochement should be attained vary widely depending on the viewpoint of the observer. There are many stakeholders in this conflict: Israelis; Palestinians living within the Green Line and in the territories; neighboring Arab countries; and the international Jewish, Arab, and Palestinian communities. In addition to the continuing *Intifada* in the West Bank and Gaza, there is now an ongoing, official peace process to consider as well.

All of these factors complicate attempts to formulate policy. But the seeming intractability of the conflict also makes attempts to break through the enmity and foster cooperation all the more critical. The Palestinian-Israeli Cooperation Program represents an important step in fostering contact and cooperation between the people of two ethnic groups in conflict. Such a program will not be without risks. The contentious political environment of

the Middle East requires that there be consensus among U.S. policy makers before proceeding with any programming initiatives. The aim of this report and the workshops is to build that consensus.

Prior to the workshop, participants received the preliminary report that reviewed the experience of cooperation. Mr. Joseph Montville, the Project Director, provided a brief summary of Franco-German cooperation experience in post-World War II Europe and the role of functional cooperation activities in conflict resolution. The report describes and analyzes in detail four case studies of Arab-Jewish cooperation:

Israeli-Palestinian Center for Research and Information (IRPCRI). Sponsors three round tables on public policy and development issues, featuring Palestinian and Israeli economists, industrialists, and water scientists as panelists.

Initiative for Peace and Cooperation in the Middle East. Sponsored by Search for Common Ground, brings together 17 participants from nine Middle Eastern countries to discuss civil societies, conflict resolution, economics, and security issues.

The School for Peace at Neve Shalom/Wahat el-Salam. Promotes understanding between Arab and Jewish high school students within the Green Line.

Van Leer Institute: Arab-Jewish Project. Encourages and trains Arab and Jewish teachers to deal with issues of Arab-Jewish relations in the classrooms.

Based on these case studies and worldwide experiences in cooperation, the preliminary report assesses the potential impact of functional cooperation. Lessons learned focus on event organization, leadership, participants, process, and product or output.

The workshop, held on April 7, 1992, drew 32 participants including fourteen representatives from the Department of State, the U.S. Information Agency, and A.I.D. who discussed realistic objectives and opportunities for cooperation between Palestinians and Israelis. The workshop highlighted Palestinian and Israeli field perspectives on two main issues: the relationship between Track I and Track II diplomacy and potential areas for cooperation.

The workshop provided several key recommendations:

- Track I and Track II diplomacy offer parallel efforts within the larger public peace process. Informal activities can generate new ideas and create new relationships that support the peace process in areas where formal negotiations often cannot operate. The two processes should be complementary and mutually supportive.

- Officials in the State Department should be very interested in having others bring Palestinians and Israelis together to pave the way for more successful negotiations. Track II can begin to address "crunch issues" that will later become potential stumbling blocks in the peace process.

- More concrete examples of cooperation on the ground will demonstrate that peace and community between Palestinians and Israelis is attainable.

- Track II activities can be particularly important and effective when governments engaged in formal negotiations do not represent the majority view.

Workshop participants recommended four objectives of cooperation:

- Enlist established, respected organizations in launching pragmatic, new activities of cooperation to promote understanding between Palestinians and Israelis.

- In support of formal negotiations, identify key issues that must be addressed for the peace process to work. Fund organizations that are capable of cooperating to address these "crunch issues."

- Promote dialogue about practical issues that are of mutual interest to Palestinians and Israelis and affect their daily lives.

- Publicize program objectives and activities as appropriate, given the political environment, to broaden the peace process and increasingly include more supporters.

The workshop was a useful mechanism to explore pragmatic views from experts who have worked on both Track I and Track II initiatives. Although participants recognized the difficult nature of relationships between Israelis and Palestinians, the workshop provided concrete opportunities for funding cooperation activities that would promote the peace process.

SUMMARY OF PROCEEDINGS FOR THE PALESTINIAN-ISRAELI COOPERATION PROGRAM FROM THE WORKSHOP ON APRIL 7, 1992

Thirty-two participants, including two from the State Department, two from the U.S. Information Agency, and 10 from A.I.D., attended the workshop to discuss realistic objectives and opportunities for cooperation between Israelis and Palestinians.

The workshop consisted of two formal panels followed by open discussion between panelists and participants. The first panel focused on the dynamics and purpose of cooperation and the relationship between Track I and Track II diplomacy. Panelists included Harold Saunders, former Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs; Ambassador John McDonald, who recently established the Institute of Multi-Track Diplomacy after 40 years of public service with the State Department; and Jerome Segal, President of the Jewish Peace Lobby and architect of the current legislation on cooperation.

The second panel examined potential areas for cooperation from Palestinian and Israeli field perspectives. Panelists included Gail Pressberg, Co-Director, Americans for Peace Now; Khalil Jahshan, President, National Association for Arab Americans; Edy Kaufman, Executive Director, Harry S. Truman Institute for the Advancement of Peace at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Elias Tuma, Professor of Political Economy, University of California at Davis; and Steven Riskin, Program Officer for Middle Eastern Programs, The Ford Foundation.

Dynamics and Purpose of Cooperation

Several key points emerged about the relationship between Track I diplomacy — formal negotiations between governments — and Track II diplomacy — what is referred to as cooperation at the nongovernmental level, such as people-to-people or citizen diplomacy.

Dr. Saunders spoke about the importance of pursuing formal negotiations within the broader public peace process, pointing to his experience in "shuttle diplomacy" in the Middle East during the Kissinger years.

- The peace process should be viewed as a series of government-to-government negotiations within a larger political process. A framework for a public peace process would recognize the important issues and nongovernmental resources that can facilitate peace and bring together adversarial parties at many different levels.

- Track II activities can generate new ideas and create new relationships that support the peace process in areas where Track I often cannot operate. The two processes should be complementary and mutually supportive.

- Officials in the State Department, such as Secretary Baker, should be very interested in having others pave the way by bringing Palestinians and Israelis closer together. It was noted that many of the representatives in the formal Palestinian delegation had previously been involved in Track II activities.

- A U.S. mediator would want more concrete examples of cooperation on the ground to demonstrate community and peace between Israelis and Palestinians.

- Track II activities can be particularly important and effective when governments engaged in negotiations do not represent the majority view. Dr. Saunders noted that public opinion polls indicate that the Shamir government currently represents only a minority of Israelis.

Dr. Saunders suggested that a group of U.S. officials should look at the political environment in which the larger peace process is taking place to find allies and linkage points to support formal diplomacy efforts. State Department officials should identify "crunch issues," the major sticking points, that will have to be addressed to achieve a sustainable peace beyond formal negotiations. Getting people outside of the formal negotiations to discuss these issues now will make the transition from formal negotiations to disengagement and peace much easier.

One example of a crunch issue is elections in the territories. Several panelists agreed that within a year or so elections in the territories will likely be a real opportunity, if not a demand by many Palestinians and some Israelis. Cooperation between Israelis and Palestinians in districting, polling, and otherwise preparing for elections according to international guidelines will quell opposition from groups in the territories and give credibility to the historical breakthrough of elections. A series of media, including videotapes, audio tapes, and literature, could be prepared to publicize and build support for elections. Khalil Jahshan suggested that a group of Palestinians and Israelis could be brought to the United States to observe the elections in November as another avenue for forging cooperation for and understanding of the electoral process.

Key Issues for An Effective Cooperation Program

The panelists suggested that the following are important guidelines for an effective cooperation program involving Palestinians and Israelis.

Program administrators should achieve consensus within the U.S. government about the program's role within the larger public peace process.

The program should support practical, hands-on activities that are generated by Palestinian and Israeli groups.

Program administrators should award grants when two sides, one Palestinian, the other Israeli, are in agreement prior to receiving funds.

Reciprocity and equality are critical to successful cooperation. Equality requires the participation of both Palestinians and Israelis in the implementation, design, management, and leadership of activities.

The program should avoid premature foreclosure of possibilities for cooperation by soliciting ideas from potential participants. At the same time, the program should encourage cooperation in areas that are critical to the peace process.

Public awareness of the program and its objectives is important so that people understand the intentions. The current projects, while small, have received no publicity, which may not be in the best interest of the program. Some panelists felt that Congress could be influenced by successful cooperation activities and that the program should elicit feedback and support from Congress in informing the public.

The program may have to take some risks and support human rights, democratization, and other areas that are elementary to fairness and community. The tendency to move away from controversial issues does not necessarily protect the program from criticism.

Participation should reach beyond those individuals who have participated in cooperation programs before, including not only elites (scientists, academics, political leaders) but also youth, students, and workers. Programs should also relate to the daily lives of the people and not focus only on "ivory tower" activities.

Institutional capacity among Palestinians is often lacking. The program should provide support to Palestinian groups so that they can be equal participants.

The program should implement and support activities that can be managed effectively and demonstrate results.

Program administrators should select organizations that have commitment to and faith in community between Israelis and Palestinians. The program should attempt to include people across the political spectrum as long as they are relatively open to learning about cooperation and community.

Groups participating in the program should have their own funding sources and stand on their own feet.

A protracted conflict requires a long-term solution. The program must have continuity to bridge short-term U.S. political changes.

The value of the program will not become evident until the post-negotiation period, but investment and commitment are necessary now.

Advocacy groups should not be funded through the program. However, people from political parties or advocacy groups should participate in the program as long as they do not use it to promote their political objectives.

Limiting the program to Palestinians in the territories and Israeli Jews is not necessary or appropriate. Some panelists observed that the inclusion of Arabs and Jews in Israel and outside the immediate region, in Europe and other Arab countries, also would be valuable for the peace process.

Objectives of Cooperation

1) Enlist established, respected organizations in launching pragmatic, new activities of cooperation to promote understanding between Israelis and Palestinians.

2) In support of formal negotiations, identify key issues that must be addressed for the peace process to work. Fund organizations that are capable of cooperating to address these "crunch issues."

3) Promote dialogue about practical issues that are of mutual interest to Palestinians and Israelis and affect their daily lives.

4) Publicize program objectives and activities as appropriate, given the political environment, to broaden the peace process and increasingly include more supporters.

Alternatives for Program Implementation

1) Channel some portion of grant-making and program management responsibilities to a consortium of private voluntary organizations that have impeccable reputations in the region, such as The New Israel Fund and the National Association of Arab Americans. Having the United States as sole sponsor, facilitator, and donor of funds would not appear balanced. The United States should diversify the sponsorship role to give more balance.

2) The U.S. government should engage in dialogue with private voluntary organizations and foundations such as The Ford Foundation and the McArthur Foundation, which already support cooperation, to leverage resources and promote strategic objectives. All of the panelists believed that the amounts suggested by Congress for 1992 and 1993 are inadequate. Coordination of donors would also increase chances for successful cooperation.

3) Establish a policy group within the State Department to provide guidance on areas in which Track II efforts can parallel and support Track I efforts. Working in tandem would broaden the peace process with additional resources to address critical issues that go beyond formal negotiations.

SECTION II
ASSESSMENT OF OPPORTUNITIES AND CONSIDERATIONS FOR PALESTINIAN-ISRAELI COOPERATION

This report serves as the background document for a workshop to be sponsored by the Agency for International Development to examine program objectives and strategies for the Palestinian-Israeli Cooperation Program. The report includes a brief summary of current U.S.-sponsored aid programs in the region, a discussion of the role of cooperation programs in the broader context of diplomatic policy making, four case studies of ongoing cooperation programs between Israelis and Palestinians, and a section considering how U.S. policy makers might make funding decisions and assess the impact of their efforts. In addition, original source material is included.

The concept of a program to foster cooperation and mutual understanding between Palestinians and Israelis has been encouraged by both Congress and the Executive Branch. Foreign Appropriations Bills in 1991 and 1992 specified that A.I.D. should support "educational, cultural, and humanitarian activities" that bring together Israelis and Palestinians living in the West Bank and Gaza. A.I.D. responded to this mandate in 1991 by making available $100,000 through the Democracy Pluralism Initiative to begin a pilot project for Palestinian-Israeli Cooperation. It is expected that the program will expand in FY 1992 to $500,000. In preparation for future programming, A.I.D. is seeking to clarify the broader context for cooperation efforts as well as examine some specific cases of Palestinian-Israeli cooperation.

In Annex F, "Functional Cooperation: An Application of Track Two Diplomacy," Project Director Joseph Montville describes the growing consensus in support of the study and application of conflict resolution strategies. The field of political psychology has for years recognized the influence of political, social, and environmental stress on human and group behavior. The processes by which groups or countries distance themselves from one another and rationalize violence is also widely recognized. What is now beginning to be considered by both theorists and policy makers are the processes by which this distancing can be prevented and reversed. Thus a U.S.-sponsored program with the objective of "fostering cooperation and mutual understanding" is part of a larger trend toward proactive conflict resolution and prevention.

Mr. Montville co-authored a paper 10 years ago in *Foreign Policy* entitled "Foreign Policy According to Freud," which introduced the term "Track Two Diplomacy" to describe unofficial contacts among adversary groups that attempt to develop strategies, influence popular opinion, or organize resources to help resolve conflicts. Track Two diplomacy is separate from but complementary to Track One, or official, diplomacy, which is often constrained by public opinion, security, or economic concerns. With the tacit approval, or lack of public disapproval from official leadership, Track Two activities can facilitate new possibilities for peace and cooperation at the unofficial leadership and people-to-people level. The precedent of positive collaboration between adversaries plays a role in changing public perceptions of the conflict and ultimately allows official leadership to make overtures that might not otherwise have been possible.

Track Two Diplomacy is defined as having three distinct processes. The first process calls for arranging small, facilitated problem-solving workshops or seminars that take place among leaders or representatives of group or countries in conflict. Although these meetings focus on a specific problem, they also serve to create personal relationships among adversaries and allow participants to see their conflict as a shared problem requiring reciprocal and cooperative efforts. The second process of Track Two attempts to change public opinion in order to create a political climate that makes it safer for official policy makers to take risks in making overtures to their adversaries. Specifically, this process aims to rehumanize the adversary's image in public opinion and decrease the sense of victimhood on both sides. The third process is functional collaboration, or the act of cooperation between both sides, to attain a common good such as economic growth, the improvement of individual well-being, or safety and stability for those who have sustained material or psychological losses.

Mr. Montville cites the Franco-German reconciliation after World War II as the most compelling example of successful Track Two diplomatic efforts. Soon after the German surrender, French authorities in their occupation zone in Germany began by revising teaching materials in German schools to discourage the excessive nationalism exploited by the Nazis. The French stressed intellectual freedom and replaced radical nationalist political youth groups with those based on religious or democratic principles. These activities grew to include student and youth exchange programs, public debates on Franco-German topics, and cooperative activities among employer federations and chambers of commerce.

The first and most visible example of functional collaboration came when the French Foreign Minister announced the creation of a High Authority to control the French and German coal and steel industries. The two governments thus sacrificed a measure of state sovereignty to achieve greater economic efficiency. But they also effectively removed the state government authority to manufacture heavy weapons of war unilaterally. Ultimately, the will to take these and other dramatic steps toward lasting peace came from strong leaders such as Robert Shuman of France and Konrad Adenauer of Germany, but their capacity to take risks was enhanced by the changes in public opinion brought about by people-to-people contacts and programs. In 1992, on the eve of European economic union, the goals of rapprochement and functional collaboration have been fully realized by these two formerly bitter adversaries.

Another, more contemporary example of Track Two Diplomacy at work is the A.I.D.-sponsored Center for Strategic Studies on National Stability (Centro ESTNA) in Guatemala. The center's goal is to bring together civilian and military personnel, workers, industrialists, teachers, civil servants, and other professionals to promote the idea of a responsible civic culture. The center believes that today's democracy calls for guaranteeing non-discriminatory and pluralistic participation in the exercise of power. The model has been so successful in Guatemala that A.I.D. is trying to replicate the center in El Salvador.

Although goals for such Track Two activities may have to be modest in the beginning, there are examples today of what programs such as people-to-people dialogues and educational exchanges can do to foster peace and stability in conflict environments. The report provides four case studies of ongoing cooperation programs between Palestinians and Israelis.

Israeli-Palestinian Center for Research and Information (IPCRI) is a non-profit center directed cooperatively by Israelis and Palestinians dedicated to advancing the peace by finding mutual interests between the two groups. Located in Jerusalem, IPCRI is a public policy and development think tank that sponsors three roundtable programs. These programs include a forum of economists and industrialists, another of water scientists, and a forum on the future of Jerusalem. Meetings are closed and press exposure is limited; however, transcripts are provided to all participants. IPCRI received a $25,000 grant under the Palestinian-Israeli Cooperation Program last year.

Initiative for Peace and Cooperation in the Middle East is a project coordinated by Search for Common Ground, based in Washington, D.C. The initiative is based on the model of the Helsinki Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. The core working groups of the initiative include 17 participants from nine Middle Eastern countries, five of whom have since become members of national delegations to the official peace process for the Middle East. The project has four substantive working groups: civil societies, conflict resolution, economics, and Security. Additional activities include a quarterly newsletter and a public conference on human rights issues.

The School for Peace at Neve Shalom/Wahat el-Salam is an organization that brings together Arab and Jewish high school students within the Green Line. All participants are Israeli citizens. The Arab and Jewish student groups come together on two occasions during a school year for three days each time. They prepare for these meetings through 8-10 uni-national meetings in which they discuss and work on issues of internal conflict within their own community such as religious and secular relations or tensions between Eastern and Western Jews. More than 13,000 students have participated in this program.

Van Leer Institute: Arab-Jewish Project is a project dedicated to encouraging and training Arab and Jewish teachers to deal issues of Arab-Jewish relations in their classrooms. Since 1982 its activities have included textbook and curriculum development; design and construction of a booklet on Arab-Jewish encounters; three-day workshops to bring together Arab and Jewish teachers; and, currently, development of a current events curriculum. Although the project's most recent efforts have not yet resulted in a curriculum, the project has facilitated a dialogue between the two groups of teachers and helped them identify areas of mutual concern.

A reading of the detailed descriptions of these initiatives, including comments from participants, yields some common criteria for successful cooperation efforts. Below we present some factors that program planners may wish to consider in establishing a grant program for organizations involved in cooperation programs. In judging the viability or success of an activity designed to foster cooperation in a conflict environment, one must concede that changes will happen slowly and will be difficult to measure objectively. Changes in attitude and beliefs are not easily quantified. Creating an atmosphere in public opinion that allows reconciliation to begin is bound to be open to contention among opposing factions. Given these considerations, this report concludes with indicators or lessons learned that the team compiled from the case

studies, research on other cooperation efforts around the world, and interviews with individuals directly involved in cooperation programs.

LESSONS LEARNED: ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF FUNCTIONAL COOPERATION

All of the cases discussed in this report have one common purpose: to enhance mutual understanding between Palestinians and Israelis. Following decades of conflict and confrontation, rapprochement between the two sides through substantive cooperation is an important move to promote peace and understanding.

For the most part, the participants in the cooperation activities described in the case studies[1] played an active role in changing one another's long-held beliefs and in rising above conventional public opinion.

Often, however, the effect of functional cooperation efforts cannot be easily ascertained or measured. This is particularly true when intangible political gains such as increased understanding or an expanded sense of community are achieved through activities that might be difficult to measure or too risky to publicize. The balance between changing public opinion and achieving substantive results will probably not always be an even one.

Given the intangible nature of the important political outcomes of cooperation initiatives described in the case studies in this report as well as those in other parts of the world researched by the team, we have compiled a list of lessons learned. We present these lessons below.

The Nature of the Organization

- There should be a clear understanding of the organization's purpose in promoting cooperation and community between Israelis and Palestinians
- The political objectives of the organization should be consistent with peaceful coexistence and reflect minimum requirements of both sides.
- The organization must have a sophisticated understanding of the political process and recognize how a proposed activity facilitates collaboration within the political context.

---

[1] Participants included Palestinian and Israeli economic and political elites and scientists brought together by IPCRI and the Search for Common Ground, Arab and Jewish high school students at the School for Peace at Neve Shalom/Wahat el-Salam, and Arab and Jewish teachers at the Van Leer Institute.

- The organization should have a credible work plan and administrative and leadership capacity for implementing its work plan.

In Terms of Leadership

- The leadership should represent a balance including both Israelis and Palestinians.
- Leaders must have integrity and credibility in their respective communities.
- Both sides must be involved early on in a program's design, development, and implementation.

On Participants

- Participants should receive appropriate preparation prior to coming together for cooperation activities.
- For the participants, the activity should:
  - Increase knowledge of the situation and adversary;
  - Alter perceptions/humanize enemy images;
  - Allow them to see new options as viable;
  - Foster a sense of reconciliation; and
  - Increase their willingness to work with their adversaries.
- Participants should be able to establish personal relationships with the adversary group.
- There should be a relative balance in abilities among all participants to allow them communicate in the same language and interact on an equal basis.

On Process

- The two sides involved in a specific functional cooperation exercise should agree on a set of goals, and should state the goals in operational terms.
- The activities should be designed according to clearly specified goals.
- Intergroup (rather than interpersonal) relationships should be stressed.

- A detailed record should be kept of the activities the organization undertakes, not necessarily for publication but as a record to ensure that participants have a sense of accountability for what they say.

On Product or Output

- When possible and appropriate, joint strategies and proposals should be issued after the conclusion of a functional cooperation exercise.
- Parties should strive to agree on principles.
- There should be some information transfer or exchange through reports.
- The activity should produce a list of options for future actions.
- The two sides should make plans for mutual confidence-building measures.

Based on the case studies of functional cooperation that have been reviewed, it is clear that many factors influence successful functional cooperation. Specific factors affect the nature of each program, but the absence of the factors described in this chapter will reduce the chances for a successful cooperation effort.

Some specific guidelines for managing the process of functional cooperation process include the following:

Prior to the Event:

(1) Clearly specify goals and secure agreement on them from all parties involved;

(2) Specify the nature of the proposed activity that addresses the goals the activity seeks to accomplish;

(3) Identify appropriate target group(s);

(4) Train those individuals who are to lead the functional cooperation activity;

(5) Make arrangements to prepare the individual participants prior to the event;

(6) Plan and organize the day-to-day details of the proposed cooperation activity prior to the event; and

(7) Allocate adequate time to meet set goals.

During the Event:

(1) Seek ways to establish parity of status between or among the participating groups;

(2) Acknowledge and respect both similarities and differences between groups attending event; and

(3) Focus on intergroup verses interpersonal interactions.

After the Event:

It is important to consolidate and assimilate learning from functional cooperation activities after they are over. To accomplish this, it is useful to:

(1) Arrange suitable follow-up on activities; and

(2) Explore ways to seek broader social support for changes brought about through functional cooperation efforts.

SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS FROM ISRAELI AND PALESTINIAN POINTS OF VIEW

The case studies included in this report describe four activities: two carried out between Palestinians from the occupied territories and Israelis, and two between Palestinians with Israeli citizenship and Israelis. Since the 1970s, many organizations inside Israel have promoted coexistence and understanding between Palestinian Arabs and Jews in Israel. There are, however, few organizations that have launched similar cooperation programs between Palestinians from the occupied territories and Israelis. Even the two examples from this report that bring together Israelis and Palestinians from the occupied territories do so at the elite or professional level.

Given the current environment of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, people-to-people or grassroots activities among these two groups are still rare. There are few examples of attempts to bring together students, educators, laborers, or university students. Most cooperation activities involve interactions between Palestinians and Israelis who are academics (researchers and university scholars), professionals (water specialists, economists), and political leaders.

Several factors and conditions impede cooperation activities and dialogue groups at the grassroots level in the occupied territories — for many years, these same conditions prevented any kind of cooperative activity between the two groups. To bring together Israeli citizens, Jewish and Arab, is far less complicated on many levels than to bring together Israelis and residents of the occupied territories who are not full citizens. Below we offer some observations on the differences between these two types of interaction:

(a) There is a continuing resistance to the Israeli occupation in the territories, which results in daily casualties.

(b) Most Palestinians in Israel have adjusted to the fact that they are Israeli citizens, but in the territories Palestinians do not consider themselves citizens nor do they have any desire to become Israeli citizens.

(c) The educational system for Palestinian Arabs in Israel is an integral part of the general Israeli educational system; this system encourages dialogue, coexistence, and acceptance of a Jewish state. The educational system in the territories is administered by military authority and uses Jordanian educational curricula.

(d) Dialogue groups and cooperation projects were not encouraged or approved by Palestinian leadership, and certainly not among Palestinian Liberalization Organization (PLO) leaders until the outbreak of the *Intifada*.

(e) Since the *Intifada* began in December 1987, political contacts and dialogue groups, especially on academic and professional levels, have been approved by the *Intifada's* Unified National Leadership and the PLO. At the grassroots level, people are still

unable to contact or interact with the other side equally; the possibility of doing this is decreased by their daily contact with the *Intifada's* activities.

(f) Among Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza, those who have close ties with the Jordanian regime have always been willing to interact and even contact Israeli peace and dialogue groups. Today, some Palestinian groups still perceive those Palestinians as collaborators and traitors. Cooperation with the Israelis can be viewed as an opposition to self-determination and independence, and presented as betrayal.

(g) On the Israeli side, it is difficult to recruit participants even for dialogue groups that involve Palestinian Arabs from Israel. Many dialogue groups that include Palestinians from the territories and Israelis involve the same participants who are constantly recruited by different organizations. Thus, such programs end up preaching to the converted, rather than broadening their base of participants.

Israeli comments and concerns:

(a) Almost any cooperation effort will have some kind of hidden political agenda that will alter the conditions for negotiation. Therefore, there should not be any effort to promote cooperation directly or indirectly.

(b) Palestinians may see cooperation solely as an opportunity outside of the formal negotiation process and use cooperation to promote political objectives. In this way, Palestinians may not give full attention to the formal negotiations because they know they have another avenue to pursue their political objectives.

(c) There is great concern about the Palestinian leadership behind the cooperation activities and its relationship to Arab groups outside of the territories. Does it reflect mainstream or radical Palestinian views and objectives?

(d) Any cooperation activity will inevitably touch on issues of governance and control within the territories. Even relatively simple, humanitarian projects can easily translate into broader political issues.

(e) Many Israelis are completely opposed to any cooperation because these efforts will address unacceptable issues, such as peace making, intermarriage, self-government, and joint rule, all of which are highly politicized issues.

(f) Any financing of cooperation activities by the U.S. government demonstrates the preferences of the third-party negotiator that is sponsoring the formal negotiation talks.

Palestinian comments and concerns:

(a) On one hand, any cooperative efforts should be launched on equal and reciprocal bases; on the other hand, as a result of the political context this equality and reciprocity cannot be achieved.

(b) Cooperation efforts should have a clear political agenda. These efforts should be based on a two-state solution and the right to self-determination, and should denounce the occupation or call for withdrawal of Israeli military from occupied territories.

(c) These cooperation projects or organizations can function directly or indirectly as attempts to preserve the status quo of military occupation or promote the annexation policy. The cooperation and the coexistence theory and its practices were part of the Israeli policy and propaganda prior to the *Intifada*.

(d) Is there a possibility for cooperation between Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza and Palestinian Arabs with Israeli citizenship?

(e) Isn't cooperation a Western notion, like negotiation, that Westerners are trying to apply to the Middle East context without consideration of the cultural and the political differences that exist between West and East?

(f) Cooperation and dialogue are strategies that the Israeli government and military administration prefer us to adopt instead of the political mobilization (*Intifada*). It is always the case that the occupier prefers non-violent means and interaction because they can serve to perpetuate the occupier's purposes and policies.

ANNEX A

CASE STUDIES OF ONGOING PALESTINIAN-ISRAELI COOPERATION EFFORTS

ANNEX A

CASE STUDIES OF ONGOING PALESTINIAN-ISRAELI COOPERATION EFFORTS

IPCRI: Israeli-Palestinian Center for Research and Information

Type of Activity: Roundtable forums of Israeli-Palestinian professionals.

Objective

"IPCRI is a public policy and development think tank of Israelis and Palestinians aimed at investigating and proposing options for solutions to the issues in conflict between Israel and the Palestinians. IPCRI is dedicated to coexistence between Israel, the Palestinians and the surrounding Arab states."

IPCRI intends to advance the peace by finding the mutual interests between Israel and the Palestinians. IPCRI believes that the issues can be resolved, and that by facing the issues through a perspective of cooperation, it is possible to reduce immediate pressure and to produce practical and rational options for the development of peaceful coexistence.
IPCRI seeks to influence policies which would lead to change in the current nature of relations between Israeli and Palestinians.

Goals

The goals of the specific Roundtable forums are a) to deal with specific issues of the conflict directly and in private without the interference of external factors such as the media and b) to create constructive and direct contact between Palestinians and Israelis within a problem solving environment .

Implementing Organization

IPCRI is a non-profit Israeli Palestinian research center founded and directed by Israelis and Palestinians cooperatively.

Office Address: 1 Nablus Road, East Jerusalem.
Contact names: Directors, Gershon Baskin and Ghassan Abdallah .

Mailing address: IPCRI
P.O.Box 51358, Jerusalem
Telephone: 02 285210 Fax: 02 289 094

Beneficiaries

The participants are Palestinians scholars, academics, and professionals from diverse political backgrounds. The Israeli are from government offices and include senior officials from the Bank of Israel, an advisor to the Defense Minister, senior advisor to the Defense Minister on economic issues, an advisor to the Minister of Economic Planning, senior officials from the Ministry of Environment, the Municipal Council of Jerusalem and many professors and researchers from Israeli universities.

Description of Activities

The Roundtable discussions take place at the Notre Dame Center in Jerusalem, which is Vatican owned property and, as described by IPCRI, is considered to be extraterritorial.

There are three Roundtable programs: (a) a forum of economists and industrialists; b) a forum of water scientists; c) Forum on the Future of Jerusalem. The forums are held as close meetings. They are taped and transcripts are distributed to the members of the group as well as to a number of others connected to the subject matter. The participants in each group determine the discussion agenda and schedule.

The forums include lectures and presentations on specific issues determined by the group. These presentations are followed by a discussion that aims "to facilitate a process which allows the discussion of issues that can be separated from the overall political context or the need to resolve the entire conflict.".

For example, the economists forum examined and identified the shared interests of the two sides in economic development of the region. The same strategy was applied in discussing the environmental issues and water problems in the West Bank and Gaza. In both cases the Israeli policy makers listened and participated in the discussion and, as IPCRI reports, the output of the Roundtable discussions was presented to the appropriate Israeli ministries in the form of a policy recommendation.

Cost

As estimated by IPCRI reports, the annual cost of holding a Roundtable Forum is $12,000. This includes two group coordinators (Palestinian and Israeli), room rental, printing and transcripts, IPCRI overhead, and secretarial services. Expected total cost of the four Roundtable forums planned for the year 1992 is $60,000.

Time Period of Implementation

The forums meet on a continual basis, every three to four weeks for several hours in the afternoon. To date, the economists' forum has had 14 meetings, the Forum for the Future of Jerusalem has had six meetings, and the water scientists have had ten meetings.

Lessons Learned

(a) IPCRI has learned that by removing the media, audience and external observers Palestinians and Israelis can engage in a much more constructive dialogue.
(b) If there are certain conflict issues that can be separated from the overall conflict environment, they can be approached in a way that allows parties to identify mutual interests and cooperate in solving the specific matters at hand.
(c) It is feasible to construct Palestinian-Israeli discussion groups on certain issues, and there is a need for such discussions on both sides. However, discussions should be managed carefully and focus on concrete issues.
(d) The level of participation on one side will determine the level of participation on the other side.

Assessments

Implementing organization According to IPCRI the evaluation of its projects should be conducted by examining the outcome of the substantive dialogue between participants. Desired outcomes include:

(a) A joint statement concerning public policy matters.
(b) An influence on the macro level by transforming the output of the discussions to policy making processes on both sides.

(There are several examples of success on both levels reported by IPCRI).

DAI Assessment: There are other criteria which might be considered for the evaluation of IPCRI's program impact:

(a) The continuation of the group discussions for a relatively long period (1-2 years).
(b) The inclusion of Palestinian participants who have both the requisite professional status and influence as community leaders.
(c) Immediate implications in terms of improving relations between the two communities. If the outputs are reflected on the daily policy which is implemented in the West Bank and Israel .
(d) Signs of trust development between the two sides.
(e) The participants from both side continue to preserve their public credibility among their people, even after they participate in such discussions.

The Search For Common Ground

Name of Activity: Initiative for Peace and Cooperation in the Middle East.

Objective

To introduce unofficially into the region innovative negotiation processes, which promote cooperative relationships among Middle Eastern nations and peoples.

Goals

The specific goals of this initiative are to:

(a) Develop a broad range of independent activities at the non-governmental level.
(b) Support official peace-making efforts in the Arab -Israeli and other regional conflicts.

Implementing Organization

The project is conducted by the Search For Common Ground.

Office Address: 2005 Massachusetts Avenue N.W. Lower level
Washington D.C. 20036
Tel. 202 265 4300 Fax. 202 232 6718

Contact Names: Peter Constable, Executive Secretary
Helena Cobban, Research Director.

Beneficiaries

The initiative's Core Working Groups (CWG) consist of 17 participants from 9 nations (Egyptians, Israelis, Palestinians, Jordanians, Syrians, Kuwaitis, Saudis, Lebanese, and Turks). Though they are not official representatives, participants in the initiative were selected for their leadership roles in their countries. Five members of the CGW (Jordan, Egypt, Israel, and the Palestinians) subsequently became involved with their national delegation to the official peace process for the Middle East.

Description of Activities

This activity is modeled after the Helsinki Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). CSCE provided a sufficiently adaptable and comprehensive framework to allow constructive change between West and East. A CSCE-type negotiation process allows each national participant to address the concerns of their country on an equal basis with all other participants.

The initiative started with an exploratory trip to several countries in the Middle East (Jordan, Israel, and Egypt) where the organizers were welcomed and encouraged to continue their efforts to establish the Initiative for Peace and Cooperation in the Middle East. There were two meetings of the CWG members. At the first meeting in Italy in September 1991, four substantive working groups were created to deal with the following topics: 1) civil society; 2) conflict resolution; 3) economic matters; and 4) security issues. Each working group is made up of CWG members and in western specialists.

It is important to note that the organizers were able to include two Israeli hardliners among CWG participants; most Israelis who participate in such meetings are from the dovish side of the political spectrum. Organizers reported that in the first meeting Israelis, Saudis, Kuwaitis, and Jordanians sat together at the same table and discussed various issues.

During their second meeting, the Security Group agreed to proceed on a two-track approach to permit a full discussion of measures that might encourage negotiations in the Arab-Israeli arena. The Conflict Resolution Group planned to organize a working tour by a team of five experts to five Middle East capitals with the aim of helping to build awareness of conflict resolution in the region. The Economic Group decided to form a commission of internationally recognized figures to encourage and sponsor a broad range of cooperative activities within the region. The Civil Society Group launched a Mideast-wide campaign in support of basic human rights which the group agreed upon in September.

During the two meetings, CWG activities focused on exploring the members' attitudes and beliefs about the Middle East conflict, learning about facilitation strategies and techniques, discussion of mission statements, reports on and discussion of the four working groups, and future planning.

There are two other activities being carried out by initiative organizers and the participants:

- Publication of a quarterly Newsletter to provide information about non-official activities carried under the Initiative and other organizations that promote a regional, cooperative approach.

- A public Conference to present the Initiative and their human rights campaign.

Costs

The total cost of the Initiative's activities for one year is $754,638. This includes the project direction budget of $226,397; a Core Working Group budget of $172,500 (Security group: $92,460, Economic group $23,138, Conflict Resolution group: $23,138, and human rights activities: $77,510,), Newsletter cost of $63,365; and the cost of the conference, $76,130.

25

Time Period of Implementation

Each of the two meetings were held over three days. The meetings took place in Italy, deliberately outside of the region. For the next year the Initiative's activities will include: two meetings of the Security group, publication of several papers on security and two Bulletins of Regional Cooperation in The Middle East, and several staff visits to the region. There is no specified time limit for program activities. Plans are to continue for as long as participants express an interest and need.

Lessons Learned

The organizers report on important lessons indicated the following:

(a) The combination of the Core Working Group and substantive working groups (on four issues listed above) is very effective in engaging high level participants from the region and ensuring the constant test of the activity against the cultural and political realities of the Middle East.
(b) Diversity of participants determines the issues addressed at the meetings.
(c) The multi-track approach helps each group to progress individually.
(d) Although the participants are unofficial representatives of their countries, they successfully reflect the diversity of opinion in the region.

Assessments

Organization: According to the organizers of the Initiative for Peace in the Middle East the criteria of their impact are:

(a) The receptivity in the region to the program.
(b) The close ties developed with non-governmental organizations in the region.
(c) The enthusiastic participation of prominent individuals, four of whom are taking part in their official delegations, and many of whom have never taken part in such dialogue before.

Beneficiaries: A participant in one of the working groups described the impact of the Initiative and its importance to him in the following way.

(a) It provides him with the opportunity to interact freely and openly with people from neighboring countries for the first time in his life.
(b) It allows him to work on promoting human rights not only in his country but also in other Middle Eastern countries.
(c) He feels his work contributes to the general environment of negotiation in the Middle East.

DAI Assignment: This is a unique and important program. It has several features that provide it with great potential for impact:

(a) The participants are close to the leadership and decision making level. Thus, the program effects are transferred directly into the decision making process, which will influence the course of the conflict in the Middle East.

(b) The project assists Palestinians and Israeli to perceive and relate to their conflict and its implications in a regional context. This provides them with a broader context than the bilateral confrontation.

(c) The Initiative provides ideas and role models for the official peace process. This capacity is enhanced by such activities as holding regional conferences and publishing newsletters and joint papers on conflict issues.

(d) If the program's main message of regional cooperation reaches the public and grass roots organizations throughout the region, it will assist political leaders in beginning serious negotiation processes.

School For Peace at Neve Shalom/Wahat el-Salam

Name of Activity: Arab-Jewish Encounters.

Objectives

The program objectives are:

(a) To influence Arab-Jewish relations in Israel by changing students' attitudes and perceptions.
(b) To provide a model for Israeli society of how Arabs and Jews can live together equally and peacefully.

Goals

The organizers' goals, as stated through several interviews, are to facilitate the following qualities among high school students who participate:

(a) A perception of the complexity of the conflict.
(b) Hope and faith that their individual contribution can make a difference and that the situation can be changed.
(c) Equal and supportive encounters.
(d) The capacity to relate to the other side as an equal and independent entity.

Implementing Organization

Mailing address: Neve Shalom: School For Peace
D.N. Shimshon 9761
Tel. 02 912222 or 916282

Directors: Boa'az and Abd Salam Najar

Beneficiaries

Arab and Jewish high school students within the Green line participate in this program. The school does not have any activities for students or participants from the West Bank and Gaza. The participants are selected; most are the leaders among their peers and are considered potential future community and political leaders. To date, 13,000 students have participated in the program.

Description of Activities

According to the School For Peace approach, the process begins with a series of separate or uni-national meetings, in which each national group is led by a facilitator from the same national group. These preparations consist of 8-10 meetings of 2-4 hours each. In some cases, this preparation is done during a 2 day workshop at Neve Shalom. In these meetings, the students work on internal issues related to the specific national group. For example, Arabs discuss Israeli/Palestinian identity contradictions, and social changes in the Arab community that influence gender relations or religious and secular relations. In the Jewish groups, students focus on internal conflict between Western and Eastern Jews, immigrants, and other social problems. When the groups are ready, they meet twice. Each encounter lasts three days. The two national groups are divided into small groups of 10-15 participants led by Arab and Jewish facilitators.

In a group dynamic activity, the two facilitators ask the group members to examine their attitudes on Arab-Jewish relations. Facilitators assist the students in revealing their stereotypes, fears, and mistrust of the other side. Through structured exercises the participants experience a process which provides them with new insights on their personal attitudes and perceptions of the other side. The assumption is that by experiencing the encounter with the enemy or the other national group, fears and suspicions will be reduced. This exercise allows the students to learn more objectively about the conflict and its complexity. The objective of these encounters is to promote an understanding of the conflict's complexity and encourage the respect of each side for freedom and equality.

Costs

The costs of holding three encounters with the same group during one year (including staff, hostel expenses of the groups, and evaluation reports) is $10,000-$15,000

Time Period of Implementation

The project is implemented as follows: Facilitators travel throughout the year to Arab and Jewish schools separately to facilitate preparatory meetings. Then the two group meet together twice for three days at Neve-Shalom. After each encounter the facilitators return to the schools and receive feedback on the last encounter and conclude the project.

Lessons Learned

The lessons learned are reflected in the changes that the organization has made in the format of the program in recent years. These lessons include:

(a) Realization that there is a critical need for a continuing investment in the preparation stage.

(b) Each national group has different needs which should be addressed separately, during both the preparation and encounter stages.

(c) Any true and genuine encounter has to be held and arranged on an equal basis. Arab participants should have the opportunity to speak their own language and the social and intellectual background of the two groups should be evenly matched.
(d) The staff has to be equal and symmetrical in terms of facilitating abilities, educational background, and experience.
(e) It is essential to enable the participants to address and discuss the conflictual issues rather than focus only on positive similarities, or cultural issues.
(f) It is crucial to the success of any project to have a follow-up activity (Therefore they extended their model to include a second workshop, but they still do not have any follow up in terms of what happens to their participants after they finish the project and return to their original environment.).

Assessments

Neve Shalom: The facilitators and directors responded to questions on what they consider to be the most successful aspects of the program. They responded:

(a) Considering the political reality, the fact that the program managed to bring together the two groups is evidence of success.
(b) Participants acquire knowledge and learn about the complexity of the conflict.
(c) Students begin to perceive and look at the other side as equal; they no longer are capable of dismissing the other side.
(d) Participation in the program encourages the belief that individuals can influence the course of the conflict.
(e) The teachers and the schools continue their relations with the School For Peace, thereby bringing some continuity to their respective institutions.

Beneficiaries: The students express the accomplishments of the program as follows:

(a) The establishment of personal relationships between individuals during and after the workshops: personal friendships, visits, phone calls, and correspondence.
(b) They carry with them an overall positive memory of the experience--they learn about culture, norms, traditions, spend quality time and "have fun", and the encounter is free from arguments or violence.

DAI Assessment: As an observer of the School for Peace activities, the criteria of impact are:

(a) Students adopt new attitude toward the other national group in terms of becoming more open and able to listen and understand the other side's arguments.
(b) Students become aware of the importance of dealing with and discussing the Arab-Jewish conflict and its impacts on their personal lives.
(c) The school decides to focus and invest more efforts in raising its students' awareness of the importance of understanding and respecting the other national group's right for equality and freedom.

Van Leer Institute: Arab-Jewish Project

Name of Activity: Arab-Jewish Project: Current Events teaching for Arab and Jewish Teachers

Objectives

The main objectives of this program are:

(a) To create a reality of cooperation between Arab and Jewish teachers, as a model for possible coexistence.
(b) Raise the awareness of students and teachers to the importance of dealing with current events in both Arab and Jewish schools.

Goals

The specific goals of the program were listed during an interview with the project's staff:

(a) To educate Arab and Jewish students about their common citizenship, equal rights, and multicultural heritages.
(b) To train Arab and Jewish teachers to be understanding and open toward the other group.
(c) To provide teachers with skills and tools to deal with current events in their classrooms.
(d) To increase and strengthen the teachers' confidence in their ability and responsibility to discuss current events with their students.

Implementing Organization

Mailing address: Van Leer Institute: Arab-Jewish project
Albert Einstein Square, P.O.Box 4070
Jerusalem, 91040
Fax: 02 666-080 Tel. 02 667-141

Contact: Hagiet Zaltzberg, Director

Description of Activities

Van Leer is a leading organization in Arab-Jewish relations in Israel. Its current activities have developed through several stages:

1982-1986 Developing curricula and text books. Most curricula were developed for use in Jewish schools.

1986-1987 Education in a developing society. Activities included the design and construction of a booklet on Arab-Jewish encounters.

1987-1988 Encounters between Arab and Jewish teachers and principals. Three day workshops for each group.

1989-1991 Strategies for teaching current events of Arab and Jewish teachers.

The Current Events program is an attempt by the Van Leer Institute to encourage teachers to deal with conflict in their classes. At the conclusion of the program in 1991, no single curriculum or instruction program for teachers had been developed.

The program operated as follows: One facilitator worked separately in a uni-national setting with a group of 10-15 educators on obstacles, dilemmas, and the needs of their students in dealing with current events. The teachers learned skills and techniques for introducing current events to their students. Then the teachers met in a bi-national setting in which they examined their fears, stereotypes, and political attitudes toward the other national group. The purpose of the bi-national meetings was to allow the teachers to observe that their counterparts shared many of the same problems and dilemmas in trying to deal with currents events.

Costs

The costs of each group of Arab and Jewish teachers for one year is $5,000-6,000. Approximately 10-12 groups met each year.

Time Period of Implementation

In this project each national group of teachers met in 6-8 separate sessions during one year. Each session lasted four to five hours. In addition to these separate sessions there are 3 bi-national encounters, the first lasting four to five hours, then a two-day workshop, and finally a concluding joint session of the two groups.

Lessons Learned

The project organizers made the following observations:

(a) Teachers needed to reduce their own fears, enmity, and stereotypes of the other side in order to be able to deal with the conflictual issues that ultimately come up in a current events discussion.
(b) There should be a structured and fully designed curriculum that teachers can apply during the program.
(c) Arab and Jewish teachers face common dilemmas as educators in their classrooms. These dilemmas can be used as a common background to develop a professional and personal network between the two groups.

Assessments

Organization: The organizers evaluated their program's impact and success as follows:

(a) The teachers are maintaining some sort of relations after the project is completed: consultation, visit, phone calls, and other types of joint activity.
(b) Educators become more aware of the Arab-Jewish conflict and introduce it in at least one class during the year.
(c) Teachers request more activity at the end of the first year.
(d) Teachers gained new insights about themselves personally and professionally in regard to Arab-Jewish relations.

Beneficiaries: Arab teachers defined the program's impact different than the Jewish teachers. They argued that it is successful when:

(a) They had an opportunity to discuss political matters, in order to change the Jewish teachers' attitudes and motivate them to stand for equal rights to the Arab minority in Israel, and against the occupation of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

The Jewish teachers said the program was successful if:

(b) Participants learned more about Arabs generally by interacting with them on a personal level.

The two groups perceived the program as successful if:

(c) They were able to clarify each side's political attitudes.

(d) If the program provided them with skills and techniques for how to discuss current events, especially with regard to the Arab-Jewish conflict.

ANNEX B

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN CONFLICT

ANNEX B

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN CONFLICT

This summary will cover only the milestone events in this conflict. First, some demographic data to help to explain the environment and context of the conflict.

Researchers and analysts date the origins of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict to 1882, with the arrival of the first Jewish settlers from Europe in Palestine. The population ratio in 1918 was one Jew to 11 Arabs. When the United Nations proposed the partition plan in 1947, there were 1,432,545 Arabs and 759,100 Jews — a ratio of one Jew to two Palestinians. The most recent Israel Central Bureau figures indicate: 3,520,000 Jews and 2,088,000 Arabs (including Arabs living in Israel) — a ratio of 1.75 Jews to one Arab. The Palestinian community includes 818,502 refugees in the West Bank and Gaza, 845,542 in Jordan, 278,609 in Lebanon, and 257,989 in Syria. It is also important to point out that the Arab birth rate is 43.5 and the Jewish birth rate is 21.6. These figures illustrate the demographic shifts in this conflict that are central to the current argument between Palestinians and Israelis over settlement in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The following are essential events in understanding this conflict:

1947	The United Nations declares the partition plan which is rejected by Arab countries and Palestinians.
1948	Israel declares its independence and engages in a war with Arab countries, causing hundreds of thousands of Palestinians to become refugees in Arab countries and the territories (West Bank and Gaza).
1950	The West Bank is united with Jordan and Gaza is administered by Egypt.
1964	Founding of the Palestine Liberation Organization.
1965	First military attack on an Israeli target by the PLO.
1967	June: Israel occupies the West Bank, Gaza, and the Golan Heights during the Six Days War.
1967	United Nations Security Council adopts resolution 242, which calls for Israeli withdrawal from territories seized in the war (in the French text "from the territories seized in the war") and the right of all states in the area to peaceful existence within secure and recognized boundaries.

1970 September: 20,000-25,000 Palestinians are killed in clashes between the Jordanian Army and Palestinian factions.

1973 Outbreak of the 1973 war, in which Arab countries try to reclaim the occupied territories.

1974 PLO is recognized by the Arab countries in the Rabat Arab Summit as the sole representative of Palestinians.

1975 Kissinger's shuttle diplomacy brings limited military disengagement agreements in the Golan Heights and Sinai.

1976 First election in the territories. Palestinians elect mayors who affiliate themselves with the PLO.

1977 November: The Likud, (right wing party in opposition since 1948 led by Menachim Begin), win the election.

1978 Camp David Accords is signed by U.S, Israel, and Egypt.

1982 June: Israel invades Lebanon and forces the PLO to leave Beirut.

1982 September: PLO and Arab countries in the Fez summit in Morocco call for Israeli withdrawal only from the 1967 occupied territories. Also recognize the right of all region's states for secure and peaceful boundaries.

1982 September: Reagan initiative for negotiation based on Camp David Autonomy talks.

1985 May: PLO agrees to confederation with Jordan, including a joint delegation to the negotiations, and agrees to negotiation on the basis of United Nations security council resolutions 242 and 338.

1987 December: The outbreak of the Palestinian *Intifada* in the territories.

1988 November: PLO declares the independence of the Palestinian state, recognizes Israel, agrees to direct negotiation with Israel, and accepts Resolution 242.

~~1988~~ ~~December: Arafat denounces "terrorism".~~

1989 A strong wave of Soviet immigrants begin arriving in Israel.

1990 August: Outbreak of the Gulf crisis.

1991 October: First direct bilateral negotiation between Palestinians and Israelis in Madrid.

1992 January: Second phase of bilateral negotiation in Washington.

Developments in Recent Years

During recent years, the following have been the core issues in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

1. Recognition of self-determination for the Palestinians
2. Position of borders
3. Security of borders and security in general for Israelis and Palestinians
4. In case of a settlement, how to establish the link between Gaza and the West Bank, which will separate or divide Israel
5. Economic relations between Israelis and Palestinians
6. Future of Palestinian refugees (2,200.000)
7. Status of Jerusalem
8. Distribution of water resources
9. Jewish settlements in the West Bank and Gaza
10. The high level of enmity and psychological barriers between the two sides. The main events that have influenced these issues since 1987 are:

    (a) Outbreak of the *Intifada* in the West Bank and Gaza
    (b) Immigration of Soviet Jews
    (c) Gulf War

The impact of the *Intifada* on the Palestinian-Israeli conflict is very important in that it encouraged the Palestinians in both sectors, inside and outside the territories as well as in the PLO, to recognize and declare clearly that they will accept a two state solution, will negotiate with Israel, can't rely on Arab countries for help or representation, and would give up, at least for a certain period, resistance by military means or terrorism. The Israelis, in turn, realized that their basic conflict is with the Palestinians, and that they have to conduct some sort of negotiations with Palestinians in order to settle the conflict. The *Intifada* also deepened the polarization in Israeli society between those who support settlement and those who oppose negotiations with Palestinians based on the right to Palestinian self-determination.

At the beginning of the *Intifada*, the Israeli left and the Israeli peace movement in general were very active in expressing their support for negotiations and solidarity with Palestinians. Many Palestinian villages and cities received Israelis who came to demonstrate and show support. However, valuable relationships that were established between the peace movement (Israeli groups such as: "Peace Now", "Stop the Occupation", "Yesh Gvool", and "Women in

Black") and the Palestinian community and leaders in the West Bank and Gaza were damaged, in some cases even destroyed, by the events of the Gulf War.

In fact during this period there were rising hopes that the Palestinian and Israeli leaders were very close to the negotiating table, especially that the U.S was conducting a second level negotiations and establishing direct contact with the PLO for the first time. But, three years after the *Intifada*, both sides became more desperate, disappointed, and frustrated when negotiations did not start. It seems that the *Intifada* had left only casualties on both sides: among Palestinians 900 killed, thousands injured, and about 2000 Palestinian houses demolished. On the Israeli side, 75 Israeli settlers and soldiers were killed and hundreds injured.

At the time of the Gulf crisis in August 1990, the third year of the *Intifada*, the Palestinians were in a desperate situation. There had been no substantial political achievement or practical translation of their costly three years of resistance to the Israeli military. The Palestinian position during the Gulf war, Saddam's defeat, the clear division among Arab countries, and the Soviet Union's attitude, pushed the Palestinians into a corner. They accepted the negotiations within the current framework determined by the U.S.

During the Gulf War, Israel responded with restraint to Saddam's scud missile attacks. It was also a part of the allied coalition. The absorption of 350,000 Soviet Jews put a heavy burden on the Israeli economy and forced Israel to request more direct aid and loan guarantees from the U.S. In addition, the United States administration promised the Arab countries who supported its war against Iraq that it would promote the peace process in the Middle East. All these conditions served as the background to Secretary of State James Baker's shuttle diplomacy in the Middle East. Beginning in March 1991, Baker conducted nine rounds of shuttle diplomacy which culminated in October 1991 with the confirmation of Israelis, Palestinians, and representatives of three neighboring Arab countries to meet at the negotiating table.

Current Environment of Palestinian-Israeli Conflict:
On the Palestinian Side

The Palestinian-Israeli conflict is very dynamic and the current status is shaped by daily developments between the two groups and among nations in the region. Two critical current developments are detailed below.

The *Intifada*: Palestinians continue to resist the Israeli military and violent settlers. On a daily basis, young Palestinians are killed and injured by the Israeli soldiers and settlers. There is increasing use of live ammunition in the Palestinian resistance to the occupation in defiance of the Unified leadership which supports the negotiation process. Demonstrations, strikes, and stone throwing are still part of the daily scene in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. But in comparison to the beginning of the *Intifada* there is a decrease in the size of mass demonstrations. There is also an increase in the use of the live ammunition by the Israeli forces.

There is a high level of frustration, anger, and depression among Palestinians due to high losses in life and property of the continuing *Intifada*. There is also a high level of mistrust of the Israeli intentions to reach a settlement. Palestinians claim that Israel is focusing on procedural issues in an attempt to gain time to crush the *Intifada* and intensify West Bank and Gaza settlement.

"Talks": On one hand, for some Palestinians, negotiations are perceived as the price of their political position during the Gulf war. Therefore, there is no substantial agreement or benefit (like independence, self determination or even a partial withdrawal of the Israeli Army) that will come out of these "talks". The talks are seen by many Palestinians as an attempt by the government to gain more time to populate the West Bank and Gaza with Jewish settlers (immigrants), and to create a new political reality. On the other hand, the negotiations are described by other Palestinians as the best that could be achieved at present. Thus, in terms of responses to the peace process, Palestinians are divided among themselves over the benefits and function of these "talks" with the Israeli government. In the West Bank and Gaza Strip, the majority of the Palestinians still support the decision to negotiate. However, the voice of those who reject negotiation is becoming stronger. There were at least six occasions in which the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (P.F.L.P) took responsibility for firing live ammunition at Israeli settlers and soldiers. Using live ammunition is a sign of opposition to the *Intifada's* Unified Leadership, who support the negotiations. The Islamic Jihad and other Islamic movements are gaining support in both the West Bank and Gaza (there were clashes between Islamic activists and PLO activists in Nablus in 1991), but especially in the Gaza Strip, where their influence is strongest.

In short, there is a growing rejection of the negotiation process among Palestinians. This has been reflected in two recent incidents. The first occurred when the Palestinian delegation returned to the West Bank and Gaza from the second round of negotiations in Washington. The largest "reception" for the delegation was by those who oppose the negotiations. The second event was a physical attack on Faisal Hussaini, a Palestinian leader in negotiations, in an attempt to prevent him from speaking in the Tulkarm area. Analysts explain the frustration by the fact that Palestinians in the territories had high expectations at the beginning of the negotiation process which have been disappointed. Second, the Palestinians believe that Israel hasn't offered substantial concessions and has so far focused only on procedural issues.

The majority of those who support the negotiation process, justify it with statements such as: "we have nothing to lose and we have to try this route, because the world has always accused us of blocking the negotiations and being an obstacle to peaceful talks. " Another argument is: "There is no hope from the Arab countries for national salvation, especially after Iraq was destroyed economically and militarily." The *Intifada's* Unified Leadership, in its recent leaflets, is still encouraging both Palestinians in the West Bank and outside (the PLO) to attend the negotiations. There are some Palestinians who claim that the negotiations might succeed in stopping the Israeli policy of populating the West Bank and Gaza with Jewish settlers, especially during the period of absorption of Soviet immigrants.

Finally, both those who reject negotiation and those who support it agree that this process is a valuable opportunity to resolve this conflict, but only if the Israeli government is seriously interested in settling the conflict. Those who oppose the negotiations argue that Palestinians have gone too far in making concessions to Israel, while Israel is standing steadfast with its hard bargaining positions. Palestinians on both sides agree on two positions. First, there should be no more concessions on the Palestinian side in terms of representation of P.L.O. or other substantial issues. Second, if these negotiations fail, the situation will be worse, especially in that the political movements opposed to the talks (the DFLP and PFLP, and the Islamic movements) will gain more influence.

On the Israeli Side

Economic situation: The main issue of concern to the Israelis these days is their economy. Economic concerns are related to the $10 billion loan guarantees from the U.S., the peace process, and the election scheduled for June 1992. Israelis seem very concerned about the way that their government is functioning economically, especially with the current 11 percent unemployment rate and a prediction of 16 percent unemployment if the loan guarantees are not approved. In a recent poll, 80 percent of interviewees were unsatisfied with the way that the government handled the economy.

Talks: Issues related to the peace process contributed to the decision of the Shamir government to advance the elections to June instead of the scheduled November elections. Both parties are opposed to any consideration of land in exchange for peace. The Labor Party accused the Israeli delegation of stubbornness and unwillingness to settle the conflict, and not seriously negotiating with Palestinians. Yitzak Rabin has promised that the $3-4 billion invested in settlements will be redirected to the internal Israeli economy in projects such as the immigrant absorption process. The left wing parties in Israel argue that the government is not serious in approaching the negotiations and that it has gone along in an attempt to avoid U.S. pressure in the post Gulf War period. These left wing parties argue that Israel can give up land for peace, especially if there are international guarantees for its future security. Some of these parties (Mapam and Ratz) even agree to self determination for the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza.

Elections: Ironically, according to the latest polls in Israel, it may be Soviet Jews who have the final say in constructing the next Israeli government. January 1992 polls indicate that 16 percent of Soviet immigrants support Likud and 21 percent support the Labor party. This is seen as a good sign for the Labor alignment, especially since there are currently about 350,000 Soviet immigrants, many of whom are of voting age.

In any case the predictions in Israel indicate that there might be another National Unity government because the Israeli election will not produce a party able independently to construct a strong government. Others argue that it is too early to predict the Israeli election results, but there are optimistic signals that the Labor party (which agreed to land for peace and freezing the settlements) will be able to build a coalition government. A Labor government would continue

negotiations, but on substantial issues. Yet, other polls show the Likud ahead of the Labor party by as much as five points.

These predictions can be understood better when one realizes that Israeli society is polarized on the issue of how to deal with the *Intifada*. Accusations from the radical right parties claim ambiguity in the government position towards settlements. These parties and activists demand harsher policies and stronger security measures in the territories. The other side of the society tends to accept the principle, land for peace, some (20 percent according to last poll) even agreed on direct negotiation with the PLO and self-determination for Palestinians. Some analysts claim that it has always been the case that the Israeli government is far behind what the Israeli people themselves are ready to accept.

Finally, now that Rabin defeated Peres in the fight to represent the Labor Alignment in the June election, the chances for either a National Unity government or the defeat of Shamir coalition are greater. This is due to Rabin's hawkish image, which makes him more reliable and acceptable to more security conscious Israeli voters.

Negotiations: The first round of negotiation in October 1991 in Madrid and the second phase in Washington in January 1992 were spent discussing procedural and technical issues for the negotiation. The Israelis continue to propose to move the negotiation site from Washington to the Middle East so that their delegation members can also function in their government, and as evidence to the Arab countries and Palestinians of a process of normalization and recognition of Israel. Another issue was clear during the multilateral negotiations in Moscow. The Palestinian delegation composed of representatives from Jerusalem and outside the territories could not participate in the negotiations because Israel and the United states claimed that this is not the format agreed upon in Madrid. Palestinians argued that they can not approve only Palestinians from the territories as representing Palestinians in general when the discussion will include the status of refugees, economic development of the region, and other regional issues.

On this issue, some analysts argue that it is Israel's intention to gain time by focusing on procedural issues during the current bilateral round. By gaining time Israel can delay the negotiation of the substantial issues until after the U.S. presidential election. Israel can't negotiate seriously until the new Israeli government is constructed in July 1992. By then, the U.S. election will be in the last stages, which will prevent the present administration from pushing too hard on Israel or considering such politically sensitive issues as the Middle East conflict. Israel can gain 8-10 months by delaying the negotiation with procedural issues.

In Moscow, representatives from 12 Arab nations (Syria, Lebanon, and a Palestinian delegation were not present) and Israel met to discuss issues of common regional concern. Previously, the Israeli and U.S. positions have been to separate the Arab-Israeli conflict from the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, while the Arab states and the PLO have insisted on the interconnection of the two conflicts. There is a clear strategic and economic advantage for Israel in separating the two issues. According to a report from the Armand Hammer Institute, Israel

would gain approximately $500 million annually in trade if three neighboring Arab countries were to recognize Israel and begin open trading relationships.

As a compromise the U.S. and Russia suggested that Palestinians from outside the territories participate in working groups on economic development and refugees. These committees were assigned by the multilateral negotiators to handle regional security, water resources, economic development, and other issues. The Israeli foreign minister opposed the proposal. But analysts argue that Israel might compromise on this matter as a tactical concession.

Future Developments:

There are several potential factors that might obstruct the future negotiation process, some of these factors might be:

1. Israeli election, especially if the right wing parties (including the Likud) receive stronger support.

2. Settlers in the West Bank and Gaza provoke violent clashes with the Israeli Army.

3. Islamic movement and radical left Palestinian factions gain political control in West Bank and Gaza communities.

4. Election in the U.S. brings a new administration that does not focus on the Middle East as the Bush administration has.

5. Hardening of Israeli public opinion as a result of a downturn in the economic situation in Israel, perceived to be linked to loan guarantees and absorption of immigrants.

ANNEX C

U.S.-SPONSORED DEVELOPMENT EFFORTS IN THE REGION

ANNEX C

U.S.-SPONSORED DEVELOPMENT EFFORTS IN THE REGION

MIDDLE EAST REGIONAL COOPERATION PROGRAM (MERC)

Since the Camp David Accords of 1978, Congress has encouraged A.I.D. to provide substance to the peace agreements between Egypt, Israel and the United States. Since 1979, A.I.D. has provided over $60 million through the Middle East Regional Cooperation Program (MERC) to promote cooperation between the governments and peoples of Israel and Egypt.

In a recent review of the MERC, an assessment team concluded that, "In the entire range of USAID activities there are few programs in which foreign policy and developmental objectives have been matched so well as in the MERC."[1] With formal support from, and agreement between, Israel, Egypt and the United States, A.I.D. funding has contributed tangibly to peace by bringing Egyptians and Israelis together to resolve mutual problems and improve standards of living.

MERC program has funded projects in three sectors: five projects in agriculture, two in health, and two in marine technology. Success in the program is attributed to "the high level of political support the program enjoyed from each of the partners." Given this high level political support — which neither the West Bank/Gaza nor the Palestinian/Israeli Cooperation programs have — the MERC program's success still depends on technical and administrative leadership from all parties that goes beyond formal government support. Exceptional leadership from Israeli, Egyptian and American scientists from the early stages of the program's development created an environment of fairness and positive relationships.

Three areas of sensitivities also had to be addressed for successful collaborative relationships. First, the program requires balanced and substantive involvement of all parties, both in project development and implementation. Second, even-handedness in U.S. administration of the program is essential. Despite overall equitable management, Egyptians expressed some resentment over health and language requirements imposed upon Egyptian participants in U.S.-based programs that were not required of Israelis. Finally, because of Egyptian sensitivities to outside pressures, the program maintained a low profile with minimal media attention. Given the nature of the program, the Egyptian opposition press would have an easy target in Israel to blame for failures or to stir up controversy.

---

[1] Review of Middle East Regional Cooperation Program (Project No. 398-0158.25), DEVRES, Inc., February 6, 1991.

Overall, the ten years of success attributable to unwavering support from Israel, Egypt and the United States bodes well for expansion of the program. Expansion might include new Israeli and Egyptian institutions and researchers, new topics of mutual interest to Israel and Egypt, particularly new topics that would bring other Arab countries into the program (as the political climate permits). U.S. support for the MERC program remains resolute, and future prospects for continued success appear very positive.

THE PALESTINIAN-ISRAELI COOPERATION PROGRAM

A.I.D. authorized the Palestinian-Israeli Cooperation Program, a $100,000 pilot project of grant assistance to Palestinian and Israeli organizations engaged in cooperation efforts, in August of 1991. The concept of A.I.D. support for private voluntary organizations engaged in contact and cooperation between citizens of the West Bank and Gaza and Israelis was encouraged within the Senate's 1991 Appropriations and by correspondence from the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. The initial $100,000 of funding was made available under the FY 91 Democratic Pluralism Initiative.

In recognition of the political sensitivities that could be stirred by visible U.S. support, project implementation was assumed by the Consulate General in Jerusalem and U.S. Embassy in Tel Aviv in consultation with the A.I.D. Representative. During the first year, grants were limited to $25,000 per activity. Grantees were identified by the Consulate General and the American Embassy. The following organizations received grant support in FY 91:

- I.P.C.R.I., The Israeli-Palestinian Center for Research and Information;
- The Truman Institute;
- The Givat Haviva Institute; and
- The Worker's Hotline.

It is expected that funding for the program will increase to approximately $500,000 in FY 92. Currently, A.I.D., in consultation with the State Department and the United States Information Agency, is considering more formalized procedures to select grantees and administrate the program.

ANNEX D

EXCERPTS FROM THE SENATE AND HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES BILLS THAT MANDATE THE PALESTINIAN-ISRAELI COOPERATION PROGRAM

102D CONGRESS *1st Session* | HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES | REPORT 102-108

FOREIGN OPERATIONS, EXPORT FINANCING, AND RELATED PROGRAMS APPROPRIATIONS BILL, 1992

JUNE 12, 1991.—Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union and ordered to be printed

Mr. OBEY, from the Committee on Appropriations, submitted the following

REPORT

[To accompany H.R. 2621]

The Committee on Appropriations submits the following report in explanation of the accompanying bill making appropriations for foreign operations, export financing, and related programs for the fiscal year ending September 30, 1992, and for other purposes.

INDEX TO BILL AND REPORT

43-977

FY92

BRINGING ISRAELIS AND PALESTINIANS TOGETHER

In order to promote better understanding and mutual respect between Israelis and Palestinians living in the West Bank and Gaza, the United States should finance a broad range of educational, cultural and humanitarian activities that bring Palestinians and Israelis together. Such activities should be carried out by Israeli and/or Palestinian private voluntary organizations. The Committee encourages AID to spend not less than $2,000,000 on such activities in fiscal year 1992, and requires AID to notify the Committee of all PVOs receiving funds from this program. AID shall use regular programming notifications to provide this information to the Committee.

BALTIC STATES AND SOVIETS

The Committee has provided not less than $15,000,000; half for assistance to the Baltic States and half for assistance to eligible recipients in the Soviet Union in support of democratic reforms or market oriented reforms.

The Committee is prepared to support carefully targeted technical assistance to the Soviet Union where it will have a direct and significant impact on the promotion of the rule of law, human rights, democratic reform and transition to a market economy subject to a request by the administration. One such program entails sending U.S. judges to the Soviet Union's judicial training institute to educate Soviet judges from the federal and republic levels on the independence of the judiciary and the proper role of judges in a democratic society.

The Committee considers a limited initial request for technical assistance, including the aforementioned assistance for the Soviet judiciary, appropriate in light of the current pace of reform in the Soviet Union in order to assist the Soviets in achieving economic and democratic goals which all Americans support.

INTERNATIONAL FUND FOR IRELAND

Fiscal year 1991 level	$20,000,000
Fiscal year 1992 request	0
Committee recommendation	20,000,000

The Committee recommends $20,000,000 for the International Fund for Ireland in support of the Anglo-Irish Accord. The Committee has also included prior year provisions making funds available as needed and until expended.

In 1985 Great Britian and Ireland signed the Anglo-Irish Agreement as a step toward improving political, economic and social conditions in Northern Ireland. Article 10 of the Agreement authorized the creation of an international fund through which the two governments could cooperate to promote economic and social development in both parts of Ireland, and to secure international support for this task. The International Fund for Ireland was created in December of 1986 to promote development and reconciliation in Northern Ireland and the bordering counties of Ireland by stimulating private enterprise and investment, supplementing public programs, and encouraging voluntary efforts. Special attention was

to be focused on
the consequence
The Anglo-Iris
the Fund be dis
ty of opportunit
out regard to re
a pledge, using
money be used
for every projec
ment will requi
The Committ
ative for provid
the Fund's resc
In addition, the
and community
er towns and vi
velopment of m
ages in Belfast,
tion.
The Fund ha
has pl[illegible]d in i
"U.S. [illegible]port
long-term prob
communal stri
have been aff
search for pea
Fund is a pote
er."
The Commit
Ireland aimed
of the particip
together in a
reach a succes

Fiscal year 1991 le
Fiscal year 1992 r
Committee recom

The Commi
eral Assistanc
The Committ
available for
ment assistar
President see
certain other
tary organiza
obligation for
The Comm
Administratic
Philippines t
the state of p

Calendar No. 957

101ST CONGRESS
2d Session

SENATE

REPORT
101-519

FOREIGN OPERATIONS, EXPORT FINANCING, AND RELATED PROGRAMS APPROPRIATION BILL, 1991

OCTOBER 10 (legislative day, OCTOBER 2), 1990.—Ordered to be printed

Mr. LEAHY, from the Committee on Appropriations, submitted the following

REPORT

[To accompany H.R. 5114]

The Committee on Appropriations to which was referred the bill (H.R. 5114), making appropriations for Foreign Assistance and related programs for the fiscal year ending September 30, 1991, and for other purposes, reports the same to the Senate with various amendments and presents herewith an explanation of the contents of the bill.

Amounts in new budget authority

Fiscal year 1990 appropriations	$15,523,490,180
Fiscal year 1991 budget estimate	15,518,826,537
Amount of bill as passed by House	15,637,093,273
Amount of bill as reported to Senate	15,533,040,543
Bill as recommended to Senate compared to:	
1990 appropriations	−3,327,637
Budget estimate	+14,214,006
House reported bill	−104,052,730

34-910 ==

50

FY 91

priation without compensation of the United States-owned San Salvador Power & Light Co. [CAESS]. Despite report language, statement of managers' language, and numerous letters to the Secretary of State, the Salvadoran Government has yet to comply with the dictates of its own supreme court and come to fair and equitable terms with CAESS.

Last year, direct legislative action was taken and some progress was made. Bill langauge was included mandating that the President report on the extent to which the Salvadoran Government has made demonstrable progress in resolving this case prior to the disbursement of ESF funds. A negotiator has now been appointed, and discussions have begun.

Yet, this troublesome case remains unsolved. Accordingly, this year similar langauge requiring that the President report continued demonstrable progress is included.

This Committee believes that it is long past time for the Salvadoran Government to resolve this case. It should either come to terms with CAESS directly or refer the matter to compulsory international arbitration.

DEMOCRATIC INITIATIVES

The Committee has received a report from the Agency for International Development detailing how $15,000,000 is expended in support of its Worldwide Democratic Initiatives Program. The Committee commends AID for this program aimed at strengthening democratic institutions. The Committee encourages AID to make available under its Democratic Initiatives Program not less than $350,000 to private voluntary organizations in Israel and the West Bank and Gaza for educational, cultural, and humanitarian purposes involving both Israeli and Palestinian private citizens. The goal of such efforts should be to strengthen contact and mutual understanding between the Israeli and Palestinian peoples.

TIED AID CREDITS

The Committee recommends language which limits the financing of tied aid credits to $50,000,000 unless the President determines that it is in the national interest to exceed this limit and so notifies the Committees on Appropriations.

ZAIRE

The Committee provides language prohibiting economic support funds to Zaire.

AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS

To provide essential flexibility in the use of ESF funds, the Committee again recommends language in the bill providing that the funds will remain available for 2 years.

51

LEGISTLATION FY92

SEC. 803. PROMOTING PLURALISM AND DEMOCRACY.

Of the amounts allocated by the Agency for International Development for democratic initiatives and human rights, up to $10,000,000 for fiscal year 1992 and up to $10,000,000 for fiscal year 1993 shall be used to support the growth of indigenous nongovernmental organizations that contribute to increased pluralism, democracy, and respect for human rights and the rule of law in the Middle East.

SEC. 804. WEST BANK AND GAZA PROGRAM.

Of the amounts made available for economic support assistance, not less than $16,000,000 for fiscal year 1992 and not less than $16,000,000 for fiscal year 1993 shall be available only for the West Bank and Gaza program.

SEC. 805. MIDDLE EAST COOPERATIVE SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL PROJECTS.

Of the amounts made available for economic support assistance, not less than $7,000,000 for fiscal year 1992 and not less than $7,000,000 for fiscal year 1993 shall be available only for regional cooperative projects in the Middle East in accordance with section 202(c) of the International Security and Development Cooperative Act of 1985.

SEC. 806. COOPERATIVE DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS.

(a) COOPERATIVE DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM.—Of

52

FY92

not less than $5,000,000 for fiscal year 1992 and not less than $5,000,000 for fiscal year 1993 shall be used to finance projects among the United States, Israel, and developing countries under the Cooperative Development Program.

(b) COOPERATIVE DEVELOPMENT RESEARCH.—Of the amounts made available for development assistance, not less than $2,500,000 for fiscal year 1992 and not less than $2,500,000 for fiscal year 1993 shall be used to finance cooperative development research projects among the United States, Israel, and developing countries.

SEC. 807. ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN PEOPLE-TO-PEOPLE ACTIVITIES.

It is the sense of the Congress that, in order to promote better understanding and mutual respect between the Israeli and Palestinian peoples, the United States should support educational, cultural, and humanitarian activities that bring Israelis together with Palestinians living in the West Bank and Gaza.

SEC. 808. POLICY TOWARD AND ASSISTANCE FOR LEBANON.

(a) UNITED STATES POLICY.—It is the sense of the Congress that United States policy toward Lebanon should—

ANNEX E

ACTION MEMORANDUM FROM A.I.D. FOR 1991 PALESTINIAN-ISRAELI COOPERATION PROGRAM FOR 1991

Agency for International Development
Washington, D.C. 20523

AUG - 9 '90

ACTION MEMORANDUM FOR THE DEPUTY ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR (NE), BUREAU FOR EUROPE AND THE NEAR EAST

FROM: NE/PD, Satish P. Shah

SUBJECT: Palestinian-Israeli Cooperation Program (398-0378)

ACTION: To authorize a new $100,000 pilot project of grant assistance to Palestinian and Israeli organizations for the purpose of resolving mututal problems, promoting mutual understanding, and strengthening cooperation.

BACKGROUND: The concept of Palestinian-Israeli cooperation in resolving mutual problems is strongly supported by Congress. Earlier this year, A.I.D. and State/NEA were approached by several interest groups seeking AID support for joint activities. Furthermore, the Committee Report accompanying the Senate's FY 1991 Appropriation, inter alia, --

> "encourages A.I.D. to make available under the worldwide Democratic Initiatives Program not less than $350,000 to private voluntary organizations in Israel and the West Bank and Gaza for educational, cultural, and humanitarian purposes involving both Israeli and Palestinian citizens...to strengthen contact and mutual understanding."

Earlier correspondence from Representative Hamilton, Chairman of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, endorsed similar assistance AID-financed PVO assistance "...to bring Palestinian and Israeli citizens together and promote mutual understanding and strengthen contacts." A similar letter was received from Representative McHugh. A.I.D. responded that it would consult with State and field posts, and the subsequent consultations were encouraging. $100,000 of FY 91 DPI funding is now being made available for this project, separate from the West Bank/Gaza program.

ISSUES: Unpredictability: Such support is highly politically charged, and great care will have to be used in identifying joint programs appropriate for A.I.D. support. Visible A.I.D. support, even for deserving activities, can sometimes be counter-productive. Because of these sensitivities, responsibility for selection of grantees, signing of grants, and project implementation is being assumed by the Consulate General in Jerusalem and the U.S. Embassy in Tel Aviv. Delegations of authority for grant signing will be prepared, following your approval of this authorization.

Staffing: Both in selection and in subsequent project management and oversight, such assistance will be very labor intensive. This will entail experience and training in conflict management. If the program is extended on the basis of additional funding in FY 1992, contract support services will probably be required to assist ConGen and AmEmbassy for both Washington and Jerusalem, in order to assure technical review, monitoring, and coordination.

Start Small: Taking the above issues into account, it was agreed with State that any support should proceed cautiously and entail only modest financial assistance (maximum $25,000 per activity). This will provide the opportunity to assess political and programmatic impact of this pilot project.

DPI Requirements: For FY 1991, $100,000 is available from DPI. The objective of the DPI program is to promote "domestic political and legal development." It is important to note that DPI is funded under the DA account, which will require all grants to be concluded by 30 September 1991. Since the field posts have already identified several viable candidates for grants, there is a good chance that these funds can be fully obligated.

Another Funding Source for FY 92: Anticipating that the most likely activities are likely to be more political, educational and humanitarian than developmental, entailing application of different selection criteria, the proposed program should not be confused with or divert resources from the activities financed by A.I.D. under its West Bank and Gaza program (398-0159). The availability of initial funding ($100,000) from the FY 91 Democratic Pluralism Initiatives (DPI) program seems to offer the best opportunity for launching activities this fiscal year. However, in order to broaden the scope of activities beyond purely political and legal development, an alternative funding source for FY 1992 will have to be identified.

Very Tight 'Window' of Opportunity: The Congressional Notification cannot be sent to the Hill until the first week of September, leaving the final week of September for signing the grants. This will place a heavy burden on ConGen/Jerusalem AmEmbassy/Tel Aviv to identify and prepare grants well in advance of the final week of September.

DISCUSSION: ConGen/Jerusalem and AmEmbassy/Tel Aviv responded very positively to the proposed assistance program, and have already identified a number of activities which would qualify for DPI support. Examples include the following:

(1) $15,000-$25,000 to Hotline, enabling this joint Palestinian-Israeli-directed and staffed organization to open offices experimentally in Ramallah and Bethlehem and thereby assist Palestinians to report human rights violations;

(2) $15,000-$25,000 to the Israeli-Palestinian Center for Research and Information to finance round table and workshop meetings of water experts, evaluate water plans, collect data on current water conditions, and formulate options for resolving water use and other causes of conflict;

(3) $15,000-$25,000 to the Workers' Hotline for Protection of Workers' Rights, to expand computer facilities and legal staffing and thereby increase legal aid to Palestinian workers and to lobby the Knesset to change discriminatory laws; and

(4) $15,000-$25,000 to B'TSelem, to finance additional field work by its Israeli and Palestinian staff in investigating and reporting human rights abuses and promoting greater respect for such in both communities.

While ConGen and AmEmbassy will have delegated responsibility for these grants, they have indicated their intention to consult with the A.I.D. Representative.

JUSTIFICATION TO CONGRESS: A Congressional Notification is being prepared for clearance, but cannot go to the Hill until early September. Funds will not be obligated until the CN has expired without objection.

RECOMMENDATION: That, by signing below and the attached Authorization, you --

(a) approve the Palestinian Israeli Cooperation Program for a two-year period and initial funding of $100,000 (under the FY 1991 DA account); and

(b) authorize the joint Congen/Amembassy/AID Rep Committee to make individual grants up to but not exceeding $25,000.

Approved: _____

Disapproved: _____

Date: 8/9/91

Attachment: Project Authorization

Clearances:

NE/PD:PSMatheson [draft]
NE/MENA:VMolldrem [draft]
NE/MENA:WJMcKinney [draft]
NE/DR:JFlynn [per SPShah]
STATE/NEA/IAI:KStewart
NE/DP:LRogers
GC/ENE:HMorris
NE/DR:KLoken [draft]
NE/DR:WCole [draft]

[ENE/PD/MNE:BWickland:8.VII.91:doc.88d]

57

Attachment A

PROJECT AUTHORIZATION

Name of Country: Regional

Name of Project: Palestinian-Israeli Cooperation Program

Number of Project: 398-0378

1. Pursuant to Section 106 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, I hereby authorize the Palestinian Israeli Cooperation Program for the West Bank and Gaza, involving planned obligations of $100,000 in grant funds subject to the availability of funds in accordance with the A.I.D. OYB/allotment process, to help in financing foreign exchange and local currency costs for the project. The planned life of the program is through 30 September 1993.

2. This program will support activities of certain Palestinian and Israeli organizations operating in the West Bank and Gaza, concerned with political and legal development through resolving mutual problems, promoting mutual understanding, and strengthening cooperation between the Israeli and Palestinian Peoples.

3. The grant agreements which may be negotiated and executed by the officers to whom such authority is delegated in accordance with A.I.D. regulations and Delegations of Authority shall be subject to the following terms and major conditions, together with such other terms and conditions as A.I.D. may deem appropriate.

4. Source and Origin of Commodities and Nationality of Services:

Commodities financed by A.I.D. under the project shall have their source and origin in the West Bank and Gaza, Israel, or in the United States, except as A.I.D. may otherwise agree in writing. Except for ocean shipping, the suppliers of commodities or services shall have the West Bank and Gaza, Israel, or the United States as their place of nationality. Ocean shipping financed by A.I.D. under the project shall, except as A.I.D. may otherwise agree in writing, be financed only on flag vessels of the United States.

Charles F. Weden
Deputy Assistant Administrator (NE)
Bureau for Europe and the Near East

5/9/91
Date

Clearances:

NE/PD:SPShah		Date: 5/9/91
NE/DR:JFlynn		Date: 5/9/91
NE/DP:LRogers		Date: 5/8/91
NE/MENA:VMolldrem		Date: 5/8/91
GC/NE:HMorris		Date: 5/8/91

58

ANNEX F

FUNCTIONAL COOPERATION: AN APPLICATION OF TRACK TWO DIPLOMACY

ANNEX F

FUNCTIONAL COOPERATION: AN APPLICATION OF TRACK TWO DIPLOMACY

Joseph V. Montville

A new organization called Partners for Democratic Change recently came into being. Headquartered in San Francisco, it links conflict resolution centers at universities in Sofia, Bulgaria; Prague and Bratislava in Czecho-Slovakia; Budapest, Hungary; Warsaw, Poland; and Moscow, Russia. Its published goal is, "Building a Capacity for Democratic Innovation for Conflict and Change in Central Europe and the New Soviet Republics."

This network has undertaken projects to develop local conciliation commissions to promote cross-cultural communication and act as preventive and intervention mechanisms in ethnic conflict. It is drawing up courses to teach mediation and conflict resolution skills in schools. It is training local politicians and officials in ministries of labor, environment, education and social welfare skills in negotiation, collaborative planning and problem-solving. It is also creating trans-national facilitating and mediating teams for complex frontier issues related to security, labor relations and the environment.

Partners for Democratic Change is a dramatic example of what could be called a new culture of conflict resolution designed to use insights from psychology to manage human relationships in a way which solves problems and avoids violence. This new culture is manifesting itself in North, Central and South America, Africa, Asia and Europe. In the Middle East, the Grand Mufti of Egypt issued a call in December, 1991, for the establishment of a center to teach conflict resolution at Al-Azhar, the oldest Islamic university in the world.

When the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), which comprises the governments of North America, Europe and the successor republics of the Soviet Union, met in Valetta, Malta in 1991, it agreed in principle to set up a third-party mechanism. Its job would be to facilitate the settling of disputes among member states on such matters as trade, territory, the environment, minority and ethnic relations, and human rights. The CSCE has already established a conflict prevention center in Vienna.

All of these events mark the evolution of a new way of thinking about the conduct of inter- and intra-national relationships which reflects knowledge generated in the field of political psychology. One of the central themes in political psychology is the predictability of human individual and group behavior, both constructive and destructive, under conditions of political, social or environmental stress. Without mechanisms available to detect potential conflicts and offer facilitating or mediating services to groups whose disputes may lead to violence, the chances are that violence will occur. Political psychology has charted the stages of deterioration in political relations including the psychological distancing between groups or nations in conflict

which helps to rationalize attack and the killing of enemies up to and including the phenomenon of genocide.

Social science has also illuminated the processes by which psychological distancing can be reversed and genuine, attentive and eventually mutually respectful listening and dialogue can take place with the goal of jointly confronting and resolving the problems which generated the conflict in the first place. These processes are the substance of the partnership described above, and they supply the rationale for the growing network of conflict resolution activities in schools, communities, and research institutes in the U.S. and elsewhere. In Fairfax, Virginia, just outside of Washington, D.C., George Mason University has established an Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution which offer's the nation's first Ph.D. in conflict resolution.

Whether explicitly or not, the decision of the U.S. Congress to authorize a Palestinian-Israeli cooperation program with the objective of "fostering cooperation and mutual understanding," fits right into the evolving culture of conflict resolution. There are, of course, historical precedents for the legislation like the Middle East Regional Cooperation Program passed after the Camp David Agreements were signed. Indeed, the grandfather of the congressionally funded conflict resolution programs, named for former Senator William Fulbright, was passed after World War II.

TRACK TWO DIPLOMACY

Some ten years ago this writer, while still an active member of the Foreign Service of the United States, attempted to make the case for political/psychological analysis in an article entitled, "Foreign Policy According to Freud," published in **Foreign Policy** magazine (No. 45). The piece suggested that perhaps the most useful application of political psychology was in ethnic conflict analysis. Today, ethnic conflict dominates the international news in a way that was barely imaginable ten years ago. Even then the Israel-Palestinian conflict was considered, as it is today, a classic ethnic conflict.

"Freud . . ." also introduced the term "Track Two Diplomacy," to describe unofficial, informal interaction between members of adversary groups or nations that aims to develop strategies, influence public opinion, and organize human and material resources in ways that might help resolve the conflict. Track Two is distinct from official or Track One Diplomacy. The need for a second track was justified by the knowledge that official, public Track One leaders are often constrained by public opinion from open-minded exploration of compromise with an opponent. A show of reasonableness on the part of one leader could be misperceived as a sign of weakness by another, possibly inviting an aggressive response. The article went on:

> Political leaders are like tribal chiefs because they must assure their followers they will defend them against enemies — other tribes or nations — who want to conquer or destroy them. Even the most sophisticated leaders must adopt forceful postures at crucial moments to meet this most primitive but enduring need of people who fear for their survival (p. 155).

Offered as a contribution to the early literature in political conflict resolution, the Track Two Diplomacy concept was further elaborated in "The Arrow and the Olive Branch: A Case for Track Two Diplomacy," published by the Foreign Service Institute in 1987 and reprinted in Volkan, Julius and Montville, eds, *The Psychodynamics of International Relationships* (Lexington, 1990). Track Two was defined as having three distinct processes.

The first involved the convening of small, facilitated problem-solving workshops or seminars for leaders or representatives of groups or nations in conflict to: 1) develop workable personal relationships; 2) understand the dimensions of the conflict from the perspective of the adversary; and 3) eventually develop joint strategies for dealing with the conflict as a shared problem, the solution of which requires reciprocal and cooperative efforts.

The second process of track two diplomacy focused on public opinion. Its task was overtly psychological in that it aimed to reduce the sense of victimhood on both sides of the conflict and rehumanize the image of the adversary. If successful, this process would gradually bring about a climate of public opinion which would make it safer for political leaders to take risks in the direction of compromise and genuine resolution of the conflict.

Functional collaboration, including cooperative economic development, was presented as the third process in track two diplomacy. While perhaps not essential to achieving the psychological objectives of conflict resolution, such collaboration would offer adversaries the possibility of acquiring the "habit" of cooperation. It would also offer the prospect of economic growth, the improvement of individual well-being, and some stability and predictability for families who have sustained serious psychological and material losses in the conflict.

For the purposes of the Palestinian-Israeli Cooperation Program of the Agency for International Development, it would seem that the theoretical goals of the second and third processes of track two diplomacy — positive impact on public opinion, and functional collaboration — seem the most useful as policy guidelines. There follows for comparative purposes a brief review of historical and contemporary models of these two processes.

FRANCE AND GERMANY: A HISTORICAL SUCCESS

In the as yet unsurpassed, *France, Germany and the New Europe*, 1945-63 (Stanford, 1965), F. Roy Willis documents the extraordinary application of governmental and non-governmental initiatives designed at the end of World War II, to reduce the psychological distance between the two peoples and to rehumanize, especially, the German image in French

eyes. The goal of this multi-level activity was to create a climate in public opinion which would eventually allow the possibility of community between the two former enemies. No one would have dreamed at the time that this approach--or, in fact, conflict resolution strategy--would result in the European Community and anticipated unified market of 1992.

It is hard to imagine today that the Franco-German relationship could be an example for Israelis and Palestinians in 1992. But as Willis observed, "The German occupation of France created a hatred of Germans and Germany that left little room for forgiveness and reconciliation. The Germans were guilty not only of military aggrandizement and economic exploitation, but of sadistic savagery. The French were convinced . . . that the Germans needed not denazification but degermanization (p. 32)."

The French initiatives were carried out in their occupation zone in Germany. One of the earliest moves was revision of teaching materials in German schools to free the youth of the excesses of romantic nationalism promoted by certain writers of the nineteenth century and the Prussian army, which had been greatly intensified by the Nazis. At the university and higher institute level, the French recruited outstanding scholars and emphasized the critical importance of intellectual freedom. They also democratized higher education by founding popular universities.

There was a French policy to replace Nazi youth groups with religious and democratic political organizations and to bring German youth into contact with youth in other countries. Art exhibits conveyed good will of French teenagers to their German counterparts. German students gradually began to study in France and there was a noteworthy increase in French language training in the occupation zone.

The idea of European regional integration was growing rapidly in the post war years with France very much in the lead. The first major step in this direction — and perhaps the most famous example of functional collaboration between former enemies — was the announcement by French foreign minister Robert Shuman of the proposal to place all French and German coal and steel production under a common High Authority. Such pooling of key resources would create a common basis for industrial production and be a major move toward European federation. The coal and steel community would also literally take the war machine-making capacity out of the hands of the French and German governments, put it in the hands of a supra-statal authority, and make future war between the two states literally impossible.

The creative leadership exhibited by Shuman was reciprocated by the German chancellor, Konrad Adenauer, who was to be the principal German co-architect of the European community. But there were extremely important non-governmental initiatives from French and German individuals and organizations who were committed to the ideals of genuine community and functional integration of the two peoples.

Business organizations in both countries had been working since 1949 to ease fears about destructive competition and to expand trade relations. Employers' federations and chambers of

commerce promoted contacts to enhance trade. In 1951, a Franco-German Economic Committee was formed in Dusseldorf to bring together employers to consider ways to coordinate economic development in the two countries. Several other similar study groups came into being, and there was a steady increase in exchange visits of businessmen and workers.

Politicians and representatives of all sectors of French and German society did their part to support the idea of European integration. Christian Democrats, Socialists and Liberals formed federalist organizations. The German Europa-Union came to be synonymous with the European Movement, and it counted on its council the minister-president of Baden-Wurttemburg, and the mayors of Hamburg and Bremen. Senior industrialists, professors, and writers joined this company of leaders. By 1953 this non-governmental group was able to gather 1.7 million signatures on a petition calling for a European federal state. It was a significant example of a private initiative to influence public opinion and shape government policy.

In 1955, the German Council of the European Movement, in collaboration with the Centre d'Etudes de la Politique Etrangère in Paris, organized a series of Franco-German conferences characterized as a conversation between the representatives of the two peoples. In the parlance of track two diplomacy, these groups set out to discuss the moral and intellectual basis of the Franco-German relationship, and its relationship to the wider European scene. Such an activity is almost unknown to track one political leaders, although the best of them strongly — if quietly — support these efforts as clearly in the long-term interests of their countries. This was without doubt the position of leaders in the two governments. In fact, most of the leading politicians of the time, names like Heuss, Lubke, Adenauer, Erhard, Shuman, Pineau, Faure, Pleven, and Mitterand, joined with trade union leaders, industrialists, academics and journalists to map a European vision of the future.

Well before the luminaries got together, other citizen organizations had begun to create a general climate within which the psychological repair work from wartime losses could be done. One organization founded in Germany at the war's end, sent young French people to work in refugee camps and arranged for refugee children to spend vacations with French families. Another French group founded in 1948 formed a committee of journalists, writers, politicians, and teachers which organized public debates on Franco-German topics, prepared group visits to Germany and welcomed German groups visiting France. Significantly, the majority of the French committee membership had been German prisoners of war or resistance fighters. By reaching out to their former enemy, they were a strong moral force for reconciliation.

There is much more that could be reported on this early Franco-German model of track two activity which sought to create an environment in public opinion which would make track one negotiations easier for official leaders. But before concluding this section, it would be very useful to describe a final initiative which on the face of it might not seem so important. Yet it goes to the heart of the critical process of rehumanizing the image of both peoples in each others eyes after decades of violent confrontation and traumatic loss.

In August, 1948, French and German historians, with the encouragement of the French military government, began to meet in workshops which continued until 1953. Their task was to review history books of the two countries to identify specious scholarship which had been used by political movements to inculcate younger generations with traditional hatred. The scholars planned a series of historical brochures to clear away the nationalistic bias of older historical texts. They began with 1789 and continued to 1933, the French acknowledging the outright imperialism of post-revolutionary regimes and the Germans criticizing their books for exaggerating the French desire for revenge for the defeat of 1870.

This exercise was of fundamental importance to the Franco-German reconciliation process because true rapprochement requires each side in a conflict to acknowledge moral responsibility for past aggression and violations of basic human rights. Only with all the truth in the open can victims begin to believe that the authors of past violence or their successors are sincere in their commitments not repeat it.

There is a profound group and national process of transactional contrition and forgiveness necessary before a new, mutually trustful relationship between former enemies can be established. The historical commission is a vital first step in such a process. For example, the Soviet and Polish governments formed a similar commission to investigate the murder of the 15,000 Polish officers whose bodies were found in the Katyn Forest in Belarus during World War II. The Poles contended that they could not work with the Gorbachev regime until it acknowledged Stalin's responsibility for the killings. The joint commission proved the contention, Moscow accepted moral responsibility and apologized to the Polish people. Lest this contrition/forgiveness idea be considered aberrant, it could be noted that Lech Walesa went to the Israeli Knesset in May, 1991 acknowledged Polish guilt in the Holocaust and said, "Here in Israel, the land of your culture and revival, I ask for your forgiveness."

Another significant, A.I.D. funded track two activity is the Center for Strategic Studies on National Stability or Centro ESTNA in Guatemala City which is an education forum designed to bring together in seminars representatives of what it calls the five factors of real power in Guatemala: the economic; geographic, military, political and social. Centro ESTNA's mission statement says that today's democracy calls for guaranteeing non-discriminatory and pluralistic participation of all citizens in the exercise of power.

The Center's goal is to bring together for seminars and roundtables civilians and military personnel, workers, industrialists, teachers, civil servants, and other professionals. Through discussion and dialogue on expert lectures on democracy, security and Guatemala's economic future, the Center hopes to promote the idea of a responsible civic culture. There is an interesting twist to its technique in that participants commit to a course of several weeks and receive a stipend for attending but only *if* they attend and only in increments, so that they have a material incentive for completing the course. The model has been so successful in Guatemala that its Guatemalan director was called to El Salvador in early 1991 to work with Salvadoran collaborators and A.I.D. in San Salvador to build an identical Center there.

65

Examples of useful functional cooperation at the social, sectoral, professional, intellectual and political levels in various track two processes now taking place in Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza are included in this report. It is important to note that presently, most of these efforts do not concentrate on collaborative economic development but rather on the psychological and political impediments to cooperation. People who feel like victims are rarely willing to overlook their victimhood — and self-respect — in exchange for material incentives alone. A UNDP proposal for environmental cooperation on Cyprus authored jointly by Greek and Turkish Cypriots and engineers has languished because the basic political/psychological barriers to cooperation had not even been recognized.

Even two countries formally at peace, Egypt and Israel, have had to pursue quite modest projects funded by the U.S. Near East Regional Cooperation program almost surreptitiously and at the Egyptians' insistence because the quality of Israel's relations with the Palestinians and other Arab countries was so poor.

But one may justly conclude that politically sophisticated and feasible projects involving development cooperation may begin to succeed if there are people-to-people dialogues, educational campaigns, and other activities which emphasize the commitment of the representatives of groups in conflict to a future concept of community based on universally accepted human rights values and mutual respect. The French and the Germans have proved that it can be done.

ANNEX G

MULTI-TRACK DIPLOMACY: A SYSTEMS ANALYSIS

ANNEX G

MULTI-TRACK DIPLOMACY: A SYSTEMS ANALYSIS

MULTI-TRACK DIPLOMACY: A SYSTEMS ANALYSIS

This document presents an brief outline of the results and conclusions of a year-long study undertaken by Louise Diamond, Ph.D., Director of PeaceWorks, and Ambassador John McDonald, President of Iowa Peace Institute, on a grant from the U.S. Institute of Peace. the views expressed here are solely the authors', and in no way reflect the views of the U.S. Institute for Peace or the Iowa Peace Institute.

I. WHAT IS MULTI-TRACK DIPLOMACY?

A. Multi-Track Diplomacy is a descriptive model.

1. It grew out of decade of understanding that there was, in addition to a formal, government-to-government process for peacemaking and conflict resolution, a widespread potential and need for unofficial, non-governmental involvement.

2. It describes a living system, where the parts are seen in a circular, not linear relationship, implying that we are all in this together, working for the same goal: a world at peace.

3. Each part of the system plays a unique and needed role within the context of the whole.

4. Each part has its unique culture, methods, assumptions, language and issues; each has a positive and negative potential.

5. Choosing to see ourselves as a system gives us the opportunity to think differently about our place in the field and to open our minds to new ways of working and relating with one another.

B. Multi-Track Diplomacy is also a prescriptive model.

1. It prescribes a new way of acting within the system, such that we begin to share resources, learn from one another and build cooperative networks. We can also practice peacemaking within our own system, breaking down stereotypes and learning to work cross-culturally (since each track is a different world, a different culture).

2. It prescribes a way of acting in the world, in which our peacemaking efforts become more purposefully coordinated with one another. We can begin to

operate as a conscious network, supporting one another's activities rather than fragmenting our energies.

II. WHAT HAVE WE LEARNED FROM THIS STUDY?

A. About the world of the 21st century, the system's environment, we know that:

1. Our world is an interdependent whole.

2. The forces of unity and diversity are interpenetrating, and both must be honored.

3. We must think beyond the nation-state, power-centric model of world affairs and begin to acknowledge the sovereignty of identify.

4. The needs of identity groups for safety, recognition, a voice in world affairs and cultural and political integrity must be addressed to resolve and prevent conflicts.

5. The profound wounds created by decades, centuries of ignoring these needs must be healed.

6. We must learn to live together in new forms of relationships that are about partnership rather than domination.

7. Environmental sustainability is as much a challenge as nuclear weapons and warfare to the survival of humanity.

B. About the Multi-Tracking Diplomacy system as a whole we know that:

1. The system is on the frontier of learning and doing in meeting these challenges.

2. The system is service-oriented and value-driven, not profit-motivated.

3. The resources, information and human technologies for addressing these critical issues exist within the system, but no one part has it all.

4. The system has the ways but not the means to fulfill its purpose: it lacks access to the money needed to move quickly, flexibly and thoroughly.

5. That money exists within the system (in the business community, within the government coffers, in the foundation world), but it is tied up in other priorities and not available to the system.

6. The system also lacks a systems-vice; an understanding of itself as working together, as each part being necessary to the whole.

7. The whole field of peacemaking and conflict resolution is not normatively valued in the public or policy arenas.

C. About the nine tracks individually we know that:

1. Track One, Peacemaking through Diplomacy, is a rigidly structured world strongly isolated from the rest of the system. It is hard to access or influence policymakers, and their bureaucratic processes limit their view to creative approaches. Track One is the only part of the system that can make formal agreements with other nations.

2. Track Two, Peacemaking through Professional Conflict Resolution, is a growing field of behind-the-scenes, interactive, needs-based activities that can be very helpful in understanding root causes, overcoming psychological barriers, and identifying new approaches. It takes a joint problem-solving perspective. Track two is a rapidly evolving field now addressing its own needs for funding, ethical and professional standards, job development and institutionalization.

3. Track Three, Peacemaking through Commerce, is about the business community, which is often an invisible or even adversarial player. Business has untapped capacity for building strong international relations and providing the money needed by the rest of the system.

4. Track Four, Peacemaking through Personal Involvement, includes citizen exchanges, private voluntary organizations, NGOs and other private, non-profit initiatives. They have extensive, informed and empowered professional and grassroots networks all over the world, whose wisdom could be more fully acknowledge by the rest of the system.

5. Track Five, Peacemaking through Learning, refers to the vast interrelated fields of training, research and education. Pease and conflict resolution studies is a burgeoning field at every level of education, and the academic and think tank communities are increasingly major players in policy analysis and in Track Two projects. The field is dealing with growing pains around institutionalization needs and lack of job opportunities.

6. Track Six, Peacemaking through Advocacy, refers to activists, who have strong ties with the religious community but adversarial ties often with the diplomatic and business communities. The progressive, grassroots networks has its owns funding sources, its own kinds of people-oriented projects. It is an impassioned

part of the system whose views and resources are a valuable but undervalued part of the whole.

7. Track Seven, Peacemaking through Faith in Action, refers to the religious community, who have long played a major role as the peacemakers of the world. Virtually every major religion and many spiritual organizations are making important contributions to the theory and/or practice of peacemaking. This community is probably the most effectively networked around the world, and has access to information about the reality of peoples' lives that is needed in other parts of the system. It is also the heart energy for the whole, and offers wisdom about reconciliation and healing.

8. Track Eight, Peacemaking through Providing Resources, is the funding community. the end of the Cold War has put this field in transition, moving from addressing security and arms control issues to the concerns of the new world policy. There are parallel tracks of conventional major foundations and progressive smaller funders, who should be talking more with each other. The funders both respond to and set the agenda for the rest of the system. As it currently exists, its financial resources and ability to respond to immediate situations are far outstripped by the needs of the system.

9. Track Nine, Peacemaking through Communication, refers to the development and expression of public opinion through the media, and the technologies we have for being instantly in touch with one another anywhere on the planet. The critical issue here is about access to information; those who control the print, electronic and satellite technologies control the content of information the public receives and frame the issues for all of us.

III. WHAT CAN WE DO DIFFERENTLY AS A RESULT OF THIS STUDY?

A. We can change our view.

1. We can begin to see ourselves as part of the larger whole.

2. We can choose to become a conscious network of research, education, theory and action.

B. We can change our behavior within the system.

1. We can seek out those in other tracks, especially those we don't normally relate with, to provide mutual support, to exchange views and information and to work on joint projects.

2. We can see ourselves as a microcosm of the larger macrocosm and deal with the same identity-group needs and inter-group relations issues that affect the world "out there" as they manifest within our own system.

C. We can take a larger perspective.

1. We can work to legitimate peacemaking and conflict resolution generally, and to generate and liberate the resources that are needed for the system to do its work.

2. We can develop new institutions and collaborative projects that take a Multi-Track Diplomacy approach.

3. We can realize we are the hope of the world, and can take responsibility for putting our collective skills and wisdom to work in service of the highest good of the whole family or life on this planet.

ANNEX H

CONFLICT RESOLUTION: TRACK TWO DIPLOMACY

CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

The Center for the Study of Foreign Affairs, established in late 1982 as part f the Foreign Service Institute, aims to enrich traditional Foreign Service train- ng by keeping government officials in many agencies abreast of emerging oreign policy concepts. Its program of conferences, research, diplomatic ex- rcises and simulation, and publication combines new perspectives developed n the private sector with practical experience gained by foreign affairs ersonnel.

Conferences

In the last three years, the Center has organized more than 75 conferences nd workshops involving approximately 5,000 participants. These bring ogether academicians, businessmen, senior government officials, distinguished rivate citizens, and Center researchers for in-depth discussions of foreign olicy issues organized around a number of topics: International negotiation nd conflict resolution; Soviet studies; bilateral and regional issues; science, echnology and foreign affairs; economics; building democratic institutions; nd development of the Foreign Service.

The results of conferences are summarized in three-page leaflets in the "Fresh Look" series. These are available upon request.

Research

The Center facilitates research by foreign affairs personnel and provides a Washington base and an opportunity for participation in State Department activities for selected professors on sabbatical leave. The research undertaken by these individuals is coordinated by the Center and brought to the attention of government decision-makers.

Exercises and Simulations

A new Center activity is to develop an exercise and simulation program for he Department of State. Each year several exercises and simulations will be developed, using the reservoir of expertise within the Department of State and related agencies. These teaching instruments will provide a dynamic dimen- sion to the training of Foreign Service officers and, as analytic tools, will be able to help policymakers avoid diplomatic mistakes.

Publications

The Center publishes full-length studies of various foreign policy issues in its Study of Foreign Affairs series—many of these are based on conferences and workshops held at the Center. These are available for purchase through the Government Printing Office. (A list of current titles may be found on the back cover of this book.) In addition, several shorter studies are available in the Occasional Paper series. (Occasional papers published so far deal with the Iran-Iraq war, the history of the Foreign Service from 1776 to the Civil War, and "Crisis in Al Jazira," a foreign policy simulation.)

CENTER FOR
THE STUDY OF
FOREIGN AFFAIRS

CONFLICT RESOLUTION: TRACK TWO DIPLOMACY

Edited by
John W. McDonald, Jr. and
Diane B. Bendahmane

H-3

FOREIGN SERVICE INSTITUTE
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

When track one simply will not do,
We have to travel on track two,
But for results to be abiding
The tracks must meet upon some siding.

KENNETH BOULDING
AMSTERDAM, JANUARY 6, 1986

Library of Congress Number: 86-600-538

Department of State Publication
Foreign Service Institute
Center for the Study of Foreign Affairs
Released May 1987

Contents

Introduction

John W. McDonald, Jr.

TRACK one diplomacy is what I have been doing all of my career as a Foreign Service officer. It is government to government, formal, official interaction between instructed representatives of sovereign states. It can be either bilateral in nature, involving two governments, or multilateral in approach, involving many governments.

Track two, on the other hand, is non-governmental, informal, and unofficial. It is interaction between private citizens or groups of people within a country or from different countries who are outside the formal governmental power structure.

These people have as their objective the reduction or resolution of conflict, within a country or between countries, by lowering the anger or tension or fear that exists, through improved communication and a better understanding of each other's point of view. Track two diplomacy is not a substitute for track one, but rather is in support of or parallel to track one goals. In fact, a successful track two effort may well lead into track one, especially when specific agreements or treaties or other formal understandings are called for.

When I came to the Center for the Study of Foreign Affairs in 1983 after a long career in multilateral and bilateral negotiations, I realized that there was a large gap of knowledge and a lack of understanding between practitioners such as myself and those in the academic community who were writing on the subject of negotiation. In an effort to narrow this gap, we at the Center decided to sponsor a series of case studies on conflict management. From March to November 1984, four

---

Ambassador McDonald was Coordinator for Multilateral Affairs at the Center for the Study of Foreign Affairs until February 1987 when he retired. A lawyer and long time career diplomat, on his return from Geneva in 1978, where he served as Deputy Director General of the International Labor Organization, he carried out a number of assignments in the field of multilateral diplomacy and was given the personal rank of Ambassador on four different occasions by two different administrations.

symposia on international negotiations were held: the Panama Canal Treaty negotiations, the Falkland-Malvinas Island crisis, the Cyprus conflict, and the evolution of Zimbabwe's independence. Most of the speakers at these four sessions were the actual negotiators, the practitioners who were involved in these four cases.

We also established as part of our model a core group of ten to twelve people who had written about and taught negotiation. We asked them to be a part of the audience and then later to get together for half a day, as an academic group, to analyze and draw lessons from the symposia that we might apply in future negotiations. This material has been published by the Center in a volume entitled *Perspectives on Negotiation* (1986) and is available from the Government Printing Office.

In each of the last three of these case studies, I invited one speaker who had interacted in these particular crisis situations as a private citizen or track two diplomat. These speakers explained that often interventions outside of the normal track one channels could make a positive difference in the outcome of the conflict. In September 1984, I was asked to chair a panel on track two diplomacy at the National Conference on Peacekeeping and Conflict Resolution in St. Louis, Missouri. By that time I was convinced that it was time for diplomats such as myself to explore this particular approach. Thus, the Center organized a symposium on track two diplomacy on February 12, 1985. This book was produced in great part from presentations at that meeting.

The symposium speakers, whose abridged remarks appear in this volume, have had varied track two experience. Roland L. Warren and Landrum Bolling have been emissaries for the peacemaking efforts of private organizations, such as the American Friends Service Committee. Philip Stewart's participation has been as a member of the Dartmouth Conference, an ongoing bilateral group of private U.S. and Soviet citizens whose discussions are aimed at easing tensions and countering the often inflammatory nature of track one U.S.—U.S.S.R. relations. Journalist John Scali became a track two go-between for the U.S. government by pure accident during the 1962 Cuban missile crisis. Similarly Bryant Wedge functioned as a go-between and was able to get a dialogue started with Dominican Republic students and intellectuals after the American intervention, when a dialogue initiated by U.S. government officials would have been completely rejected. Joseph Montville and John Burton are involved, each in his own sphere, in attempts to develop track two procedures that can be used in the absence of fruitful track one efforts or as a prelude or backup to official negotiations. In the final chapter, Harold H. Saunders evaluates the role of unofficial dialogue between nations, pointing out its special relevance in a democracy where public opinion has a great effect on policymaking. Although Saunders did not participate in the symposium, his article, originally published in the

Kettering Review, is reprinted in this collection because it brings together many strands of the symposium's discussion.

No attempt has been made to be comprehensive; this is an exploration of track two and we are just scratching the surface. Many groups involved in track two activities are not represented here, nor are all types of track two interventions discussed. In fact the phrase "track two" is not widely known and is still being defined. Other phrases in current use are citizen diplomacy, people-to-people diplomacy, nonofficial or unofficial diplomacy, supplemental diplomacy, and public spirited diplomacy. The one thing these all have in common is that they are all nongovernmental. This small book is meant to be an introduction. So far no systematic study of track two has been done, but such an effort is certainly needed.

Negotiation and conflict management is only one of the subjects emphasized by the Center for the Study of Foreign Affairs in its program of research, symposia, and publication. The Center, the newest unit of the Foreign Service Institute, aims to combine the experience of practitioners and the perspectives of academicians and others from the private sector to gain new insights into vital foreign policy issues. Other subjects of emphasis are Soviet studies, building democratic institutions, economic issues, and science, technology and foreign affairs. Comments on this and all other Center publications are welcome.

The Dartmouth Conference: U.S.- U.S.S.R. Relations

Philip D. Stewart

Conceived by Norman Cousins, at President Eisenhower's request, the Dartmouth Conference is a determinedly unofficial group of Soviet and U.S. non-governmental, foreign policy specialists that has been meeting regularly for twenty-five years to discuss U.S.-Soviet relations. Participants change over the years but they all are highly knowledgeable in their fields and able to influence the policymaking process to some degree—though none plays an official government role. Philip D. Stewart has been the rapporteur for the Dartmouth Conferences for about a dozen years. He argues here that through straightforward, non-polemical discussions—often on subjects that could not be broached by officials from either country—this group has developed some ideas that have subsequently been fed back into official channels. In recent years, with the failure of detente, the Dartmouth Conference has provided one of the very few channels for communication between the United States and the Soviet Union.

FOR many years, particularly in the era of detente, potential funders, track one diplomats, and members of the public asked track two diplomats what we were actually doing. They did not see any real accomplishments. What good, they said, is good feeling? What good is conversation among Soviets and Americans? Since you don't talk with the policymakers, how can you possibly do any good? To these critics the key to evaluation often seems to be the extent to which track two is able to replace track one. However, that is an incorrect understanding of where track two fits in. Harold H. Saunders, former assistant secretary of state for Near Eastern and South Asian affairs, states it most accurately when he points out, in the last chapter of this volume, that nonofficial dialogue is useful because it can "alter perspectives and define alternatives which have been tested in discussion—ready for that moment in the policy process when change is required."

The Dartmouth process began in 1959 with President Dwight Eisenhower's comment to Norman Cousins that his experience in government had shown him that track one diplomacy was almost incapable

of communicating across the barriers to the Soviets. More important, Eisenhower argued, the questions of war and peace which this relationship poses are too important to leave to track one diplomacy alone. So Eisenhower asked Cousins whether it might be possible to create a citizen-to-citizen channel. Cousins, taking that as an order, went to Moscow and persisted for over eighteen months before the other side finally said, "Well, why not. Let's appease this man. Maybe there'll be some propaganda value out of it." And in 1960 the first meeting was held at Dartmouth College—hence the name of this activity. Meetings have been held regularly since then.

A Test of the Citizen-to-Citizen Concept

Each side selects its own delegation, but we have developed a tradition in which we each make strong representations to the other about whom we would like to see on the delegation. We discuss with each other how effective each side feels the various participants are.

Currently the leadership of the conference on the American side consists of David Mathews, the president of the Kettering Foundation, and Norman Cousins. I have served as coordinator of the American component of the process for more than ten years. There are also a number of work groups: regional conflict management headed by Harold Saunders, arms control chaired by Professor Paul Doty of Harvard University, and bilateral political relations, directed by Professor Seweryn Bialer of Columbia University. The leadership tries to select participants who have the substantive knowledge and ideas to contribute usefully. Of course, it is also important that participants have political credibility with the current administration. The selection process is very difficult because our groups consist of only four or five people. We need to constantly keep flexibility in those groups because only in that way can we maintain freshness of ideas and relevance. On the other hand there is a very great satisfaction that comes from such participation and a desire to continue. I have to keep reminding participants that none of us is tenured in this process.

The third meeting of the Dartmouth group was scheduled for the middle of October 1962 at Andover, Massachusetts. The participants arrived the very night that John F. Kennedy went on national television to announce the blockade of Cuba. This was the first and perhaps the most fundamental test of whether citizens have the right to talk to each other—citizens who are in a sense close to their government, citizens who on the Soviet side are responsible to their government for what they say and do even if they have slightly more latitude than officials. Both

---

Dr. Stewart is Professor of Political Science at Ohio State University, a position he has held since 1964. He is the author of the forthcoming

sides contacted their governments, and both governments said, "Talk. Keep in close touch with us. See what you can do to understand what is happening on the other side, what the intentions of the other side are." George Kennan described these as the most intense, the most difficult, but far and away the most rewarding discussions of his twenty-five years of official diplomacy, because what they proved was that once the humanity of the other side is established, it is possible to go beyond official positions. It is possible to think together about whether there are fundamental common interests on which we can and must act.

Exploring the Possibility of a U.S.– Soviet Trade Relationship

Beginning in the late 1960s, the idea of a renewed trade relationship was discussed in the Dartmouth meetings. These discussions helped pave the way for the 1972 agreements. Exchanges among scientists on our common interests in the global environment, in global research were set up and have made a modest contribution.

In the period from 1972 through 1975 Soviet economists and ministers participating in Dartmouth discussions were authorized to go far beyond anything done before in trying to find ways in which the efficiency of the Soviet economy might be fundamentally improved through collaborative efforts. They went so far as to try to find a way in which the Soviets could—without losing face—join the International Monetary Fund, and how American corporations could engage in joint undertakings with Soviet enterprises on Soviet territory for the exploitation of resources or the development of new products. The fundamental argument the Soviets made to us was that their economy would never become efficient until it was made to compete on the world market, and they were searching for ways to bring this about.

Unfortunately, that whole enterprise came to naught, destroyed by global inflation following the rise in Arab oil prices, which the Soviets strongly supported—in retrospect much to their own regret. It came tumbling down with the cooling of the detente era, and today the people who urged this effort are in much less important political positions. Apparently, however, serious discussions about these same questions have now been revived in the U.N. Parallel Studies Program, another vitally important avenue of unofficial diplomacy. As I look at the Soviet economy and converse with Soviet people on this issue, it is clear that the need is more pressing now than ever.

A Channel for Communication

In November 1983 one of the Dartmouth Conference's working groups called the Task Force on the Middle East held one of its regular sessions in Moscow in which we attempted to come to a better understanding of how each side saw its interests in the Middle East and what possible

The U.S. side wanted to find out the extent to which there is any serious interest on the Soviet side in moving toward peace rather than benefiting Soviet power from continuing conflict. An important side discussion at that meeting had to do with the presence of Soviet troops and air defenses in Syria. The Soviets made it very clear that they were speaking unofficially but responsibly when they argued that there is a thin red line that runs along the Syrian border, and if American planes or Israeli planes, which were indistinguishable, began to attack Soviet-manned air defense forces that could create a cycle that would lead irreversibly to direct Soviet-American conflict.

We reported this information to our government. *Newsweek* and the *Christian Science Monitor* later mentioned that our report had led the State Department seriously to rethink our policy in this area. This suggests another important function of such dialogue: it creates a credible channel through which signals as well as communication on issues of common interest can take place.

The "Visionary" Function

The Dartmouth Conference has a group on arms control. We met in Denver in May 1983, shortly after the report of the Presidential Commission on Strategic Forces was published. General Brent Scowcroft, who had headed up the commission, was one of our participants, and one of the important agenda items was the issue of strategic stability. That concept has come up again and again in our discussions. Most often the Soviet response is that our missiles and military activities are destabilizing and that theirs are stabilizing. Stability is in the eyes of the beholder. It is purely a political concept. However, our objective was to try to persuade them that there is more to strategic stability than that. We both have an interest in a future in which the reduction of incentives to use nuclear weapons could take place. The Scowcroft Commission Report provided a springboard for such discussion.

At the Denver meetings, the Soviets were primarily skeptical. The task force met again in December 1984, shortly before talks between Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko and Secretary of State George P. Shultz. Georgi A. Arbatov, the director of the Institute of U.S.A. and Canadian Studies, whom many people regard as simply a propagandist but whom I see as a complex person with multiple roles, including policy consultation and advice, reported that after that meeting he had talked about the concept of strategic stability with Soviet generals, Politburo officials, and a wide range of people, trying to understand whether or not this was merely a political concept. He said, "There is now a strong group, at least in the Soviet leadership, that regards this as a vital future issue, that we can discuss what a stable relationship would look like in the future and how do we get there." There followed a lengthy discus-

the various options were. We are not yet agreed on how to get there, but we have begun to create a framework for discussion that is useful. In other words, there is also a visionary function—looking ahead at issues that are not yet on the official agenda.

More broadly we talked about what might a negotiating framework look like if we were to return to negotiations. What should Shultz and Gromyko discuss in Geneva? This is a time when unofficial discussions can be most valuable. Once there is a policy, our flexibility is often reduced in the arms control area, even as "private citizens." But where there is uncertainty, there we can discuss fruitfully. So we had a frank discussion about what a framework would look like. In some small way those discussions helped to increase the confidence of both sides that it might be possible to come to a common understanding. We also gained a great deal of insight into why the space issue is important on the Soviet side.

The Effects of the International Climate

One vital limiting factor that is often overlooked is the international climate. Like track one diplomacy, track two is always constrained or facilitated by the international climate. When official relations are warmer, the Soviets are much more likely to have a green light to explore issues, and we can look at the pattern of issues that we have been able to address and can see direct effects. When times are tough discussions are more limited.

In the spring of 1984 the administration tried to open communication directly with Soviet Chairman Konstantin U. Chernenko on arms control. Indeed, when the Dartmouth arms control task force went to Moscow in March 1984 President Reagan sent a personal letter to Chernenko through Brent Scowcroft. One of our other participants tried to arrange an informal meeting with Chief of the General Staff, Marshall Nikolai Ogarkov, an old personal friend. The Soviets took those signs, given the climate, as an indication that we had become official representatives of the American government. In their view we had crossed the line from unofficial to official representatives and gone beyond what they could agree to do in Conference meetings. Their response was to refuse to recognize that a meeting had even taken place. Normally, name cards are placed around the table of the jointly recognized delegation. No such name cards this time. Normally Soviet and American flags sit on the table. No such flags. At the beginning of the meeting, one of the Soviet representatives said, "If you go back home and say that you had a meeting with the Soviets discussing INF (intermediate nuclear forces) and strategic arms control we will deny that such a meeting ever took place." To give political credibility to that argument, they brought in General Viktor P. Starodubov, chief Soviet delegate to the Standing Consultative Committee (which supervises compliance with the SAL

agreements), and a wide range of Soviet officials, a wider range of powerful people than had ever directly participated in our meetings.

The message was clear and unequivocal. If track two diplomacy tried to replace track one diplomacy, even at the behest of officials, perhaps particularly at their behest, it is not likely to be successful, particularly in difficult times. On the other hand, the examples suggest that when appropriately addressed in difficult times, track two can contribute effectively to track one.

Credibility

If the people involved in track two are going to help track one diplomacy, they have to be technically credible. In that respect, the Dartmouth process is *professional* policy dialogue, as distinguished from citizen-to-citizen discussions. Dartmouth participants are people whose professional competence and activity give them the kind of knowledge that will generate respect for their views on the other side. It is this that makes Harold H. Saunders and Evgeni M. Primakov able to work productively on policy issues. (Saunders is a former assistant secretary of state for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs; Primakov is deputy director of the Institute of World Economics and International Relations.)

Technical credibility leads to political credibility. Participants must be convinced that their counterparts have the confidence of their governments so that ideas generated will have some chance of making a lasting effect.

Mutual Commitments

To be effective, particularly in the Soviet-American context, the undertaking has to be a joint undertaking. A dialogue is not something one side can create and present to the other side. It has to serve the vital interests of both sides. This means that it will often take a long time to develop a sense of commitment. Dialogue, to be effective, must have relevance to contemporary issues, but also a broad sense of vision. The dilemma here is that when dialogue becomes too concerned with contemporary issues, it risks becoming irrelevant. It merely repeats what is going on in official negotiations, and that is not useful. To the extent it lacks vision, it is failing its greatest hope: to create a common set of ideas, to break down stereotypes, and to begin a mutual process of common thinking.

If the United States and the Soviet Union cannot work together to try to find solutions that will meet the vital interest of both sides and then to try to develop these as political possibilities, the relationship doesn't have a chance. I am encouraged to believe that as a result of twenty-five years of effort, as a result of the disillusionments of the past on both sides in spite of grand hopes, that we are now ready to think seriously together about our future.

American Friends Service Committee Mediation Efforts in Germany and Korea

Roland L. Warren

The American Friends Service Committee was founded in 1917, originally to handle the philanthropic activities of the Friends, at first focusing abroad on "services of love in wartime" for conscientious objectors. Since then the AFSC has carried out extensive relief and social service work especially for refugees of the many armed conflicts that have marked this century. In addition, in the last 25 to 30 years the AFSC has been trying to establish the conditions of peace through informal, off-the-record diplomatic conferences, student exchanges, and missions to trouble spots in times of tension. Because of the backlog of good will created by its service activities, the AFSC has been quite successful in its quiet diplomacy. In his discussion of his AFSC activities in Korea and Germany, sociologist Roland L. Warren raises the question of the relationship between track two activities and formal diplomacy. The AFSC, as a general procedure, keeps the State Department informed about AFSC activities. However, AFSC officials, to establish their credibility as mediators, must be clearly perceived as independent private citizens and completely neutral.

TRACK two activities in Germany and Korea are part of the ongoing efforts of the American Friends Service Committee to work for and help sustain peace in various hostile situations. Such activities have been particularly extensive in Germany, in the India-Pakistan dispute, in the Nigerian civil war, and in the Arab-Israeli conflict, though other efforts of a less extensive nature could also be mentioned.*

My own experience was in Germany in the period immediately after the Berlin Wall was constructed, and just recently, on a two-week mission to North Korea.

During my two years as Quaker International Affairs representative to both parts of Germany, 1962-64, I sought to exercise whatever

*See C.H. Mike Yarrow, *Quaker Experience in International Conciliation* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1978).

mediating influence seemed possible between the two parts of Berlin, between East and West Germany, and between the two major power blocs. While no miracles were expected, it was hoped that I could establish viable contacts with officials and opinion leaders on both sides of the conflict and be a channel, however modest, through which less stereotyped, more rational, solution-oriented communication could take place.

Since I was the first such representative to Germany, I had to develop my own role and differentiate it from other possible roles such as missionary, journalist, pro-Communist American, and CIA agent. The Quaker sponsorship helped, since some of my conversation partners on both sides of the Wall had been fed as babies by the Quakers immediately after World War I, and since many of them knew of Quaker peace efforts and efforts toward disarmament. During the two-year period I held a total of 245 conversations, 153 with officials and 92 with non-officials. Ninety-five were in West Berlin, 71 in East Berlin and the German Democratic Republic, and 79 in the Federal Republic. It did seem possible to establish and maintain relatively high-level relationships on both sides and to have meaningful discussions about moves toward decreasing tension, which was extremely high, for at that time Berlin was the focal point of East-West hostility.

My experience in North Korea was much more limited, consisting of a two-week stay there with three others from the American Friends Service Committee. During that time we made extensive visits, traveled to a small number of cities other than Pyongyang, and held protracted talks with various government officials.

Trying to Understand Both Sides

In Germany, as I talked with officials in East and West Berlin and in Bonn, as well as with American officials and, to a lesser extent, Russians, I made it a practice never to say anything, or even agree to anything said by someone else, on one side of the conflict that I was not prepared to say and defend on the other side. This practice simplified some of my life—for example, I did not have to worry who might be tapping my telephone in that many-sided situation—but in some respects it presented great difficulties. It was hard enough to refrain from taking sides with the self-proclaimed "good guys" on either side of the Berlin Wall; but it was harder still to have to indicate my disagreement at times when my agreement might otherwise have been assumed.

Dr. Warren is Emeritus Professor of Community Theory at Brandeis University, and a National Board member of the American Friends Service Committee. Among his many books and articles are *The Community in America* (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 1978) and *Social Change and Human* [illegible] (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1977).

On the other hand, the practice proved to have certain advantages. First and foremost, it checked my own tendency to succumb to the heated invectives and one-sided interpretations of reality that were encountered on both sides. But also to my pleasant surprise, my own position with these officials seemed to gain greater weight through my constant effort to see both sides, and to explain to officials from each side how a particular action was perceived on the other. These officials were interested substantively in my interpretation of what their counterparts on the other side were thinking and saying—there were few if any people who had both credibility and access to these officials on both sides--but they were also interested in my own opinion.

I believe this interest was based not on my special expertise, although I endeavored to do my homework as thoroughly as possible, but rather on my credibility as a friend, rather than a hostile adversary. Naturally, they liked it better when this friend agreed with them—which occurred now and then on both sides—but they seemed to give special status to an opinion that did not arise from hostility. As someone has said—and it fits personal as well as international situations: "We seldom hear criticism except in anger."

What impressed me deeply was the utterly different conceptions of reality represented by the two sides. The same action would have quite different meanings when transferred into the opposite thought system by people on the opposing side. It gradually dawned on me that each side had a completely puncture-proof system for blaming all evil on the other, damning them if they did, and damning them if they didn't. The common reality base on which rational discussion might take place was extremely narrow. Gradually, I came to formulate my principal objective as attempting to broaden the base of reality definition between officials I talked with on both sides.

Lessons Learned in Germany

- There are so-called hawks and doves on both sides. Often, it helps to point out that actions taken on one side may have the effect of strengthening either the hawks or the doves on the other side.

- Although mediators think of themselves as simply helping to bring agreement, rather than activating their own substantive agenda, it nevertheless helps in situations like this to have in mind two or three specific steps that might be taken at no risk to either side, which would tend to reduce tensions and lead to the resolution of other, more important issues.

- Although my initial intent had been never to pass my own personal judgment on a particular action, I soon found that this was not plausible. First, I am not set up that way, psychologically. I tend to judge

almost everything. More important, these officials themselves were interested in judgments by a friendly observer, but not by a sort of opinionless ideological cipher.

• A related observation is that the officials I was in contact with seemed loath to assign a meaningful role to a nonjudgmental observer. The attempt to be "above the battle" in the sense of having no personal commitment to communicate apparently conveyed to them a lack of interest in this fateful conflict.

• I found it useful not to place premature strains on a relationship. One might be able to say some things after a relationship of credibility has been firmly established that would be highly inflammatory if said too early in the relationship.

• Finally, there is the matter of timing. Some possibilities for mutually satisfactory agreement may be at hand potentially, but the situation may have to "ripen," as it were, before they can be dealt with. Nevertheless, it should be added that the ripening time may be hastened as individual measures are taken that reduce the tension.

Conflict Neurosis

Looking back on the analysis that I made at the time of the German situation, I see many similarities with the Korean situation today.

First, at a certain level of analysis, there was a close correspondence between the positions of either side, both sides asserting that

> The other side is completely to blame for the failure of reunification and continues deliberately to thwart this purpose. We have a true picture; theirs is distorted to confuse the issue. We are willing to negotiate; they have either ignored overtures or set impossible terms. They have provoked incidents which risked war and war might have occurred were it not for the patience of our side.*

There was an additional charge, which, translated to the Korean situation asserts: The other side's system is oppressive.

The German situation at the time also appeared to be similar in many respects to what psychiatrists might call neurotic behavior. As I understand it, though I am no specialist, neurotic behavior seems to offer a solution to the individual's problem, although the solution is in fact only temporary, and fundamentally the problem itself is not solved but aggravated. It denies certain real aspects of the circumstances or

* Yarrow, p. 96. This is Yarrow's condensation of a passage from Roland L. Warren, "The Conflict Intersystem and the Change Agent," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, September 1964, p. 233.

claims that certain aspects are true when they are false. It is often characterized by so-called psychic mechanisms, including projection, fantasy, regression, and rationalization.

In Germany at the time, there appeared to be such a "conflict neurosis," with the following characteristics:

• An oversimplified picture of the real state of affairs. Every act of the opponent is explained by a few selected motives which are in keeping with this oversimplified picture.

• Many matters which are peripheral are forced into the area of conflict. A growing area of the public life of both parties is penetrated by these tensions.

• A process of moralization is pushed to the extreme so that everything the one side does is considered justifiable, while everything the other side does is deemed immoral.

• In these circumstances, a ready basis for reciprocal trust and a mutually acceptable solution becomes increasingly remote. Measures adopted to protect one side from the unreliability of the opponent encourage counter-measures which increase this alleged unreliability.

• Those who do not completely condemn the opponent are themselves the object of growing distrust and suspicion.

• It becomes increasingly difficult to consider new events in an objective and flexible way. The scope of perception of reality diminishes. If the true situation is more complex, more varied, one must ignore this complexity, this diversity. One's position gradually no longer fits the facts; the facts must be tailored to fit one's position.

I do not want to press this analogy too far, but I believe the similarity between mental illness and this conflict syndrome is both interesting and instructive.*

Advantages of Track Two Diplomacy

On the basis of my reading about the Korean situation and my short but intense opportunity to experience in North Korea the tensions that exist between the two divided parts of that country, it seems to me that many of the characteristics of this conflict neurosis are present there. I draw from this conclusion the same inference I drew in the German situation: namely, if there is to be a peaceful and at least minimally satisfactory resolution of the vast differences between the two sides, then

* See Roland L. Warren, "Krankheit, Konflikt, and Gesellschaft," *Stimme*, September 15, 1963.

H-13

a prerequisite is the broadening of the scope of agreement in the two conceptions of reality, and a reduction in the exaggerated distortions which daily occur in official diatribes, in press releases, and, through the operation of the media, in the minds of the people themselves.

In this process, track two diplomacy becomes especially important. There are many differences between this and the normal procedures of diplomacy which operate in its favor. One subtle advantage is that the parties to it do not have the awful responsibility which governments must assume not to make public missteps officially. Such possible official missteps are particularly apparent where the issue of official recognition is or may become involved, but this is only one example. Thus, the complaint which some governmental officials at times make, that track two diplomats do not have to take into consideration all the policy restraints that official diplomats do, actually constitutes a strength, rather than a weakness, of many kinds of track two diplomacy. Further, small steps toward agreement are much easier to take in situations of less tension than in the usual official negotiations.

Under these circumstances, provided certain other prerequisites for effective track two diplomacy are met—such as the competence of those engaging in it—the parties involved are freer to engage in "best case analysis," rather than "worst case analysis," which is usual in official negotiations under conditions of high tension, as William D. Davidson and Joseph V. Montville have pointed out in their *Foreign Policy* article, "Foreign Policy According to Freud" (Winter 1981-82, No. 45).

Korea: Many Opportunities to Reduce Tensions

In our own two-week visit to North Korea we were allowed greater freedom of travel and access than has been the case in the few earlier visits made by Americans. We were deeply impressed by the almost unbelievable adulation of President Kim Il Sung, and by the wide-spread extolling of the "chuch'e" (national self-reliance) philosophy, North Korea's own addendum to Marxist-Leninism. The virtually complete control of information flow by the party and government was quite apparent. We recognized that under present conditions it is practically impossible for an ordinary North Korean to hear any other interpretation of the international situation or of world events or Korean problems than that which the party wishes to be made available. At the same time, we were favorably impressed, and said so, by what we considered to be sincere and largely successful efforts at overcoming poverty, reducing the gap between high and low incomes, subsidizing housing, and providing free health and educational services of high quality to all the people. We sensed the strong spirit of pan-Korean nationalism and its counterpart in the alleged independence from all foreign domination, including that of the Soviet Union and China, even though no secret is made of the firm allegiance to the Socialist bloc. We recognized some ambiguities in their assertions of willingness to negotiate on the one hand and certain specific policies and actions on the other that made the prospects dubious.

During our visit, we repeatedly expressed the understandable fea by South Korean Christians of what would be the fate of their churche under any type of confederation, and we conveyed that the assurance given did not seem persuasive to us. We also pointed out that if the goven ment was serious in its desire to reduce tensions, a readily accessib step involving no threat to their security would be a lessening of t highly inflammatory anti-Seoul and anti-American propaganda in the mass media. We also took the opportunity repeatedly to point out t unacceptable aspects of the proposal for a confederal republic propos by President Kim Il Sung in his Sixth Party Congress address in 19

We came away with a strong sense that there were many opportunit for small steps to reduce hardships and to reduce tensions that co be taken by both sides, and that become more feasible as tensions r ease. Obviously, there is a reciprocal process here, whereby steps reduce tensions in turn create a more favorable climate for further ste We are convinced of the desirability of cultural interchange and of formal discussions of the important divisive political issues as well serves the interests of neither the United States nor South Korea humanity in general to attempt to keep the North Koreans bottled in their part of the peninsula and thus to contribute further to the o sided, vitriolic perceptions of South Korea and the United States wh such isolation breeds.

A realist must recognize the understandable apprehension on part of many South Koreans that any such moves toward liberaliza of contacts simply involve playing into the hands of the "enemy," strengthening its position internationally. This fear is probably e gerated, itself a result of the conflict neurosis prevailing on the penin Nevertheless, it must be taken into account in planning or enacting t two diplomacy. At its best, track two diplomacy does not oppose policy of any government, but rather seeks to take steps toward pre ing the ground for political solutions while at the same time hono the understandable commitment of each government to its own sect

Pressure for Change

Years after the Berlin Wall was built, the official West German tion was one of apprehension that any steps toward cultural exch or political discussions, even by nonofficial organizations, would r ly result in strengthening the hand of the East German governme regard to recognition and would thereby contribute to its legitimacy. moves constituted, in the minds of many, a betrayal of the German pe

But often in such situations, positions become frozen, and with the thinking that supports them. Years later, after the German d

was to a certain extent accomplished, largely through the Ostpolitik of Foreign Minister and then Chancellor Willy Brandt, Heinrich Albertz, his deputy mayor at the time I was there in Berlin, said:

> The years of 1961-64 were times of great tension and fear. Incidents at the Wall were happening all the time. Students and others in West Berlin were inflamed. To advocate contact and exchange with the builders of the Wall was equivalent to high treason, and we were exactly in the position of such advocacy. The Quaker representatives provided moral support of immense value, since we stood alone, without the backing of the three Western allies, of the West Berlin citizens and of the Bonn government. Yet Willy Brandt, Egon Bahr and I knew it was necessary.*

By its very nature, track two diplomacy is likely to be out ahead of official governmental policy and the logic used to support it. Especially in tense international situations, such rigid policy and logic often result in a shutting off of creative possibilities for action that might improve the situation without jeopardizing the government's security.

Effective track two diplomacy must be based on a realistic assessment of national security considerations. Even so, it often constitutes a pressure toward change, and as such is sometimes looked upon with skepticism or hostility by governmental officials. It is highly desirable that it be conducted with the full knowledge of the governments concerned and to the extent possible, with their acquiescence, however unofficial this may be. When conducted responsibly, it can serve not only as a gadfly for change but as a means of helping make desirable change possible through helping to prepare the way for fruitful negotiations.

Mediating Intergroup Conflict in the Dominican Republic

Bryant Wedge

In some international conflicts official contacts are not possible because of the level of hostilities. That was the case in the Dominican Republic in 1965 after the U.S. intervention. On April 24 a group within the army had rebelled against the government in order to restore Juan Bosch, the president who had been deposed by a military junta in 1963. Air force and navy elements opposed the insurgents and Santo Domingo became the battleground of a civil war. On April 28, a contingent of U.S. Marines landed to protect U.S. interests and took up positions in the "international zone," which served as a buffer zone between the rebel- (constitutionalist-) occupied area and the area controlled by the junta loyalists. A cease fire was called but conditions on the ground remained unchanged: a stalemate resulted, with no communication between the opposing sides.

At this juncture the U.S. Department of State called on Bryant Wedge to try to re-establish communication and contact between the parties. Though his trip to the Dominican Republic was paid for by the U.S. Agency for International Development, Wedge was allowed to operate independently, eventually managing to win the confidence of both constitutionalists and loyalists. In this case study Wedge describes how he established a dialogue between the parties and brought them together on neutral ground to pursue their mutual interests.

DIPLOMATS have advocacy functions; they represent and negotiat for their sovereign states. While this enables a wide range of i terstate arrangements, it limits freedom of diplomats to act informall especially with non-recognized political entities, or to mediate impa tially when their own interests are involved. Track two diplomats ha no representative or advocacy functions; however, they may provi impartial mediation of disputes, even with non-recognized parties. T theory and practice of dispute management has developed rapidly domestic problem-solving over the last two decades; it has sometim been useful in international conflicts.

This presentation is a summary of the transactions between official and track two diplomacy in resolving disputes between a revolutionary youth movement and the Provisional Government of the Dominican Republic during a civic uprising in 1965-66. Ambassador W. Tapley Bennett, Jr., who was U.S. ambassador to the Dominican Republic at that time, asked me to convey his regrets that he could not be here for this discussion as the case represents an unusually successful instance of problem-solving collaboration between official and second track diplomacy.

On September 1, 1965, I received a telephone call from Joe DeCola, a State Department youth affairs official in the Dominican Republic. I gathered that he was asking me whether I would be willing to come to the Dominican Republic to establish contact with young Dominican revolutionaries in order to determine whether there was any way to open communication between them and the U.S. diplomatic mission in that country—possibly even to reduce the violence and killing that was taking place there. I accepted the invitation, provided that I should be able to act as a wholly independent consultant—and thus began a real-life experiment in track two intercession in violent intergroup conflict.

The Intercession Model

The intercession model for unofficial intervention in intergroup conflict involves mediating between the groups in conflict.* In carrying out mediative dialogue with members of groups in conflict, group sentiments can be explored in the groups' own terms without necessarily agreeing with those outlooks. Whenever the adversary groups are found to have some common or complementary interests that can be satisfied by communication between them, the task becomes one of facilitating the contact. The ultimate purpose is to help in establishing and institutionalizing some communication linkage between the groups: a link that does not penetrate and disturb the cultural identity of either. Once such a communication bridge is established, the flow of information across it tends to spread and infiltrate other segments of the societies.

Dr. Wedge is associated with the Center for Conflict Resolution at George Mason University. He taught psychiatry at the University of Chicago and Yale; public diplomacy at the Foreign Service Institute and the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy; and conflict management at George Mason. He was founder of the National Peace Academy Campaign and has been a frequent consultant on communication and negotiation projects of the Department of State.

* For background on the theory and practice of intergroup conflict intervention see: Bryant Wedge, "A Psychiatric Model for Intercession in Intergroup Conflict," *Journal of Applied Behavioral Science* 7 (1971): 733-761.

Direct contact and communication between groups in conflict i tiates some attitude change, enough, in many cases, to allow memb or leaders to envision the possibility of working together on comm problems. It becomes possible to assist in the process of jointly co sidering programs of cooperation. Once such a process has been est lished, negotiation at official levels becomes acceptable.

The complete model for intercession in intergroup conflict can expressed in five stages.

1. The intervenor (an individual or group) establishes contact with each of the parties through a process of dialogue as an interested outsider.
2. The interests of the parties are defined and possible mutual interests are tentatively identified.
3. Members of the conflicting groups are brought together on neutral ground to establish contact and communication.
4. Assistance is given in considering practical programs of cooperation between the groups.
5. The intervention is terminated when official negotiation is established.

If the mediator has been correct in identifying possible areas mutual interest between the groups, he can rely on these interests to asse themselves in the processes of contact. There is no manipulating of larg scale groups in conflict—at least not from the powerless position of a unofficial mediator—and representatives of each group must be a lowed to work out their areas of cooperation in their own way. In part cular, the participants from each side have to consider the timing an method of communicating their impressions to their respective group In short, for such interventions to succeed, it is necessary for participan representatives to maintain the highest credibility as loyal members their group of origin. Generally, they can persuade their group to sup port a program of limited cooperation with the adversary only whe they are convinced that such cooperation is in the self-interest of th group.

There are many possible patterns for bringing participants fro adversary groups together, and not all of the technical variations hav been explored. But I am certain that the success of mediation depend on a careful, step-by-step accommodation of technique to the flow o events and to the distinctive qualities of the groups. It is for this reaso that the intercession model is centered on process rather than on tech niques and that emphasis is placed on dialogue as a means of guidin the mediator. After reviewing the background and formation of the group in this conflict, I shall describe the intervention in terms of the stage of the model.

e Model Applied

Background—Formation of the Conflict: The Young Revolu-narles. On April 24, 1965, a group of young military officers in the minican Republic attempted a coup d'etat against a government which y suspected of intending to perpetuate itself in office by imposing itary-oligarchic rule. They were opposed by senior officers in con- of the regular military forces. When the regular forces attempted suppress the uprising by force, massive violence erupted in the capital y of Santo Domingo as large numbers of citizens, especially youths, lied to support the "revolution." An armed and angry mob was organ- d in the city and the armed forces were brought to a stop; at least 0 persons were killed in four days and the country verged on a massive vil war. At this point the United States intervened and troops were erposed between the warring parties, but hostilities continued for some ne.

These events mobilized and crystallized a number of groups, a long em a "Revolutionary Dominican Youth Movement" and a deeply con- erned and thoroughly challenged U.S. diplomatic mission.

The group self-identified as the Revolutionary Youth Movement was ought into being by the April uprising. While a number of conspiratorial roups, especially Communist and Castro-Communist groups, had arisen en before the assassination of the dictator Rafael Trujillo in 1961, and hile there were various loose political groups in the schools and univer- ities, none of these had gained any broad support; nor were any of them ble to lead or control the movement that was mobilized by the upris- ng. Instead, thousands of young Dominicans, infected by democratic nd reformist ideals, deeply frustrated in their aspirations by the chaos nto which the society had fallen after the downfall of the dictator, and especially disgusted by the maneuverings for power and advantage of a privileged oligarchy in league with a corrupt military, had flocked to he center of Santo Domingo in response to the call of the young military rebels.* By the time they had been attacked by the regular military and had themselves become armed and organized in the defense of the city, they were fully mobilized as a group. Among them were virtually all of the rising young leaders of the nation.

The political culture of the young revolutionary group was entirely new to the Dominican Republic. There were no dominant leaders and no structure of authority; rather a powerful consensus process developed among them. Every succeeding event was discussed widely until an interpretation and a position was agreed on—sometimes in hours, sometimes over several weeks—after which the decisions reached became

* The formation of revolutionary youth movements is described in Bryant Wedge's "The Case Study of Student Political Violence: Brazil, 1964, and Dominican Republic, 1965," *World Politics* XVI (January 1969): 183-206.

a permanent part of the group's belief system, and deviation led to isolation of the deviant. Their primary concern was negative, to prevent the dominance of the old military-oligarchic alliance in Dominican life. Beyond that, they subscribed to reform of the social structure, constitutionalism, and the idea of progress through work. As a secondary issue, they were critical of the United States military intervention which many of them thought had prevented the victory of their revolutionary forces and which they saw as an intervention on the side of the old-style regime.

With respect to the U.S. mission, the young revolutionaries were unremittingly hostile. They felt that the mission had recommended the intervention in order to crush the revolution, and they vastly resented the imputation of a communist character to the revolution in official statements, especially by the President of the United States—although they were ready to proclaim that there were a number of communists among them and that they accepted communist leadership for practical purposes of organizing their military defense. They asserted that they would never follow this leadership politically and would control their own communists. The attitude was not helped by a press critical of the United States, which they followed carefully. Toward the United States as a nation, they were more friendly; they believed that assistance from the United States would be absolutely necessary for their reform programs to succeed. They were frustrated by their inability to communicate with the United States and yet distrusted the embassy and would not approach it.

For its part, the U.S. diplomatic mission had, as a group, suffered what can be characterized as a traumatic experience. At the time of the uprising, the mission had numbered something fewer than 50 officials headed by the ambassador and organized on standard bureaucratic lines with offices for public affairs, international development assistance, cultural relations, political analysis, military attaches, labor affairs, intelligence functions, and the like. This group of men had striven exceedingly hard to encourage the stabilization, democratization, and development of Dominican society, which was just emerging from a radical dictatorship, when they were, in the words of Ambassador John Bartlow Martin, "overtaken by events." The uprising surprised the embassy as it did all Dominicans, including the participants. Long-established friendships with Dominican people were broken, the bloodshed in the streets was appalling, and the embassy came under sniper fire. Worst of all, from the embassy's viewpoint, all of their reliable intelligence reports indicated that many foreign-trained communists were actively involved in the uprising.

The decision to intervene in a Latin American country with combat-ready troops for the first time in nearly forty years brought a storm of protest from almost every Latin American country and from some outside their hemisphere, while significant sectors of the American press

:ere strenuously critical. The President of the United States had taken he decision, but the embassy was certainly involved and, of course, orced to defend its recommendations. The shooting went on; troops oured in until they numbered 28,000; the President constantly sought nformation, advice, and justification; high-level diplomatic missions rom the United States and the Organization of American States descended on the embassy; the press corps made demands—and all the time con-:usion reigned in Dominican politics, with a whole series of claimants :o leadership rising and disappearing from public view. The members of the mission worked literally day and night and established a beleaguered group solidarity into which newly arriving members were rapidly recruited.

It was only when truce lines were established and the violence diminished that it became evident to concerned members of the U.S. mission that most of the potential young leaders of the country, especially those from the universities, were somehow associated with the uprising. It was not at all clear how they were organized or who their leaders were, although they supported the rebellious young officers and certainly had a number of communist personalities among them and vast quantities of communist literature available to them. With this knowledge and in the absence of any direct contact or discussion, the mission was naturally wary, especially as such public statements as newsmen brought from the scene included vigorous condemnation of U.S. policy in general and of the embassy in particular. However, the significance of these young leaders to the future of the country was obvious, and the mission became concerned as to how to establish contact with them to explore the possibilities for offering encouragement and cooperation in building democratic institutions within the Dominican framework.

It was at this point, some four months after the uprising, that I became involved as a mediator.

Establishing Contact. Before going to Santo Domingo, I negotiated the terms of consultation with the sponsors. I would act as an independent consultant, neither representing the U.S. government nor subject to official control, while the mission was entitled to disavow any responsibility for my work or findings. I would not, it was understood, identify any of my informants among either the revolutionaries or the U.S. government.

I decided to establish dialogue with Dominican youth before engaging with the embassy since I wished to avoid any partisan preconception that might interfere with perception. By chance, I arrived in Santo Domingo on September 25, a few minutes after deposed President Juan Bosch had landed after his return from exile. It was a day of great tension in the Constitutionalist Zone. I established myself in a local hotel near the demarcation line—in itself a statement of nonofficial identity—and entered the zone dressed as an American scholar. As I walked among the tense crowds for several hours, I approached no one nor did anyone approach me. I observed the grimness, the tension, the determination. Guns were everywhere, in the hands of patrols of young men who carried them proudly and professionally. Deadly seriousness was the order of the day.

I was, of course, profoundly interested in attitudes toward me as a conspicuous American, the only one in the zone that day. It was apparent that I was observed—as was verified later. The extraordinarily accurate word-of-mouth communications system classified me as someone who would bear watching; but no look or gesture, friendly or hostile, was directed toward me then. This was a community that would not engage in radical stereotyping but would wait for evidence; these were serious and dignified people.

After six hours, I felt that I had got enough of a "feeling" for the community and knowledge of its styles of communication to initiate contact with some of its members. Since it was evident that any approach on my part would not be welcomed and also clear that the organization of the groupings was very diffuse with no clear channels of access, I could not risk singling out any particular persons. I decided to invite an approach to me and did so by joining a crowd in raising my arm in the clenched fist "salute of the oppressed" at some high point in the speech which former President Bosch was making from a balcony. Within minutes, three young men approached me and asked, "Who are you?" When I answered, the dialogue was started, and I was soon being instructed in the organization and articles of faith of the revolutionary movement and sent or introduced to a wide range of participants. "What is your purpose here?" "How long are you going to stay?" I explained that I was a professor interested in the political psychology of revolution and that I had come to study their revolution and planned to stay for three weeks. They supplied me with the Spanish words to describe this role and, during our exchange, sharpened the definition, which was helped by my calling card identifying me as the Director of the Institute for the Study of National Behavior—"*conducta nacional*," as this became translated. But the real test followed very quickly with a vigorous criticism of the U.S. intervention. I said that I would try to understand their point of view but that I might not agree with it. This led them to extensive elaborations of their complaints and of their understanding of and participation in the revolution. They then took me into their counsel as they criticized the speech that Bosch was making, supporting some points and disagreeing with others. Clearly, this was a thinking audience, not blindly accepting any leadership, and even reexamining their own ideas. Indeed, they soon asked my opinion of their theories, and I responded with absolute frankness.

Before we ended this episode, my informants had described their own involvements in the uprising and insisted that they, and Dominican youth generally, were dedicated to the democratic reform of their society. They would deal with issues as they arose in practical terms and would accept no ideologic or personalistic leadership. They would examine the ideas of communism as any other ideology, but, frankly, Dominican communists were unsympathetic. They recommended that I become acquainted with the 14th of June Movement, a Castro-Communist organization that was sometimes practically helpful, as when it supplied the know-how to organize the armed defense of the revolution. And they recommended that I observe an attempt to reopen the Autonomous University of Santo Domingo under revolutionary auspices, which was to take place in two days. "We can transform our society," they said, "only if we have the knowledge and technical skills, and we can acquire those only in the university."

During the next three weeks, all of the observations of these first "dialogue partners" were borne out. Most important, of course, was the discovery that there was a genuine group or movement with which some thousands of young Dominicans identified themselves and that it was possible for the mediator to enter into serious dialogue with its members. I recorded 33 interviews-in-depth with individuals and 18 extended exchanges with groups that included 248 participants. These exchanges always involved a certain amount of testing me and my views; the question really was whether I could recognize the personal and social concerns and aspirations of their group. But, mainly, both my dialogue partners and I became concerned to define what they meant by "revolution" and how they could proceed toward their goals. There were subvarieties of dialogue, including friendly debate with groups and vigorous dialectic argument with young communists, but for the most part we became jointly engaged in diagnosing the social-political realities of the nation. I refused to criticize or defend the U.S. intervention.

One particular problem was that of political language. Youth who had been mobilized into political consciousness by the uprising generally lacked the concepts and words to discuss their purposes. They seized on the most generally available formulation, which happened to be a Marxist pamphlet, Leo Huberman's *Principles of Socialism* (a widely distributed propaganda pamphlet of unidentified origin). From this they learned to speak in terms of the "necessity for transformation of the political, social, and economic bases of national life." While a few communists among them may have meant to achieve this through class warfare and revolution in the Marxian sense, the great majority saw the issue as one of reform of existing institutions to provide broader social justice. Certainly democratic aims concealed in Marxist language might make for nervousness on the part of the U.S. mission until one could get at the intentions behind the jargon.

A second problem was my own credibility. In the circumstances of conspiracy and announced intelligence activities of the U.S. government, it was not surprising that many of my interviewees suspected that I was an intelligence agent. When we were well acquainted, they would tell me of this suspicion. My answer was that I was a thoroughly independent scholar, but there was no way I could possibly prove that I was not from the Central Intelligence Agency. But, what if I were? Did they not insist that they wanted the United States to understand them? This sort of exchange almost always ended with their extracting a promise from me to do my "level best"—whether I was such an agent or not—to convey my understanding of them to the U.S. government. In any case, I did not conceal the fact that I was having discussions with the U.S. embassy; and this, of course, stimulated comments on their views of the official U.S. mission which, as we shall shortly see, included a high component of hostile stereotyping.

The U.S. Diplomatic Mission. My dialogue with the mission took an entirely different form. The embassy had consented to my consultation and had been informed of my arrival. My role was well defined, although novel and a little unsettling to the officials. The approach was formal and respected bureaucratic structures. I called on the ambassador several days after my arrival, after I had established dialogue with the young Dominicans. I was briefed on the embassy's judgments concerning political events. Then I systematically introduced myself to every section of the embassy concerned in any way with youth affairs, some nine sections in all. In each case it was necessary to lay out my credentials as a consultant and to indicate my knowledge of and sympathy for the rigors of the Foreign Service.

The stimulus to carry out a dialogue with members of the mission was my acquaintance with the young revolutionaries; every member of the mission was keenly interested in what was developing in the Constitutionalist Zone or, as some of them called it, the Rebel Zone. (I find this regularly true; whenever a group is defined as a potential adversary, interest in that group is very high, especially in the absence of contact.) However, here too, considerable stereotyping had taken place, and I found that it damaged my credibility to challenge the stereotypes with my facts or opinions; so I neither criticized nor defended the revolutionaries. The purpose, I had to keep reminding myself, was to maintain our dialogue in order to understand viewpoints, not to challenge those views.

Now, while these discussions covered a great range of topics, I shall confine myself to summarizing the views that these two groups held of each other—a subject on which I gathered a vast amount of data since knowledge of my acquaintance with the "other" group naturally elicited opinions concerning it from each side. There was some variety of knowledge and viewpoint in each group; but there was also a model

or dominant image of the other, each group manifesting elements of the "hostile enemy image."

One startling aspect of these hostile images was the degree to which they were compounded of proved or believed facts. Each group had extremely accurate information about the other side: The embassy was entirely correct about the presence, activities, and purposes of Dominican communists—many of whom I came to know quite well; and the revolutionaries were correct when they reported Pentagon contingency plans that were closely held secrets (a fact which I was not cognizant of until some months later). But in each case the countervailing circumstances tended to be overlooked and there were powerful restraints on the extreme plans of each side. In any case, it was soon evident that my firsthand knowledge of each side carried very little weight with the other, any challenge to the stereotypes was rejected, and it was clear that if I were to urge contrary facts and interpretations concerning either group on the other I would soon lose all credibility.

Identifying Common Interests. What I have reported so far are the attitudes that were expressed during the first phases of dialogue with the two groups; each group asserted its belief that the other was unmitigatedly hostile to its purposes. As the dialogues progressed each group began to inquire whether I thought the other would be willing to assist in the realization of its purposes in limited and acceptable ways.

The U.S. mission was vitally interested in the reestablishment of political stability in the Dominican Republic and the resumption of democratic institution building. Quite obviously, this shaky young republic would need substantial American technical and economic assistance to achieve this end; just as obviously, the leadership, technical manpower, and intelligentsia to build democratic institutions would have to be drawn in large part from the generation of youth, especially those in the universities. The condition, of course, was a political one; the United States could hardly risk supporting institutions that were communist in their leadership and character. But the matter was still more complicated: if the United States did not recognize and help with the development of democratic reform, would this not throw Dominican youth into the arms of the communists who promised radical revolution?

The Revolutionary Youth Movement, for its part, while it sought radical reforms in Dominican society, also recognized that hard work and technical skill would be needed and, after five months of intense political education in the Constitutionalist Zone, were turning their thoughts to preparing for these tasks by returning to their studies. They knew, moreover, that their nation would need external assistance from the United States (the Cuban alternative was decidedly unattractive to most of them); but they were extremely wary of political conditions attached to such assistance. Whatever institutions were built, they wanted them to be Dominican institutions; whatever assistance they received

should be on Dominican terms. In particular, they applied this formula to their hopes for the great university of their country, the Autonomous University of Santo Domingo.

The Autonomous University had been the center of a great deal of controversy ever since the assassination of Trujillo; indeed, it had been shut down by strikes or government action much more than it had been functioning. It was closed again at the uprising, but faculty sympathetic to the revolution called a formal council and elected a reform-minded rector and administration. The council was boycotted by about one-third of the faculty, who promptly founded their own university on conservative lines. While there was considerable controversy about the legality of this action, the new administration announced that the University would be opened on September 27, and despite many provocations and difficulties, it was. The Dominican Provisional Government refused to pay salaries, but the faculty taught anyway. It was soon evident that the new university administration had the complete confidence of revolutionary youth and would take care to keep it. From extensive discussion with professors and administrators I realized that their interest in recognition and technical support in organizing the university had become sharply clarified since needs for reforms were urged.

Now, as I alternated between the two groups with knowledge of both, each group sharpened its statements of interest in cooperation and each emphasized the conditions. Those conditions, I should emphasize, were incompatible with mediation: the university administration could not afford to deal directly with the embassy for it would lose credibility with the young revolutionaries; and the embassy could not deal with a very controversial institution which might, after all, prove to be communist-controlled—as conservative Dominicans insisted it was. Instead, as my announced departure date approached and I emphasized that this would terminate our contact, probably forever, both the embassy and the revolutionary youth-university administration complex importuned me to advocate their interests. The embassy asked for concrete program recommendations that would open up some channels of communication with Dominican reformist youth and, of course, hoped that my analysis would support its own judgments. The youth-university group urged me to encourage the U.S. government to stop worrying about the dangers of communism and to support their reforms, especially in the university; but they always attached the provision that any assistance would have to be completely without political conditions. Although I explored the possibilities thoroughly, neither side would agree to direct contact with the other.

Bringing the Groups Together. The first copy of my report to the State Department was sent directly to the American ambassador in Santo Domingo, who generally endorsed its findings. In the report, I outlined the development of the new political culture among the Dominican Youth

Movement, emphasizing its complete lack of communication with the United States and its conditional interest in establishing contact. I recommended that maximum attention be given to establishing contact through sponsorship of a variety of programs which would bring nonpolitical American groups and individuals into contact with the young Dominicans; and I specified a range of program possibilities. I expressed the view that the Autonomous University would become a principal institutional expression of reformist aspirations.

After extensive discussions with responsible officials in the State Department, I was asked to outline specific recommendations for developing a program of assistance to University development in the Dominican Republic. I recommended a carefully phased approach with the first step being confined to the sponsorship of expert-to-expert and institution-to-institution contact. Out of this, I expected would grow a phase of joint program exploration with emphasis on the Dominican character of the institution, and from this process I anticipated the development of specific projects suitable for international development assistance.

Programs of Cooperation

Here the matter rested from the end of October 1965 until April of 1966. Meanwhile, a fragile peace had come to the Dominican Republic. American troops were officially withdrawn and preparations were under way for internationally supervised free elections. The Autonomous University continued to function, while the more conservative, private Universidad was planning to begin its classes. I had predicted that the movement of reformist youth would remain cohesive, that the Autonomous University would continue to operate under its reformist administration, and that the Provisional Government would eventually recognize the university administration. All of these predictions were based on direct acquaintance with the persons involved and were at variance with official estimates based on secondary sources. When, in fact, elections were held in the university at the end of March, the reformist administration was confirmed in office, and the Provisional Government resumed its recognition and financial support. I received another call from Washington asking whether I could put my recommendations concerning the university into effect.

Assisting the University. At my suggestion, a competent research organization was asked to administer this project. In May, the project director and I visited the Dominican Republic and offered to sponsor the visits of ten expert consultants to the two universities in Santo Domingo with the support of the U.S. Agency for International Development (AID). We were formally invited by both. The letter of invitation from the rector of the Autonomous University read, in part, "... so that the institution that you represent may lend assistance, technical or pertaining to other academic matters, in the efforts that our University is making—expanding the reorganization of the administration, the formulation of new plans of study and research, and the training of teaching personnel."

We offered to attempt to recruit any experts that the universities designated. The administration of the Autonomous University asked us to invite a professor of chemistry from Mexico, a professor of agronomy from Puerto Rico, and a professor of higher education from the United States; in addition, there were requests for experts in university administration, pharmacy, engineering, architecture and city planning, economics, and teacher training. Both the embassy and AID in Washington approved these plans and, to their very great credit, agreed to our invitation of consultants solely on grounds of technical expertise without any consideration of nationality or political status. One of the most inspiring aspects of this project was the readiness with which outstanding experts recommended by professional organizations accepted our invitation despite the dangers, uncertainties, and token compensation.

The consultant group was gathered together and thoroughly briefed on the background of the project, with a principal official from the Autonomous University in attendance. The invited experts were asked to act purely as technical consultants and to develop recommendations in joint consultation with their Dominican counterparts when the visits would commence in July. I accompanied the first consultant group of three experts, later joined by two others.

After the consultations began, there was an immediate crisis of confidence when newspaper articles appeared suggesting that the experts had come solely to assist the conservative Universidad. As the expert consultants were individually subjected to accusations of perfidy or puppetry to an alleged U.S. policy of supporting "reactionary" forces, each one asserted his personal neutrality toward Dominican political questions and all declared their sole interest in better education. This "testing" reached its height at a luncheon given by the administration of the Autonomous University for the visiting experts when the Mexican professor of chemistry spontaneously made an impassioned speech to the effect that he was certainly no puppet and that he believed the project to be nonpolitical in character. He pointed out that the life or death of the university depended on the quality of its work and that it needed every assistance it could get, regardless of the source, just so long as there were no political conditions attached. Each consultant declared his readiness to provide his best technical judgments regardless of any other concern.

After this crisis, the consultations soon settled into a steady and intensive process with the professional quality of the experts overriding any other considerations and rapidly gaining the appreciation of their Dominican counterparts. For example, the expert on higher education dealt with matters of organization and budget, of the purchasing, receiving, and distribution of equipment and supplies, of inventory control.

personnel policies, registration procedures and archives; in each of these areas some of his suggestions were put into immediate effect, and the same was true of each consultant's recommendations. Within a very few days a genuine joint working relationship had developed, and administration and students both recognized the complete seriousness of the project. A few provocations from splinter parties of the extreme right and extreme left failed to mobilize any support in the face of this working relationship. Soon, too, social relations began to develop, climaxed by a magnificent feast in the open at the university's experimental farm.

Direct Contact Established. In the course of this visit the consultants were invited to have lunch with Ambassador Bennett who was interested in the progress of the project.

What better opportunity for bringing members of the two groups together, since both groups were pleased to honor the consultant group? After some deliberation on all sides, the rector of the Autonomous University invited twenty leading members of the embassy, exclusive of the ambassador for protocol reasons, to join twenty leading members of the university administration and faculty, including members of the important Reform Commission, in honoring the visitors. To the guest list were added the Mexican ambassador, the Papal Nuncio and two bishops who, added to the five consultants on the scene and myself, were expected to act as neutral buffers. The rector of the conservative Universidad was also invited but did not think it wise to attend, although the rector of the Catholic University from the second most important city of the Dominican Republic, Santiago de los Caballeros, did make an appearance.

For over 15 months, the two groups had been watching each other from a distance without direct contact; I have outlined the images that were held by each side of the other. But there was also great interest and curiosity on each side. Did the others really have horns? Were the embassy officials really reactionary capitalists? Were the university officials really communist puppets?

As the guests arrived, they tended to pair off quickly or rather to form triangles with one of the buffer groups as the third member. Prototypical was the pairing of the rector (after he had welcomed his guests) with the public affairs officer of the embassy. These two senior members of their parties stood for two hours in earnest dialogue, an open space having been left around them which only I and the servant with drinks entered. Each partner in this dialogue reviewed his side's case with a good deal of ardor: the rector asserted that he could never accept U.S. intervention in Dominican affairs, and the public affairs officer argued just as heatedly that the interventions had probably saved Dominican society from tearing itself to pieces. Both agreed, however, that the task of rebuilding and modernizing the society was immense and that each side had a role to play in this great effort.

The same sort of event was taking place in every corner of the rector's spacious home. The next day I met with a sizable sample of the participants from each group and observed a very striking change in the attitudes which they held toward each other. There was no change whatsoever in basic beliefs, nor would any participant from either side admit that he had learned any new facts or changed his interpretation of the facts which he had. But the members of each group now recognized their counterparts as serious and dedicated men who were sincere in their commitments to the development of a better society no matter how much they might differ in social philosophy and method. In brief, the two groups kept their identities distinct and intact, and they remained at odds on many issues; but they now perceived the "other" group as consisting of "men that you can work with" in limited ways. Two days later, the American ambassador invited the rector for luncheon.

Five days after this first meeting, I reciprocated the rector's hospitality with a party at the house of an American friend. This time, however, we drew up a somewhat different guest list—persons from the university and the mission who were less concerned with policy and more involved in program administration. Except for the expert consultants, no neutral buffers were present. While some of the characteristics of the first meeting were repeated—a certain amount of assertion of one's own position and feeling out of the other—this process was much reduced in intensity. Rather, the principal focus of discussion was quite practical: By what administrative arrangements might some of the program recommendations which were emerging from the consultants' joint discussions with their counterparts be effected?

Developing Projects. Although substantial contact had been established between the leadership of the two groups and the possibilities of limited cooperation had been recognized, there were still large impediments to the actual development of projects. First, the projects had to be carefully specified. There was no possibility, for example, that the mission could just approve a "shopping list" of the needs of the university for external assistance. And each group had to consider the effects of any program on the overall development needs of the Dominican Republic. Moreover, neither leadership group had a free hand. The university administration had to walk carefully and justify any cooperation with U.S. persons or programs in order to maintain its good relations with the students—and there was a plenitude of student critics and provocateurs. The U.S. mission had to go through the difficult process of allocating technical assistance funds to this purpose in the face of overwhelming demands from other sectors of the society; then it had to justify such allocations to the Washington headquarters at AID. Throughout all of this, great care had to be taken to maintain even-handedness in terms of Dominican domestic institutions.

H-22

As the experts' visits continued through the summer, with each consultant spending about two weeks in working consultation, there was a consolidation of working relationships and further definition of conditions of possible future cooperation. The most important consensus that emerged from these joint considerations was that cooperation would be most useful if it were sharply limited and that initiation of proposals would rest entirely with the Dominican institution. The book *Higher Education in the Dominican Republic* *, which resulted from the consultants' reports, was distributed to the Dominican institutions, U.S. mission, and the State Department; recommendations focused on steps which could be taken with Dominican resources. However, it was agreed that continuing consultation would be extremely helpful in upgrading the university's offerings and that some visiting professors could fill in in special fields of study until Dominican students had gained competence in those subjects; moreover, it was thought that assistance could be given to promising students to obtain foreign training in needed fields. Areas of cooperation had been specified, and the mechanisms for assistance were established.

Termination

The mediation was substantially completed when cooperative mechanisms began to be worked out between the groups.

Almost the last episode of this experiment was stimulated by the appearance of an attack on the program of cooperation in a communist newspaper in Santo Domingo. I was accused of being "an agent of cultural penetration who, by clever psychological means, has weakened the true (i.e., communist) revolutionary spirit." I was also represented as having been a friend of President Kennedy, which was regrettably untrue—but which certainly increased my popularity—for President Kennedy was the popular ideal of most young Dominicans, including reformists. (I can only suppose that my communist friends were deliberately softening the accusation.) The article called on students to rise and reject this cooperation. By this time, however, the program was so well established and accepted that the rector was able to reply on a TV program. He categorically denied cultural penetration but pointed out that the university was happy to receive economic and scientific help—on terms that did not diminish the university's dignity—from such international programs as this had been. After that, the attacks died down. But this event, in November, certainly signaled the completion of the intercession. Its purposes had been accomplished, and further involvement might prove more embarrassing than helpful.

* H.P. David (Ed.), *Higher Education in the Dominican Republic: A Report of Academic Visits* (Washington, DC: American Institutes for Research, 1966).

More than eighteen years have passed since this experiment, during all of which time some level of contact and communication has been maintained between the U.S. mission and the universities of the Dominican Republic. The new reformist culture of young Dominicans has maintained its nationalist thrust and has often been extremely critical of the United States; some groups quite violently so. But at no time has there been a mass demand for a break in contact between the institutions, even when a second national election was conducted in a heated climate. The two groups have proceeded very carefully but have continued to cooperate. Regrettably, severe budgetary constraints have prevented the U.S. mission from responding to many reasonable requests for assistance, but the university officials have accepted the mission's limitations.

A New Science of Peace-Making

Third-party mediation of intergroup and international conflict is scarcely new in our world; it is an ancient function of professional diplomats and concerned private persons. Not new, either, is the idea that finding some way of getting representatives of conflicting groups together may somehow contribute to peaceful resolution of conflict. What is new is the theoretical basis of the approach and the development and testing of new procedures and techniques based on theoretical-empirical analysis. Such approaches permit the more precise specification of the problems and the development of systematic procedures—rules of the game—for their alleviation. We can begin to build a science of what I would unashamedly call peace-making.

The main hypothesis, that contact and communication between members of groups in conflict will favorably alter the images which they hold of each other, was strongly supported although in rather unexpected ways—the images changed less than the judgments about qualities of the other side that had not been central to the images. The second hypothesis, that programs of limited cooperation in the pursuit of partial common goals would result in even further movements toward less hostile images was also supported, but findings that such cooperation blurs the boundaries of small groups did not obtain for distinct national contexts.

The third major hypothesis, that the development of limited cooperation and favorable changes in the images between groups in circumstances of violent social conflict would diminish the degree of violence, was supported by the experiment. The alienation between these groups and the unfavorable opinions which they held of each other impeded the construction of civic order, and the reduction of alienation contributed to the return of domestic peace. Young Dominicans were less inclined to feel desperately isolated when some channels of communication were opened, and the U.S. mission was less anxious about the political dangers of the Reformist Youth Movement after contact was established.

Conclusion

The successful linking of responsible unofficial mediation with the functions of official diplomacy is still in its early stages; the Dominican Republic example is still the only full-scale officially-invited instance on record. Meanwhile there are literally dozens of protracted unresolved conflicts in this world which deserve such approaches and would provide a safe laboratory for their testing. I believe the development of this carefully defined function will rank as a major diplomatic invention and help us all toward more scientific problem-solving in international relationships.

Strengths and Weaknesses of Track Two: A Personal Account

Landrum Bolling

This volume makes the point repeatedly that track two diplomacy is not a substitute for official relationships among nations or contending groups. In this study, Landrum Bolling, a veteran "private" diplomat who has been involved in the Dartmouth Conferences and in American Friends Service Committee activities for years, points out that track two does not mean "amateur." While informal contacts between nations will inevitably take place, when private individuals set out actively to mediate or to search for solutions to tough international problems, they must know what they are doing. Dr. Bolling gives examples of the pitfalls of track two from his own experience, revealing at the same time the great potential of track two to try out new ideas that eventually can make an impact on official, track one, diplomatic positions.

H-24

BEFORE I make some observations about my own private diplomacy efforts, I would like to list in the most straightforward way possible the positive points and the hazards of track two diplomacy as I see it.

Strengths

Informal Contacts between Countries Are Pervasive and Diverse. One of the strengths of the informal approach is that informal contacts between people of one country and another are pervasive. Americans are involved in all kinds of activities all over the globe. They have many kinds of contacts with other societies and with various strata within those societies and with the government. To some extent private citizens are involved willy-nilly in international communications and in the interpretation of national policies, objectives, and values. This is just inevitable. They may do this badly; they may do it well. In some circumstances they may be ugly Americans, in others they may be looked upon as friends and allies or humanitarians willing and eager to help. But the very pervasiveness of informal contact points toward trying to make as much positive use of those international contacts as we can.

These informal contacts communicate extremely diverse citizen perspectives. Those perspectives are not always accurate or balanced or objective, but on occasion they may provide useful confirmation of official perspectives or they may even cause officials to rethink their own perspectives. It is therefore important for there to be a continuous flow of communication between the private citizens who have contacts abroad and our government. Of course, this does not have to be a CIA, cloak-and-dagger agent business. It is just a matter of common sense that private citizens will want to communicate their views to their government officials. Personally I have never had any inhibitions about talking to U.S. embassy officials or to people in the National Security Council or the State Department or the White House about what I as a private citizen have seen and heard and have come to believe.

Nonofficial Contacts Provide an Opportunity to Try Out New Ideas. Another strength of the informal approach is the very fact that it is nonofficial. Some track two activities border pretty closely on the official. Anybody who goes out with money from the Agency for International Development, even though he is a private citizen, has got some direct links to government, and John Scali, private citizen though he was and is, was nonetheless carrying out an official mission. But in many of track two activities, the individuals are really private citizens. Because their contacts are nonofficial, their communication can be relaxed and they can try out new ideas without commitment.

In dealing with troublesome problems it is often useful to find some mechanism by which new ideas can be tried out with minimal risk. Officialdom may be very inhibited about trying out ideas; even floating a balloon to an official of another country might seem to be sending more of a signal than is meant. But if an idea is tried out with an unofficial person, then if it does not fly or if there are repercussions, the government can always disavow it. The person engaged in this informal communication naturally has to understand that he may be disavowed in this way and not have his ego invested in a particular message or point of view. He has to be totally vulnerable and willing to say, "Yes, I made a fool of myself. That was wrong." Just let it go.

One of the possibilities of the informal approach is that it may offer a way of beginning a process of revising official policy with minimal risk and without loss of face. Where do you start to commence to begin

---

Dr. Bolling is President and Rector of the Ecumenical Institute in Jerusalem, an organization which promotes interreligious dialogue. In the area of private diplomacy, Bolling has been active in the Dartmouth Conference series and in the Arab-Israeli dispute. He led seminars on the media in the Third World which resulted in his book, *Reporters Under Fire: U.S. Media Coverage of the Conflicts in Lebanon and Central America* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1984).

the process of altering policy? Over and over again, official policy is based on wrong perceptions of what the situation is or of what the other side wants. This is inevitable because people facing each other with official responsibilities have great limitations upon them as to how far they can go. They have got to interpret the official policy as long as that is the official policy. Often they seem to have their feet planted in concrete. But the nonofficial person can perhaps, in some situations and with minimal risk, be useful in helping to begin a process of revising official thinking about what the policy should be.

Officials May Be Helped to Face Unpleasant Facts. Informal contacts can be a means of helping one side or the other or both to face awkward or unpleasant facts that are difficult to confront honestly in direct official negotiation. Of course official diplomats have a lot of blunt, direct confrontations, but sometimes the nonofficial person may be able to say in very direct and very simple ways that certain facts are facts that have got to be faced up to and that current policies do not take those realities into account. At some point the private communicator has to be able to say the emperor has no clothes.

I once went in to see Secretary of State Cyrus Vance and National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski about what the United States was doing to get Palestine Liberation Organization leader Yassar Arafat into a negotiating process. Our government was concentrating on trying to formulate words we could get Arafat to say which would make it possible for us to enter into discussions with him under the formula that Kissinger had written into the Israeli-Egyptian disengagement agreement. I came back from one of my meetings with Arafat and I told Secretary Vance, "Look, we are wasting our time trying to get him to say the magic words we want him to say. He is not going to say them. We may think he should, and any outside objective person may say 'Why can't he say these words?' but the fact is he is not going to say those words. If we're waiting for Arafat to say those words so that we can engage in a dialogue with the Palestinians, forget it. We've tried this long enough and it isn't going to work." This is just one example of how officials sometimes persist in a course of action that is pointless; somebody needs to say, "That is not going to fly."

Often informal communicators and unofficial diplomats are out ahead of the official track one diplomatic process. In our system where decision making is diffused, professionals in the State Department, the professionals and amateurs in the White House, and the often know-nothing amateurs in Congress all need to be educated in the realities of an existing situation, the failures of existing policies, or the necessity to adopt politically unpopular policies. It may be that outsiders can bring some measure of new thinking into those discussions.

Informal Diplomacy Creates the Atmosphere for Formal Negotiations. Those of us who have had an opportunity to be engaged in fairly high-level discussions about important international issues have a moral-social responsibility to share what we have learned with a broader public. We become resources for general public information and may be able to contribute to establishing the proper preconditions for negotiation. So often the problems are not at the negotiating table itself. The problems are trying to get people ready to negotiate.

The Soviet Union and a number of Arab states have been pushing for an international peace conference on the Middle East. We on the American side keep saying, "The conditions are not ripe for that international conference to take place." And that is true, but I do not see us doing very much to help create the conditions that will make it possible for a conference to be held. Obviously a conference on Middle East peace will never amount to anything unless there is very careful preparation for it. Informal communications may be, at certain stages, very important in setting the atmosphere for those negotiations.

Weaknesses

Amateurs Can Cause Trouble. First among the limitations of the informal approach is the danger of amateurism. Some people who are involved from time to time in track two activities may have very high professional credentials, but others are quite limited in their knowledge and background. They have to be very careful not to become well-known meddlers, arrogating to themselves a sense of importance or superior knowledge. They have to realize that their role is bound to be limited and their knowledge and understanding will not be as great as it ought to be.

Related to that is the fact that informal diplomats often have an imperfect understanding of official policies and foreign policy objectives per se. They may not really understand what their own government is doing and why.

Track Two Diplomats Play an Ambiguous Role and Can Be Manipulated. Another limitation is the sheer ambiguity of the role as seen by all interested parties. To what extent is a track two diplomat really carrying a serious message from one government to another? In the case of John Scali, it was perfectly clear. His role was approved by both sides. But often it is a much murkier situation than that. As a matter of fact, often sides prefer to leave it murky. They find it advantageous to deal with a person who can be disavowed by either side.

Informal diplomats are often vulnerable to manipulation, sometimes gross manipulation for disinformation purposes. I have been involved over a period of ten years in informal diplomacy and probably have been used at one time or another for disinformation purposes. I would not want to guarantee that I haven't.

Track Two Efforts Often Are Merely Stalling Maneuvers. Another problem to be concerned about is whether track two is a waste of time. Some track two diplomacy efforts are probably stalling maneuvers. The governments themselves ought to be getting on with the job, with direct negotiations. Instead of that, they are playing games through intermediaries who are not really going to contribute anything in the long run. This is a perversion of the process.

Track two activities may be a cop-out substitute for direct negotiations which are being blocked for political reasons. My own experience with the Palestinian problem over the years is a very good example. I have a feeling that the United States has handicapped itself unnecessarily ever since 1975 by binding itself to Henry Kissinger's letter in Annex 2 of the Second Disengagement Agreement, in which he said "the United States government will not negotiate with the PLO or recognize the PLO until it recognizes Israel and accepts U.N. Resolution 242."* This was a very reasonable sounding limitation. It is one the Israelis wanted, and Kissinger was willing to give them. The meaning of that annex is somewhat ambiguous, and one can interpret it in various ways, but the tendency has always been to interpret it in more restrictive rather than more liberal terms. As I went back and forth during the Carter years, I came increasingly to feel that I had no business in this role. It would be so much better if somebody from the U.S. government and somebody from the PLO would meet in Cyprus or Paris or wherever and sit down and talk directly.

Arafat said to me on several occasions, "I am prepared to meet with anybody from the U.S. government at any level, anywhere, anytime. You tell Washington the PLO is prepared to talk. Designate somebody officially from the U.S. government who's prepared to talk with me. I don't care what level he is. I don't care where we meet. I don't care when. Pick a time, I'll be there." We were never willing to do that and I think it has been a gross mistake.

---

* Resolution 242 affirms that the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East must be based on "termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and political independence of every State in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from acts of threat or acts of force." It also calls for withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the 1967 war and affirms the necessity of "guaranteeing freedom of navigation through international waterways in the area," for settling the refugee problem, and for "guaranteeing the territorial inviolability and political independence of every State in the area, through measures including the establishment of demilitarized zones."

Personal Observations

Dealing with the Palestinian Question. I got involved in the Palestinian problem a long time ago. I was a war correspondent during World War II, and on V.E. Day I got a strange kind of cable from my office in New York asking me to go immediately to Algiers and try to dig out a story of a riot that had taken place on V.E. Day in Constantine Province. Apparently there had been a lot of casualties that the French were covering up.

I went to Algiers, but I could not get anybody to talk to me, not even the Americans. They were covering up for the French. The French were covering the whole situation. I got over to Setif, the provincial center, and I gradually dug out the story, thanks partly to a British Wing Commander whom I met by chance. This man was chief of intelligence for the British in North Africa. He opened up his files, and I sat in his office and made notes of what the British had learned about this particular riot.

Then I went around to the Americans again, but this time I knew so much there was little point in their trying to hide from me. One official opened up the American intelligence files and I got the story. The French had killed something like 2,000 people in putting down a demonstration. A bunch of boy scouts had raised a flag in the middle of a victory parade on V.E. Day, saying, "Free Masali Haj" (he was the leader of Algerian nationalism).

When I got to the French and tried to find out why they did these things, they said, "You have got to stop demonstrations such as these once and for all. Force is the only language these people understand, and we had to put an end to this once and for all." Famous last words. In any case, in that incident I saw Arab nationalism in action and got fascinated by it and have watched it ever since.

I used to write, among other things, for the Jewish Telegraphic Agency and had a lot of contact in post-war Europe with the survivors of the camps. The pain, the tragedy, and the horror of that chapter in the history of Europe and the history of the Jewish people gave me deep sympathy for the effort to create the state of Israel. I was drawn to an interest in the Middle East in ways that I never anticipated out of my wartime experience.

After the Six-Day War, I was asked by the Quakers to get involved in a study of the problem. Early in 1968 I started shuttling between the Arab countries and Israel. On both sides I was given an extraordinarily warm reception for someone who came simply trying to listen and understand. Being able to listen is probably the most important single quality an informal diplomat should bring to his task.

After a few years, I began to write an in-house memorandum for the American Friends Service Committee which was sponsoring this activity. We started out with no intention to publish anything, but it eventually grew into a little book called *Search for Peace in the Middle East*, which earned me plenty of brickbats from both sides. That does not necessarily prove that I was right, but it provides some psychic comfort to know that the hard-liners on both sides think you are a terrible person.

Shuttling back and forth I learned that on both sides there was an enormous desire to move out of this confrontation and this endless cycle of wars. In March of 1968 a deputy minister in the Egyptian Foreign Office told me, "We Egyptians are ready for peace. We've had enough of this. How many more wars do we have to fight with the Israelis? Israel is here to stay. Let's get this over with." When I went to Israel and tried to communicate this, I met almost total, absolute, frozen disbelief. There was a long period during which I could not find a single Israeli who would even hear of the idea that there was anybody on the Arab side who wanted anything except to destroy the Jews wholesale, drive them into the sea. Over and over they said, "There's nobody over there to negotiate with. To make peace you have to have two parties ready to sit down and negotiate. There are no Arabs who will meet with us."

Eventually Egyptian President Anwar al Sadat decided the only way to answer that was to get on a plane and fly to Israel, and that gave an answer. There *was* somebody on the other side who was willing to negotiate.

But as a matter of fact there were tremendous numbers of Egyptian people and Egyptian officials who for years had been saying, "This is what we want." In that respect Sadat was like many politicians. "A successful politician," we like to say in America, "figures out which way the crowd is going and runs around and gets in front." To some extent this is what Sadat did, although to say that sounds like I am minimizing his accomplishment. To go to Israel took a lot of courage.

One of the most difficult challenges that we face as intermediaries is overcoming the unwillingness on both sides to believe that there are people ready to negotiate.

After 1975-76, I was involved in meetings with Yassar Arafat. I remember a conversation I had with him one night in Beirut in which I said to him, "Mr. Chairman, in the West people ask over and over again whether you really control the PLO or not. Who controls the PLO?" He said, "I control the PLO." I said, "Well, if you control the PLO, why do you put up with all the nonsense that goes on? Why do you allow the terrorist acts that you say you deplore?" Why do you say one thing one day and find yourself contradicted the next day by someone who appears at a press conference in Damascus as a spokesman for the PLO? If you run the PLO, why do you allow this to go on?" He said, "I do control the PLO. I control al-Fatah and al-Fatah controls the PLO." I said, "Still, tell me how you manage to live with these contradictions."

And he gave me a very slick kind of answer. He said, "Well, we're a democracy, that's why. The PLO and the Israeli Knesset are the only two democratic institutions in the whole Middle East." He said, "President Carter doesn't tell a dissident senator from Vermont that he can't make a speech in the Senate that may disagree with Carter. I can't tell all these different factions of the PLO that they can't disagree with me. That wouldn't be democracy." I said, "Well, I hear your argument but I don't think it really has much relevance to this issue. If you say that you are going to continue to allow people in your movement to contradict you and you say you're trying to move in a more positive way toward a peace settlement, all I can say to you is do not be surprised when you are not believed in the West. Your credibility is very questionable simply because you allow these things to happen." He shrugged his shoulders and in effect said, "Well, I can't argue with you."

Over the years the American government was trying very hard to find a way to get the Palestinians officially involved in the peace process, particularly around the time of Camp David. And of course Camp David was really predicated upon the hope that Palestinians would be engaged in the peace process in some way even though the PLO itself would not be accepted into that negotiating process. I had some very interesting discussions on this point after Camp David.

I went to see Arafat after Sadat's trip to Israel. I remember Arafat was very angry with Sadat, not so much for what Sadat had put forward as policy, but because Sadat had trapped him into attending the meeting of the Egyptian National Assembly at which Sadat told his own people he was going to go to Jerusalem. He said, "Sadat didn't tell me he was going to make that speech." (Actually I do not believe Sadat told anybody he was going to make that speech in quite that way.) "He got me there," Arafat went on, "and suddenly he was making a speech about going to Jerusalem, and the television cameras are following me sitting there listening and knowing that most of the Arab world will be aghast at this. It took me weeks to explain why I was there. I will never forgive Sadat for trapping me into being there."

Along the way, after the Camp David agreements were signed I tried to get from the Palestinians what they were willing to do regarding the provision in the accords for the involvement of the Palestinians and the Jordanians in trying to negotiate autonomy. I spent a couple of hours with Arafat in the middle of the night—he was a great night owl—as he endlessly denounced Camp David and autonomy. I went back to my hotel feeling very low in my mind and believing that it was another wasted effort that was not going to get anywhere.

Around 1:00 in the morning, I got a phone call from a PLO man who had been with us in the meeting. He said, "I need to talk to you further." To this day I do not know what really provoked this, but I think [illegible] had instructed him to come talk with me. The message that he gave me was essentially this: "We do not exclude the possibility of having some involvement in a process for autonomy, provided certain conditions are met. If we can be assured that the issues of the land and water rights will be dealt with and that there will be genuine autonomy for the local government, we will not oppose the elections of people who would sit in this legislative council." Now this was exactly the formula that was used when the Israelis allowed free elections to take place in the West Bank cities. Everybody wondered what the PLO's role would be. Would the PLO try to break up the elections? The policy the PLO followed was very shrewd. They sent out the word, "If we do not oppose a particular candidate, you will be free to vote for that person. If we denounce certain candidates, this is a signal that that person is someone that ought not to be voted in." As you know, those elections were a landslide victory for the PLO. Officially the PLO denounced the elections and said they should not take place, but in fact they were glad that the elections had taken place and the people they did not denounce were the people they wanted elected.

In a sense I got the signal they were thinking the same way about autonomy. "We will not denounce certain candidates. They can run and that will have our blessing." I do not know how far they were prepared to go at that time, but these are the kind of messages I got.

These stories show how difficult it was to find out what signals really meant. It could well be that this aide to Arafat who came to me in the early morning hours was trying to mislead me. I do not know.

Participating in the Dartmouth Conference. The Dartmouth Conference has dealt with a great many issues over the years—disarmament, trade, scientific cooperation, cultural exchange, etc., etc. One of the issues that we got into about ten years ago was the matter of regional conflict. What do the superpowers have to say to each other in areas of regional conflict where our support of our client states may get us into trouble directly? The Soviets and the American delegation agreed that the examination of regional conflict was a legitimate topic for our discussion. We set up a task force in which we talked essentially about the Middle East. I was the co-chairman with the Soviet specialist on the Middle East for about five years. Harold Saunders has now replaced me as the co-chairman for the American side. Discussions are still going on.

One of the first of these discussions took place in the St. Regis Hotel in New York in December 1975. On the American side were Ambassador Charles Yost, Norman Cousins, who is really the founding father of the Dartmouth Conference, and myself. On the Soviet side were Vitaly Zhurkin, who is the chief deputy to Arbatov at the Institute of U.S. Studies; another U.S. Institute man named Aleksander Kislov, who is an old Middle East hand, a former correspondent who knows the Arab world very well; and a third was a man named Igor Belyaev, one of the principal writers on Middle East affairs.

During one of our two-day discussions in December 1975 the six of us decided we would play a little "what if" game. What if our two governments asked us to draft a resolution for joint submission in the United Nations to flush out, amend, add to U.N. Resolution 242 so we might be able to move forward? We argued over every phrase and debated the meaning of word after word. It was an agonizing discussion, and yet in the end we came to a resolution which both sides thought we could sign. We agreed to submit it to our two governments.

I do not know what happened on the Soviet side. As far as I can tell nothing happened on the American side. We submitted it and I never heard a word from the State Department. Maybe no one even read it.

We met again in May 1976 in a most improbable place, a resort in the desert on the Arizona-Mexican border, a place called Rio Rica. There our working party looked over the draft resolution again, added to it a little bit and reaffirmed it.

In the summer of 1977 we met again in a seaside resort outside of Riga in Soviet Latvia, and there we had some very thorough discussions of the Middle East issue. I was asked to nominate people for our Dartmouth directors to consider to be invited to this meeting. Two of the people I picked that everybody agreed should come were Joseph Sisco, president of American University and former undersecretary of state, and Rita Hauser, a very long-time activist in the American Jewish Committee. With Sisco and Hauser, the meetings were bound to be lively. We discussed these issues back and forth and we came up with another statement which again basically reaffirmed what we had agreed upon in December 1975. When we finished it, Sisco said, "In the end the Russians will never buy this. Maybe we've been able to persuade some of these people sitting around the table in this little subgroup, but the Soviets will never accept this."

I was on the team that was to draft the communique for the whole conference the last night of the meeting. It looked as if Sisco was absolutely right. The word came down from the top that the communique should be about how we reaffirmed the importance of detente and the peaceful resolution of our differences and we had met in the spirit of frankness and understanding, and so on in a predictable fashion. I simply raised a terrible row about this. I said, "Look, did we spend these last three days in an utter waste of time? We tried to say something substantive that could be said to our governments. If all this exercise is just a charade, then I think the whole Dartmouth process should be called in question. Either you meant what you said and were prepared to stand up and say it to the plenary session and to the world, or we'll forget about the whole business." I really had a knock-down argument with the people on the Soviet side, but I saw very clearly that I had some allies on the Soviet side too.

One of these allies got a copy of *Pravda*, the official Soviet newspaper, that carried the text of a speech by Chairman Leonid Brezhnev in which he had said some things about the Middle East. There were some sentences in there that fit in exactly with our communique. So my ally suggested that we incorporate some of the chairman's words into the communique. By putting a little of this gloss on it, we actually got the communique through.

October 1, 1977, was a very extraordinary day. That was the day on which Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko and Secretary of State Cyrus Vance publicly issued a joint declaration about peace in the Middle East. I did not think much about any connection there. However, the Soviets say that our discussion at the Dartmouth Conference really was the beginning of this move. That joint statement lasted about five days. The Israelis were furious about it. Israeli Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan came charging over, the pro-Israeli lobby in New York was mobilized, and within five days the whole thing was scuttled.

What did the declaration say? Its language is very similar to what we worked out in those meetings in New York, Rio Rica, and Latvia. The two governments say they believe that it is in the interest of the people in the area as well as in the interest of strengthening peace and international security in general to achieve as soon as possible a just and lasting settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict. (Who can quarrel with that?) The settlement should be comprehensive. (That gets a little dubious. Comprehensive is a cold word that the Israelis dislike very much.) It should incorporate all parties concerned and all questions. It should deal with such key issues as withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the 1967 war. (That is almost exactly the wording of U.N. Resolution 242.) The declaration calls for resolution of the Palestinian question, including insuring the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people, terminating the state of war, and establishing normal peaceful relations; mutual recognition of the principle of sovereignty, territorial integrity, and political independence; security of the borders between Israel and the neighboring Arab states; establishment of a demilitarized zone; stationing of observers; and international guarantees. It then goes on to say that all of these things should be carried out within the framework of the Geneva Peace Conference to which both countries were committed and are still committed today.

That is a formula which one government after another in this country has said really must be the basis of peace. The declaration is the only joint U.S.-Soviet public affirmation of that formula. It probably had something to do with the private discussions that went on in the Dartmouth Conference, but nobody needs to claim credit for it since it was a complete failure. It may be, however, that, in the field of diplomacy, as is true in the hard sciences, the failures are as important

to learn from as successes. I hope there are some lessons that have been learned from our failures in our dealings with the Russians about the Middle East, and some lessons to be learned from my abortive efforts to be a communicator between the Palestinians and the U.S. government.

Track Two: An Alternative to Power Politics

John W. Burton

Track two diplomacy or conflict resolution is a new field of study and its proponents are attempting to elaborate a theoretical basis for their work and to clarify the necessary terms and concepts. John W. Burton defines track two diplomacy somewhat differently than other contributors to this volume. For him it is an approach that can be employed by either official or non-official diplomats. His view is close to that of Montville, who sees track two efforts as a necessary complement to official diplomacy. The track two approach starts by an analysis of the needs, values, and interests of the parties to a dispute because, says Burton, these cannot be suppressed even by major force. From the analysis, the parties can deduce options which meet their requirements for resolution of the conflict. In his comments, Burton also catalogues the weakness of track one diplomacy, and of power politics, to deal with the most urgent problems of our day.

TRADITIONAL thought in the study and practice of international relations has been labelled the "power politics" approach. It was an approach adopted by international lawyers and others who were disillusioned by the failure of the League of Nations in the 1930s. After the outbreak of World War II they regarded themselves as the "political realists," for they were declaring themselves against the idealistic world-government ideas that they had entertained previously, and in favor of the realities of power.

The Morgenthau Philosophy

The main exponent of this school of thought was Hans Morgenthau, one time international lawyer. He asserted the basic proposition that man is aggressive; therefore, the state is aggressive. His conclusion, which followed logically from this premise, was that power, implying military power, was required for the defense of the state and, therefore, the acquisition of superior power was the prime goal of states. It was the struggle for power, and the relative power of states, that explained events in the international system and from which events could be predicted

Morgenthau was writing from within the boundaries of an already powerful state and understandably had a special great power perspective, a perspective that is still widespread in this country. It was never made clear that only powerful states could have this power goal. He was also writing at a time at which there were only fifty or so states, mainly European—conceptually and institutionally a manageable number. He had inherited a traditional idea, which in fact was devoid of empirical evidence.

Morgenthau's book, *Politics Among Nations*, subtitled *The Struggle for Power and Peace*, was first published in 1948. Peace could, in this perspective, be defined *only* by reference to power balances, deterrent strategies, and threats sufficient to curb the aggressiveness inherent in states. However, being a lawyer and normative in his outlook, Morgenthau assumed that superior power acquired by a state in the struggle for power would be used for peaceful, altruistic purposes. Such an assumption, however, is inconsistent with the main premise that man and the state are by nature aggressive.

The Morgenthau philosophy has led to a disturbing mix of illogical reasoning and political expediency. It is now claimed that a new generation of arms is necessary even prior to arms control talks. The argument is that this is the way to bring talks about. Within a power-politics framework the real, but unstated, motive on both sides is to seek to use arms control talks as a means of further ascendency and power. The only final limits to arms escalation, within this logic, are costs and domestic repercussions leading either to war as a desperate final fling in the face of domestic unrest, or a reallocation of resources toward domestic requirements. Empirically and theoretically the former is the more likely. It is within this framework that we can explain the fall of Rome and of British imperialism and predict war between, and the decline of, states which engage in power expansions and imperialisms.

The more recent intellectual fall-back position, adopted both by so-called hard-liners and so-called liberals, has been to claim mutual deterrence rather than power balances, as a peace strategy. This has persisted despite proof in war after war that deterrence does not deter. However, the comfortable argument, which defies evidence, logic, and behavioral considerations, persists: while deterrence did not deter in the past because

---

John W. Burton, now a Visiting Professor at George Mason University, was Director of the Conflict Resolution Project at the Center for International Development, University of Maryland, from 1983 to 1985. Formerly in the Australian Foreign Service, he was Permanent Head from 1947-1951, and attended many international conferences, among them the U.N. Charter Conference, the Paris Peace Conference, and the Delhi Conference on Asian Relations. He has written widely on international conflict resolution and has been on the faculty of University College, London, and the University of Kent, Canterbury, England.

of miscalculations of relative power in a power-balance system, now with mutual overkill capacity there can be no such miscalculation.

What we are now experiencing in global politics casts doubts on the theories and practices of the peace-through-power school, the deterrence school, the arms control and disarmament school, and the world order normative idealists. Theory defeated them decades ago; now events are defeating them all. The argument between hawks and doves in respect to defense policy is an unreal argument. They are all in the same peace-through-power thought system. They are in the peace-through-superpower camp.

Rethinking Basic Hypotheses

When there is failure on this scale, failure of a theory and its applied consequences, it is time to rethink basic hypotheses. This is what second track diplomacy is all about. It is not just about unofficial methods within this allegedly political realistic world of power politics. Indeed second track diplomacy has its official applications. It is not about improved negotiating skills so that "leverage" and power can be employed more effectively. It is not about shrewd diplomacy and walks in the wood. It is about an altered set of hypotheses about world politics and human behavior.

The shift in thinking is easy to understand by those who are engaged at other social levels with problems of conflict and violence. At a meeting last year in St. Louis some 500 people gathered together to talk about handling conflict at all social levels, from matrimonial, to industrial, to communal, to international. They were engaged in problem solving in which there was an assumption of no-fault, an assumption that persons and groups act the way they do, not simply because they are aggressive, but for reasons that can be identified. When these reasons are identified, remedies can be found that take them into account and resolve relationship problems.

However, it is argued by traditionalists that the behavior of international actors is not like that, despite the fact that they based their original idea that the state is aggressive on the premise that man is aggressive. It is now argued that at lower social levels man is not aggressive, but is merely seeking certain human needs in difficult environmental circumstances. The state, however, the argument goes, is not a person and its behavior is potentially aggressive. However, even this statement has to be qualified now. It applies only to the states that lack "values," "culture," and "true notions of freedom." Others can be trusted with superior power because their value systems also are superior: they are not aggressive.

This is the thinking of first track diplomacy. It justifies adversary diplomacy, deterrence strategies, covert operations, interventions into the domestic political affairs of countries that have different social and

a power-bargaining framework tends to be dysfunctional, leading to increased conflict. Whether it be arms control or any other issue, there are good reasons for employing second track techniques in order to discover options that subsequently can be negotiated.

As I have already emphasized, second track diplomacy is not necessarily unofficial. That is not its characteristic feature. In this I am taking a view not wholly in accord with that of other track two advocates. Track two is an approach that analyzes the needs, values, and interests of the parties. Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker was credited with tremendous insight in the handling of the Panama Canal negotiations and finally had to persuade U.S. legislators to accept as a political reality certain needs of the local peoples. The Chiefs of Staff were also persuaded. Bunker was conducting second track diplomacy, that is, the non-power track, the track that recognizes the *real* political realities of identity needs and values that cannot be suppressed even by major force.

What Ambassador Bunker did through experience and intuition can be taught and learned. First, however, the conventional idea that power rests with states must be changed, for out of that idea comes adversary diplomacy, power bargaining, trade and aid blackmail, overt and covert interferences and other such self-defeating power operations. Probably the change will come only after costly failures on a scale that make the obvious apparent. The state-centric power model will give way, despite resistance, to a human-needs approach which recognizes where power finally rests. Teachers of diplomats and students can anticipate a changing audience and the need for an altered curriculum and prepare themselves for it.

Backstage Mediation in the Cuban Missile Crisis

John Scali

In October 1962 U.S. reconnaissance flights confirmed that nuclear-armed Soviet missiles were being set up in Cuba. On October 22, President Kennedy announced that he was going to place a naval blockade around Cuba to prevent more missiles from coming in and demanded that the missiles already there be dismantled and removed. Communication between Kennedy and Khrushchev was opened through diplomatic channels and, after some very tense days, Khrushchev finally agreed to U.S. demands. At the time it was not generally known that the official messages were being supplemented by back-channel negotiations between journalist John Scali and a Soviet embassy official. This is a case of a private citizen being used temporarily as a bearer of messages when the official channel was strained and overloaded because of a crisis. One can argue that this example stretches our definition of track two diplomacy, but it is a fascinating story of the role a private citizen can play.

H-32

I STAND before you as an accident of history. Back in 1962 wh tending to my business as a correspondent assigned to the St Department, I received a telephone call from a Soviet diplomat wh made me a major player in the solution of the Cuban missile cris

The call came on Friday, October 26, 1962, four days into the Cut missile crisis. It was from a man whom I initially identified as Mr. but who was actually Aleksander Fomin, the counselor of the Sov Embassy in Washington. The counselor position was just a cover. Fon I knew, was actually the KGB chief.

Lunches with Fomin

When Fomin first telephoned me six months earlier and sugge that we have lunch, I took the precaution of asking a friend of n at the FBI to check on this Aleksander Fomin who had suddenly ca

Meetings on the Falklands/Malvinas Dispute

In 1983 it was clear that the Falklands/Malvinas dispute was not responding to international or diplomatic techniques. The two governments concerned had no direct relationships and there was no movement. The Center for International Development at the University of Maryland invited Tory and Labour members of the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee to meet with persons who would be involved in the political process once elections had taken place in Argentina. In September 1983, they met for four days in the framework I have described above. After they had returned home they set up their own organizations through which to keep in touch with each other and extend their internal political contacts. This paved the way for a deeper analysis of the situation in April of 1984. A third meeting took place in February 1985, that time with a representative of the Falkland Islands participating.

During these discussions important discoveries have been made, particularly in relation to sovereignty. Why would Argentina seek, at such great costs, to occupy these islands? Was it just a move for political purposes by a military regime that sought to curry favor? Why would such a move to curry favor turn out to be a liberating experience? Was sovereignty at issue, and what is meant by sovereignty if, as was stated, Argentina had no intention of sending citizens to live on the Falklands to exploit them in any way? Was there some deeper motivation—perhaps relating to identity and recognition—that could be satisfied in other ways and probably would not be satisfied even though the islands were part of the sovereign territory of Argentina? If so, what are these motivations and how can they best be satisfied? This kind of analysis is not possible within an official negotiating framework, which tends to dwell on irrelevant history and law and is characterized by bargaining from established positions.

In the case of the Falklands, of course, it has not been possible for the two parties even to meet together officially. At Geneva they were in separate rooms with the Swiss as go-betweens, and even this arrangement broke down. The second track process is clearly one that is useful when states or nations do not formally recognize each other or are at war.

Inter-Communal Meetings on Lebanon*

The first meeting on Lebanon at the Center for International Development took place in May 1984 and was attended by Lebanese drawn from eight different communities. During four days it became apparent that it was one thing to define a goal, it was another to spell out that goal

* This section on Lebanon draws heavily on a report by my colleague, Edward Azar.

in unambiguous and constitutional terms. However, this seemed possible once there was clarity on goals and motivations. Finally, at a second meeting in October 1984, 22 points emerged as the basis of an agreement. The first of these was a reiteration of the conclusions of the first meeting: there should be a united Lebanon. The second spelled this out in four dimensions: a *united, independent Arab* state that was a *meeting ground for Christianity and Islam.*

During these four days there were the beginnings of some deductions that arise out of a statement of agreed needs and values and shared and disputed interests. It became clear that for practical and conceptual reasons there had to be a transition stage, moving from the unacceptable present, to a more acceptable condition of living. The longer-term constitutional goals that followed logically from the analysis of needs, values, and interests could not be pursued for the time being, but it was agreed that they had to be kept in view to ensure that the transition would not create a condition that destroyed any possibility of their fulfillment.

The Link between Tracks One and Two

The facilitators, in both the case of Lebanon and in the Falklands/Malvinas case, have taken the view that they are facilitating conflict resolution between parties whose leaderships are not present and who, because of the complexities, cannot be expected to do more than respond to practical options that are the outcome of the process. The facilitators realize further that the communication problem that representatives face on return is a major one. For this reason some direct communications between the facilitators and those at an official decision-making level had been thought necessary. It is necessary for the experience of the participants to be more widely shared. For this reason it is likely that within the series of meetings that are held at the University of Maryland Center for International Development, there will be several similar interactions within Lebanon, involving those more directly concerned.

This points to the link between unofficial and official track two diplomacy. The unofficial is an exploratory operation, designed to discover options. At a certain point of time the whole process must move to an official level. There is, however, an intermediate stage at which there is movement between exploration and application. The Center is at an intermediary stage in the case of Lebanon, and it is expected that there will be both exploratory seminars at the Center and ongoing discussions in Lebanon.

I should like here to emphasize that this process has a general application. While the cases to which I refer are limited ones, the same processes apply to conflicts such as are in evidence in arms control talks and others that affect the thermo-nuclear states. Direct negotiation within

embassy counselor, had an urgent luncheon with me today at which he asked what high American officials would think of the following proposition: (1) The Soviets would withdraw their missiles under U.N. inspection: (2) they would promise never again to reintroduce such offensive weapons into Cuba if the United States, namely President Kennedy, would pledge publicly in these circumstances not to invade Cuba. He asked that I call him urgently with the appropriate reaction whenever it was available." I yanked it out of the typewriter and brought it up to Roger Hilsman, who was just coming out of his office on the sixth floor. He read it and said, "This could be very important. Don't go away. Where are you going to be?" I said, "I'm going to be covering the crisis as I have been for the past five days." So he said, "I'll get back in touch with you." I then reverted to John Scali, reporter, not saying one word about this in any of my broadcasts or to anyone else.

That night after I got off the air at 6:00 p.m., I had a telephone call from Hilsman who said, "Without telling a soul, get into a car which we have now outside your studio and come to the office of the secretary of state. We may be on to something very important, but please do not tell anyone." I am a reporter with twenty years of experience and know that if I am going to be absent from the all-night coverage of a crisis such as the Cuban missile crisis, I will have to inform my bureau chief off the record if necessary where I am going to be. I promptly did that as briefly as possible, explaining that it was ultra secret.

I went to see Secretary of State Rusk in company with Roger Hilsman. He came out of his office in his shirtsleeves and said, "John, this could be the first sign that they want to back off. It fits with something we have picked up at the United Nations. I want you to go back to him and tell him this," whereupon he handed me a legal-size piece of yellow paper on which he had written, "The U.S.G. sees possibilities in this and suggests that the matter be brought up with the American representative at the U.N. and with U Thant, and that it be discussed for its possibilities. However, the time is short." He told me that if I was pressed about who authorized this message, I was to say it came from the highest officials in the U.S. government. I found out afterwards that this was true. As soon as the memo had hit his desk, he had called Robert McNamara at the Defense Department, and then the two of them discussed with the President whether or not this could be a backstage message. In any event, they thought it was important enough for me to follow up.

The Five Dollar Cup of Coffee

From Roger Hilsman's office, I called Fomin and suggested we meet immediately. It was then about 7:00 in the evening. This time I suggested that we meet at the Statler Hilton coffee shop about half a block from the Soviet embassy. The place was virtually deserted. I gave him

the message word-for-word but did not show him the piece of paper He asked me to repeat it, and then proceeded to question me. "You know John, if this message does not come from the highest sources in the U.S. government and I were to relay it to Moscow, I could be made to look like a fool." I told him, "Mr. Fomin, if at a crucial time such as this I were to lie to you, I would be the most irresponsible person in the world. I can assure you I am not irresponsible." This seemed to satisfy him.

"You know, he said, "if there is to be international inspection of the removal of the missiles in Cuba, why shouldn't there be inspection simultaneously of the United States, Florida, the Dominican Republic and several other Caribbean areas where you also have mobilized forces because how do we know that you will not go ahead and invade Cuba?" I said, "Look. This is a new element that you are raising for the first time, and I have no special instructions on this. But let me give you some advice as a reporter. If you persist in this you will ruin whatever chance there remains of any kind of peaceful settlement. It is the Soviet mobilization of missiles in Cuba that has created the crisis and not the countermobilization of the United States in Florida and elsewhere. Secondly," I said, "if the President were to agree to allow international inspectors to roam the coast of Florida and one or two or three other places in the United States, he would be under such terrible attack by the American right wing that the agreement would have absolutely no chance of being approved. If you wish to throw in a barrier which is calculated to ruin all prospects for agreement, you will persist in this. If not, I suggest that we go ahead on the basis of what we discussed initially." He thought for a while and then said, "Very well," whereupon he took the check.

We each had had a cup of coffee, and the check was for 30 cents. As it happened the cashier was engaged in a long and very friendly discussion with a female friend, and they did not notice us standing there waiting to pay the check. The discussion between the two women continued for a period of time, whereupon Fomin grew so impatient that he took a five-dollar bill out of his pocket, slapped it onto the counter, and, without waiting for change, hustled up the steps and disappeared. I had known this man for six months, and he was never renowned as a big tipper. So I had to assume that he was excited.

I went back to Hilsman's office at the State Department and dictated an account of this meeting to four State Department secretaries who went off and typed each section as quickly as possible. The secretary of state read it and said, "We may be on the way to a solution. A message from Khrushchev has just started to come in. It's in three sections. We've already translated two and we have a pretty good idea of what's in the third. All I can tell you is that this message comes from a man who is stupefied with anxiety." He continued, "As far as we can tell, the

my friend asked where I was at the moment and told me that two people would be over to talk to me in fifteen minutes. Two gentlemen showed up and very candidly advised me that Aleksander Fomin was a colonel in the KGB, a man who also had the reputation of being a personal friend of Nikita Khrushchev. Only six months earlier he had taken over in Washington, presumably to reorganize the KGB apparatus in the United States. Despite his rank, he had never been to the State Department, and it was unusual, if not unprecedented, for him to go outside his own embassy circle. In view of the fact that he had asked to have lunch with me, they wanted to warn me that it would be a risky operation but that, if I felt so inclined, to go ahead.

Properly forewarned, I agreed to a luncheon with Fomin at a restaurant of his choice. He assured me that he had called me only because he knew of my "eminent reputation" as an "outstanding foreign policy specialist" and that several of his friends had suggested that if he wanted an overview of what was really going on, I was the one who could give it to him. I nodded modestly and proceeded with our conversation which wound up more or less as a low-key, polite debate on Soviet-American foreign policy. It was pleasant but for me as a journalist completely uninformative. We parted and he suggested perhaps we should have lunch again.

Back in my office, I sat down and wrote a brief memo that I gave to my friend in the FBI, as he had suggested. Just to make sure that the government was in communication with all of the proper elements, I gave a copy to the head of State Department Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Roger Hilsman.

Over a six-month period, Fomin and I went to maybe seven or eight lunches, always after a telephone call from him which would suggest the luncheon and choose the restaurant where we would meet two or three days later. I always informed my friend in the FBI in advance that X luncheon was coming up in such and such a place. On one occasion, I think it was the sixth luncheon, I was so busy I forgot to make the telephone call to my friend at the FBI. After my lunch with Fomin at a restaurant on M Street—since closed—I went to my car, which I had parked several blocks away. There I found my friend leaning against the fender. He said, "Are you going my way?" I said, "I guess I am." In any event I explained, I think to his satisfaction, that I had simply forgotten to let him know and proceeded to write the usual memo.

Ambassador Scali has been recognized internationally as the man whose unusual backstage role as negotiator for the U.S. government helped avert a nuclear war during the 1963 Cuban missile crisis. A senior correspondent for ABC News, Scali has also served as a Presidential Advisor and U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations.

An Urgent Luncheon

When Fomin called me on the fourth day of the Cuban missile crisis and suggested that we have lunch immediately, I knew that this was unusual but I almost refused because I had a dried-out bologna sandwich which was to be my lunch. He said, "It is very important because the situation is serious." I then promptly agreed and met with him at the once-famous restaurant—now only a memory—the Occidental, just a few blocks from the White House.

We were usually on a first-name relationship, but this time there was a noticeable tenseness between us. He said, "The situation is very serious." I said, "Yes. And it was predictable. I can't quite understand why you've tried such an insane move, one that was calculated to ring every alarm bell in the U.S. government." He said, "Well, let us talk about it for a while." We ordered our food. Normally he was very fastidious about what he was to eat, but this time he was preoccupied and ordered fish, which he normally did not eat. But he never even picked at it when it arrived.

Finally, he said, "You know, there might be a way to solve this problem. The Cuban delegate at the United Nations yesterday made some remarks which could point the way." Even in those days I followed the United Nations carefully, and I said that I didn't recall that the Cuban delegate had said anything. He said, "Yes he did. He said something to the effect that if there was a proper understanding on both sides, Fidel Castro would be prepared to remove the missiles." I said, "Well, I haven't heard of it," but he insisted it could be important and asked me if I could find out from my "highly placed friends" in the government what they thought of it. At this point we had no reason to play games. I was the only correspondent who had accompanied Secretary of State Dean Rusk to all of his international conferences. It was well known that I was one of his friends and one of President Kennedy's friends as well. I told him I was not sure I could get in touch with the secretary of state, given the crisis atmosphere, but that I would see what I could do. He gave me two new telephone numbers which I had never used before. One was his private home telephone number and the second was what he called a direct telephone number to his office in the embassy.

In the cab back to the State Department I began to wonder if the meeting was as significant as I thought it might be. For all I knew the same operation was being conducted with a dozen other correspondents in the United States. I had just about talked myself out of doing even a memo on it, when, as a precaution, I called a friend of mine in the CIA and asked, "Is Fomin important enough for the Soviets to float a proposal for settling the Cuban missile crisis?" Back came the answer "Hell, yes!" Still not quite convinced, I sat down and typed a very brief memo that went something like this: "Aleksander Fomin, Soviet

As another example, debate over the nature of the Palestinian problem has been heated. In some quarters, the Palestinians were pictured first not as a people at all, and in later times only as "terrorists." For those who hold these views, any move to recognize equal Palestinian rights is a threat to Israel's own identity, and they have opposed such moves with all the vehemence they can muster.

On the other hand, there are those who have accepted that the Palestinians are people with rights comparable to those enjoyed by Israelis. Some remember that the United States in 1947 voted for a just partition of Palestine by creating both a Jewish state and an independent Palestinian Arab state. There are even those who probe the psychological needs of both the Israelis and the Palestinian people and recognize the longing of each for acceptance by others, an idea which in diplomatic parlance has been termed "mutual recognition." Again, how one defines the problem in debate over it will begin to determine a course of policy.

The nonofficial dialogue with the Soviet Union over the years has enlarged understanding of the psychology of each people in dealing with the other and of real objectives on both sides. Private exchanges over the years have unquestionably introduced greater realism and hence more accurate definition of the problems of conducting U.S.- Soviet relations. Their first contribution is to help in putting the problem in an accurate conceptual framework.

For instance, one definition of the problem of dealing with the Soviets in the Middle East is that they want to maintain "controlled tension" so they can spoil any effort to achieve greater stability by moving toward an Arab-Israeli settlement. The only policy prescription that can flow from this perception is one of confronting, blocking, and excluding the Soviets at every turn.

The quite plausible alternative picture that emerged from the Dartmouth talks—and from my last ten years of watching the Soviets at close hand in the Middle East—is that Soviet analysts do not believe a policy of "controlled tension" is realistic: their experience shows that no one controls mounting tension and that explosions produce Arab demands for military support that the Soviets do not want to provide. The policy which would flow from judging that the Soviets may not be spoilers only is straightforward diplomatic discussion to judge what measure of cooperation and competition is most likely to enhance stability—both in the Middle East and in the U.S.-Soviet relationship.

So much for defining the problem, and for the importance of definitions. Now second, there is a period in any policymaking process when decisions are made on a course of action—and that, too, is a point where new ideas can have an influence. Often the most realistic definition of alternative approaches comes from political opponents or from neutral [illegible]—at least the government is forced to define [illegible]

How are these views of the problem or alternative approach injected into the decisionmaking process? As more and more of the p ticipants in nonofficial dialogue—along with other analysts—write a speak of their views and experience, ideas become increasingly curr in the policy community both in and out of government. Anyone w has participated in the policymaking process will affirm that the "id in the air" do influence the way public officials approach a proble This is especially true when, at the beginning of an administration, str public opinion presses for new approaches; it is true also when cumstances cause government to consider mid-course corrections in policy; and it is true when governments clearly hit an impasse. At t moments, new ideas find their way into policymakers' thinking. Th "ideas in the air" often come first from the private sector, espec when they reflect changes in viewpoint. Here, it seems to me, is w the unofficial dialogue has its second opportunity for impact.

Participants in nonofficial dialogue have an opportunity to share native definitions of the problems and explore policy options with a w audience and with policymakers after they have returned from their And it might now be worth making an effort to increase communic among all of the American groups engaged in such dialogue, not with a view to sharpening their own exchanges with Soviet counter but also in hope of using these exchanges as a base for broad American understanding of the relationship.

The Value of Private Talk

In this overall policymaking context, what kinds of specific tributions may stem from private dialogue? First, such meetings can as laboratories for identifying the human obstacles to better officia tionships. In the Arab-Israeli arena, private meetings between I and Palestinians have been the only meetings possible, given t willingness of both parties to meet officially. Yet these meeting the years have been extremely productive in identifying what is nec on each side to break through some of the psychological obsta official negotiations. Remember President Anwar el-Sadat's w the Israeli Knesset when he visited Jerusalem in November, 1

> Yet there remains another wall. This wall constitutes psychological barrier between us, a barrier of suspicion, a barri of rejection; a barrier of fear, of deception, a barrier of hallucin tion without any action, deed or decision . . . a barrier of distor and eroded interpretation of every event and statement. It is t psychological barrier which I described in official statements constituting seventy percent of the whole problem.

These psychological barriers can often be better understoo [illegible] dialogue than in official meetings with formal

is no such proposition in the entire message, but it talks about the terrible consequences of a nuclear war between us, and if you put his message and Fomin's proposition side by side, they seem to fit." Then he turned to Hilsman and said, "I want your guys to stay up all night if necessary examining this thing for any hookers, and to make sure that it is what it appears to be." He said to me, "John, you have served your country very well. When you report this, remember, eyeball to eyeball, they blinked first." That is an expression usually associated with an account of the Cuban missile crisis written much later by Stewart Alsop. He is named as the source of that remark, but I just wish to assert that I heard it first.

The "Trollope" Ploy

At 10:17 the next morning, Associated Press cleared a bulletin out of Moscow which quoted a new message from Nikita Khrushchev which said that the only way to settle the Cuban missile crisis was to swap American missiles in Turkey and Italy for the Soviet withdrawal of missiles from Cuba. The secretary called me about 10:30 and suggested I come in to see him. When I went into his office, he said, "Well, John, what happened?" I said, "Mr. Secretary, I don't know. Either there is mass confusion here—which is certainly understandable—or the Soviets have deliberately carried on this operation through me to divert the attention of the U.S. government while it rushed the missiles into a state of readiness." Very solemnly and coldly he looked at me and said, "Call your friend and find out what he has to say."

I called Fomin and suggested we meet at the Statler ballroom on the mezzanine floor, which I knew would be deserted at that time. I was so angry that I was afraid I would raise my voice and I figured that a deserted ballroom would be the best place to do this. The first question I asked him was what had happened. He said he didn't know. He was completely mystified. He and Soviet Ambassador Anatoly F. Dobrynin had been waiting and waiting for an answer, but there were so many people sending messages that perhaps their message had not arrived yet.

I said, "The United States is determined to get those missiles out of Cuba one way or another. The longer you stall, the more certain you make an American invasion. In fact, an American invasion of Cuba is only a matter of hours away, and what makes your story so unbelievable is that only three hours ago a Soviet SAM missile in Cuba shot down an American U-2 plane. Now you know and I know that those missiles are manned by Soviet forces." Appearing to blanch, he said, "An American plane has been shot down? I did not know that." He added, "Please, don't get excited. This is not a double cross. Go back and tell whoever it is that you are in communication with to wait and to be patient because there are so many people writing messages for the chair-

[illegible]" He said, "I'm sure

I went back to the State Department. Hilsman had already collapsed from lack of sleep. His deputy, Thomas L. Hughes, was there. I again dictated what turned out to be about a five-page memo. They took me to the White House via the side door and the President came out. The main question he asked after looking over the memo very quickly was, "John, do you think this man is bluffing?" I said, "Mr. President, that's a difficult question to answer. I've known him some six months, but if he is an actor, he's a hell of a good one because he appears to be genuinely alarmed."

The President went back into the Executive Committee (ExCom) meeting of the National Security Council where at that time they had been considering whether or not to send American planes into Cuba to take out the SAM missile site which had shot down the U-2. As a result of whatever decisions the President had made after reading my memo, they decided to wait a while longer and not to order the attack.

That afternoon, Saturday afternoon, Robert Kennedy was the one who found the solution, the so-called "Trollope" ploy.* His suggestion was that the United States should ignore the last message broadcast in the open from Khrushchev in Moscow and instead concentrate only on the first message which had expressed the proper degree of alarm and to regard the proposal from Fomin, which had been made through me, as an official part of the Soviet government's response. This is why the President's reply to Khrushchev said, "Your proposals, as we understand them, are that you will remove the missiles from Cuba under United Nations inspection and that you will promise not to reintroduce offensive weapons of this kind into Cuba and that the United States will publicly pledge not to invade Cuba, as we are now pledging."

After the White House had made known the message, I went back to being a reporter and reported what the White House had said and what appeared to be a prospect that somehow this might be a settlement. I couldn't sleep that evening. About 9:15 in the morning Radio Moscow broadcast a message which said, "Your proposal has been accepted." To say we breathed a sigh of relief is an understatement.

Getting Scooped on the Most Important Story of My Career

I sought to get clearance to tell this story for almost two years. After months, the secretary of state finally agreed. But President Kennedy was reluctant. Finally, he said to me that he would write in his own hand writing a letter to me which would extol my contribution, to use his words, during the Cuban missile crisis. I could have this, but I could not reveal it until he had retired and left the White House. At that time

*Named after the 19th century British writer Anthony Trollope, in whose novels young girls often think that a squeeze of their hand indicates a proposal

if you recall, the President's popularity was about 80 percent in the United States. I thought about this and I told him something that I will remember a long time. I said, "Mr. President, if a reporter works very hard, goes to church every Sunday, helps old ladies across the street and is an exemplary citizen, and then on top of that he is lucky—even then a story like this won't happen to a reporter but once in a lifetime. You're asking me to accept a letter from you which I must keep secret for another six years. It's like my asking you, Mr. President, to be satisfied with renomination by the Democratic Convention in secret." The President threw back his head and laughed. He said he understood what I meant. He said, "Let's discuss this again when I get back from Dallas."

After that great tragedy, I didn't have the heart to ask Rusk or anybody else for clearance to tell my story. But I found out about four months after that meeting with the President that Roger Hilsman, who had resigned from the State Department, was in the process of writing a book which was to be called *To Move a Nation: The Politics of Foreign Policy in the Administration of John F. Kennedy.* Roger called me and said, "Look, I'm going to tell your story." I said, "Roger, please don't do me any favors. I will tell my own story." He said, "You will never be allowed to tell this story, and I think the President wanted to give you credit, so I will be your biographer." I said, "I don't want you to be my biographer," whereupon I went to Secretary of State Rusk. "Don't you worry, John," he said, "Hilsman will never write that story. I can guarantee you that." But he was wrong. Hilsman's book did tell my story, and in August 1964 *Look Magazine* published in advance the two chapters that told how John Scali had acted as a secret go-between. Whatever opportunity I had to tell this story vanished. And above and beyond that, I was exposed to the world as a journalist who got scooped on the most important story of his career.

When Citizens Talk: Nonofficial Dialogue In Relations Between Nations

Harold H. Saunders

From his vantage point as a State Department policymaker during the Carter Administration and recently as a participant in the track two efforts of the Dartmouth Conference, Harold H. Saunders examines how informal, private dialogue can contribute to policymaking. He concludes that private dialogue has, on balance, a positive —though perhaps not an immediate—effect on policymaking, mainly because it contributes "a sensitive picture of the problems to be faced and, as moments of impasse approach, alternative ways of approaching the problems." We thank Hal Saunders and the Charles F. Kettering Foundation for permitting us to incorporate these very relevant comments in this book. His article, first published in the Summer 1984 issue of the Kettering Review, *was included in the symposium kits given to each of our 120 symposium participants.*

H-38

WHAT does nonofficial dialogue among U.S. and Soviet citizen contribute to peace between the two superpowers?

What exactly do groups like the Dartmouth Conference groups ar others like them accomplish? What can they not be expected to achiev What are the dangers that nonofficial dialogue will undercut offici policy?

First, let's get the negatives out of the way quickly.

The Dangers and Limits of Nonofficial Dialogues

There are dangers. During the twenty years when I worked at poli levels of the U.S. government in the White House and in the State Depa ment, our principal concern was that private spokesmen would someh represent the United States in a way that did not accurately reflect th authority to speak.

Sometimes there is almost deliberate misrepresentation of that uthority, but more commonly there is simply the implication that dividuals represent more than they do. Sometimes a consultant or person ho has some contact with a senior policymaker drops the name and aves the implication that he is accurately representing that individual's ewpoint. Sometimes there is the careless statement that "the Congress inks" a certain way about an issue.

On other occasions, members of Congress or private Americans ave gone to another country and in an honest effort to break an im-asse at a time of crisis have been tempted to promise more than they ould deliver. For instance, during the Iranian hostage crisis, a member f Congress went to Tehran and discussed the possibility of congres-ional hearings as a way of meeting the Iranians' demand that their rievances be heard—only to find when he returned to Washington that ongressional leadership rejected the idea. In other cases, individuals rom the academic world have spoken with leaders in the Arab-Israeli-alestinian conflict, suggesting approaches to solutions that their own overnment could not deliver on.

These concerns can quickly be taken care of when both parties to he dialogue validate a particular channel. During the hostage crisis, or instance, two Paris-based lawyers became intermediaries between he U.S. government and the authorities in Tehran for a time, because of their unusual contacts with Iranian revolutionary leaders. Their role was validated by an exchange of messages and tokens which made clear that responsible individuals on each side intended to work through that channel. Later, in the final stages of negotiating the hostages' release, the government of Algeria was affirmed as the acceptable intermediary by a formal exchange of messages. During the Cuban missile crisis, correspondent John Scali became a channel for a time, when he was asked by a Soviet official to transmit an informal proposal to the U.S. government. Other examples will come to mind.

Most of the long-established and broadly recognized nongovernmental dialogue groups have in fact been initially set up and have been continued, not only with the full knowledge but with the encouragement of both the U.S. and Soviet governments. The Dartmouth Conference, for example, is formally understood on both sides as a dialogue among private citizens, although individuals in both groups are known to have greater or lesser contact with their own governments. During

---

Harold H. Saunders is a research fellow at the Brookings Institution in Washington, D.C., and co-chairs the task force on U.S.-Soviet relations in regions of potential conflict within the Dartmouth Conference. From 1978-81, he was Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs.

the talks, a precise informal effort is made on both sides to understand as fully as possible who has what contact and influence with his or her government, and conference leaders report fully to their governments. In short, the terms of reference are clear.

But even these exchanges have limits. We have to acknowledge at the outset that such exchanges will rarely influence the next step in the implementation of an established policy course. Once a big government like ours has agonized through a difficult problem to a decision, it will not change course lightly. In truth, despite disclaimers about how the President wants to hear other points of view, the last thing a President really wants once he has made a complicated decision is to have somebody give him another option. In the short term, government officials will listen to reports from the nonofficial dialogue but will generally be swept along by the momentum of the present course of action. It is not in that time frame that nonofficial dialogue is most likely to influence policy.

The Importance of Defining Our Problems

So much for the dangers and limits of such exchanges. What can they achieve?

Turning to the positive potential of nonofficial discursion, we need to think for a moment about how policy is actually made, so as to understand where the points of entry for new ideas are. I would particularly zero in on two points in the policy process.

First, there is a period early in any decisionmaking process when it is essential to define the problem the policymakers face. Sometimes there are also moments of redefinition as a problem drags on. That may sound like a sophomoric point but it is not. Often it is very difficult to put a problem in a conceptual framework. Even when that is achieved, there will be heated controversy over the definition of the problem because those who want to influence policy recognize that how a President defines a problem will begin to shape his decisions on how to deal with it.

For instance, in 1978 there was almost continuous debate over whether the Iranian revolution was made in Moscow or had been generated primarily from internal Iranian causes. As it happened, one picture of the problem included memory of a conversation, in 1970 or thereabout, between an American professor and the shah, in which the shah discussed how important it was to him to create political institutions that would keep pace with economic development. "If I can't solve that problem," he said, "my son will never rule in Iran." That picture of Iran's struggle to maintain some parallelism between economic and social change on the one hand, and political growth on the other, provided one way of setting the stage for dealing with the revolution. But others insisted that it was essentially a problem of public disorder encouraged by Moscow-supported groups and susceptible only to military resolution.

As another example, debate over the nature of the Palestinian problem has been heated. In some quarters, the Palestinians were pictured first not as a people at all, and in later times only as "terrorists." For those who hold these views, any move to recognize equal Palestinian rights is a threat to Israel's own identity, and they have opposed such moves with all the vehemence they can muster.

On the other hand, there are those who have accepted that the Palestinians are people with rights comparable to those enjoyed by Israelis. Some remember that the United States in 1947 voted for a just partition of Palestine by creating both a Jewish state and an independent Palestinian Arab state. There are even those who probe the psychological needs of both the Israelis and the Palestinian people and recognize the longing of each for acceptance by others, an idea which in diplomatic parlance has been termed "mutual recognition." Again, how one defines the problem in debate over it will begin to determine a course of policy.

The nonofficial dialogue with the Soviet Union over the years has enlarged understanding of the psychology of each people in dealing with the other and of real objectives on both sides. Private exchanges over the years have unquestionably introduced greater realism and hence more accurate definition of the problems of conducting U.S.- Soviet relations. Their first contribution is to help in putting the problem in an accurate conceptual framework.

For instance, one definition of the problem of dealing with the Soviets in the Middle East is that they want to maintain "controlled tension" so they can spoil any effort to achieve greater stability by moving toward an Arab-Israeli settlement. The only policy prescription that can flow from this perception is one of confronting, blocking, and excluding the Soviets at every turn.

The quite plausible alternative picture that emerged from the Dartmouth talks—and from my last ten years of watching the Soviets at close hand in the Middle East—is that Soviet analysts do not believe a policy of "controlled tension" is realistic: their experience shows that no one controls mounting tension and that explosions produce Arab demands for military support that the Soviets do not want to provide. The policy which would flow from judging that the Soviets may not be spoilers only is straightforward diplomatic discussion to judge what measure of cooperation and competition is most likely to enhance stability—both in the Middle East and in the U.S.-Soviet relationship.

So much for defining the problem, and for the importance of definitions. Now second, there is a period in any policymaking process when decisions are made on a course of action—and that, too, is a point where new ideas can have an influence. Often the most realistic definition of alternative approaches comes from political opponents or from neutral analysts outside government—at least the government is forced to define alternatives by discussion of alternatives outside government.

How are these views of the problem or alternative approach injected into the decisionmaking process? As more and more of the pa ticipants in nonofficial dialogue—along with other analysts—write a speak of their views and experience, ideas become increasingly curre in the policy community both in and out of government. Anyone w has participated in the policymaking process will affirm that the "ide in the air" do influence the way public officials approach a proble This is especially true when, at the beginning of an administration, stre public opinion presses for new approaches; it is true also when c cumstances cause government to consider mid-course corrections in policy; and it is true when governments clearly hit an impasse. At th moments, new ideas find their way into policymakers' thinking. Th "ideas in the air" often come first from the private sector, especi when they reflect changes in viewpoint. Here, it seems to me, is wh the unofficial dialogue has its second opportunity for impact.

Participants in nonofficial dialogue have an opportunity to share a native definitions of the problems and explore policy options with a w audience and with policymakers after they have returned from their t And it might now be worth making an effort to increase communica among all of the American groups engaged in such dialogue, not o with a view to sharpening their own exchanges with Soviet counterp but also in hope of using these exchanges as a base for broade American understanding of the relationship.

The Value of Private Talk

In this overall policymaking context, what kinds of specific tributions may stem from private dialogue? First, such meetings can as laboratories for identifying the human obstacles to better official tionships. In the Arab-Israeli arena, private meetings between Isr and Palestinians have been the only meetings possible, given the willingness of both parties to meet officially. Yet these meetings the years have been extremely productive in identifying what is nece on each side to break through some of the psychological obstac official negotiations. Remember President Anwar el-Sadat's wor the Israeli Knesset when he visited Jerusalem in November, 19

> Yet there remains another wall. This wall constitutes a psychological barrier between us, a barrier of suspicion, a barrier of rejection; a barrier of fear, of deception, a barrier of hallucination without any action, deed or decision . . . a barrier of distorted and eroded interpretation of every event and statement. It is this psychological barrier which I described in official statements as constituting seventy percent of the whole problem.

These psychological barriers can often be better understood i longed private dialogue than in official meetings with formal ag

imilarly, in nonofficial Soviet dialogues recently, one factor in the Soviet relationship has come through clearly. It is a strong desire viet individuals to have their country seen as an equal participant e world stage and not to be treated as inferior. To recognize this s not to urge that we drop our guard on any security front. It is that purposeful dialogue at an official level may require a more tic vocabulary in recognizing what produces constructive Soviet nses.

Second, private meetings can serve as laboratories for understan- or confirming real interests and how they are defined on each side. nples in the Dartmouth context alone are extensive. We have dis- ed at length U.S. and Soviet interests in the Middle East, the reasons he Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, American concerns in Central erica and the Caribbean, how our respective actions in southern ca have affected each other, and our concerns in Europe.

On another front, since the U.S. government has prohibited itself n talking with members of the Palestinian Liberation Organization, understanding of the thinking of the PLO leaders has come from ate Americans who maintain a dialogue with them, as well as from lligence, from other Arabs, and from analysis of their actions.

Third, when at an impasse, private meetings can serve as a place identifying alternative approaches that might meet needs on both es. Opportunities for this kind of refinement of approaches may be st common in the arms control area. The Dartmouth task force on ns control, which met in Denver last spring, did produce an alter- ive to the current stalemate in the talks on intermediate range missiles. s equally true that a dialogue with Soviet experts on the Middle East uld produce a picture of how the two governments might talk to each her about this dangerous area if they decided it would be advantageous do so.

Fourth, private meetings can provide an opportunity for discussing d even testing methods for improving machinery between the govern- ents for dealing with each other in a crisis. The Dartmouth task force n U.S.- Soviet relationships in areas of potential conflict is moving to evelop a conceptual framework which would take account of how each de defines its interests in areas of potential conflict, and of some re- ent work in Moscow on principles of crisis avoidance and management.

The ideas developed in these groups may not necessarily show up mmediately in policymaking circles. Governments are locked into their wn tracks and can move from them only at certain points—when a elatively new problem arises or when an old track hits a dead end. What he nonofficial dialogue can offer is to alter perspectives and define alter- natives which have been tested in discussion—ready for that moment n the policy process when change is required.

This is not to say that these changed perspectives and possible alternatives cannot be produced by government, of course. Secretaries Henry Kissinger and Cyrus Vance both maintained a direct informal dialogue with the Soviet ambassador in Washington. At Camp David, officials in both parties have maintained private, as well as official, exchanges. At some points, however, this may be better done through private channels. At the current moment in U.S.- Soviet relations, when the official dialogue remains strained or almost nonexistent, nonofficial exchanges may offer a more effective forum.

One other point needs to be made. Nonofficial dialogue is the vehicle for informing private citizens in each country. Often when our government seems to be floundering, it is an informed public which creates the environment and even the pressure for governmental decision. Our republic needs an informed public. That public is nourished through this kind of private exchange, since it does not participate in the direct exchanges between governments.

The measurement for the success of nonofficial dialogue between nations should not be immediate impact on policy. Its success lies in its contributing a sensitive picture of the problems to be faced and, as oments of impasse approach, alternative ways of approaching those problems. At those moments, it is the "ideas in the air" that, often as not, provide insight into new approaches. Those ideas can be developed, examined, and crystallized when citizens talk.

New Dimensions in Foreign Economic Policy, ed. Ernest H. Preeg and Diane B. Bendahmane. An examination of three key topics—international banking and the debt crisis, the oil shocks of the 1970s, and industrial policy—and how the U.S. economy is increasingly affected by developmen abroad. 1986, $3.75, GPO stock #044-000-02131-5, 118 pages, bibliography

Black Labor Unions in South Africa, eds. Anthony Freeman and Diane B. Bendahmane. Traces the history of the black trade union movement and explores the influence that the movement has today on the fight against apartheid. 1987.

National Negotiating Styles, ed. Hans Binnendijk. The negotiating styles c six countries—China, Japan, the Soviet Union, France, Egypt and Mexico—are examined by a group of experienced practitioners. Contains good adv for U.S. negotiators. 1987.

These publications are available from the U.S. Government Printing Office Washington, D.C. Upcoming publications will deal with informal diploma U.S. base negotiations, the future of the GATT, countries in transition from dictatorship, and U.S.-Soviet summitry. For information on these upcomin works, or on the Center's Occasional Paper Series, write to the Center for the Study of Foreign Affairs, 1400 Key Boulevard, Arlington, Virginia 222

Bibliography

Armstrong, Barbara. "Group Therapy for the Middle East." *The Washington Post*, June 24, 1984.

Azar, Edward E., and John W. Burton, eds. *Facilitated Conflict Resolution: Theory and Practice: Lebanon a Case Example.* Great Britain, Wheatsheaf Books, Ltd., 1986.

Berman, Maureen R., and Joseph E. Johnson. *Unofficial Diplomats.* New York: Columbia University Press, 1977.

Davidson, William D., and Joseph Montville. "Foreign Policy According to Freud." *Foreign Policy* 45, Winter 1981-82.

Landau, David. "Citizen Diplomacy." *Kettering Review*, Summer 1984.

Montville, Joseph. "Notebook on the Psychology of the U.S.-Soviet Relationship." *Journal of Political Psychology*, June 1985.

_____. "Foreign Policy According to Freud?" Interview with Joseph Montville in *Tarrytown Letter*, Tarrytown Group No. 38.

Moyer, Robert S. "The Enemy Within." *Psychology Today*, January 1985.

Rogers, Carl R., and David Ryback. "One Alternative to Nuclear Planetary Suicide." *The Counseling Psychologist*, September 1984.

Root, Elihu. "A Requisite for the Success of Popular Diplomacy." *Kettering Review*, Summer 1984.

Saunders, Harold. "When Citizens Talk." *Kettering Review*, Summer 1984.

Starrt, James D. *Journalism's Unofficial Ambassador: A Biography of Edward Price Bell*, Chs. 6 and 8. Ohio University Press, 1979.

Yarrow, C.H. Mike. *Quaker Experience in International Conciliation.* New Haven: Yale University Press, 1978.

Volkan, Vamik D. "The Need to Have Enemies and Allies: A Developmental Approach." *Political Psychology*, June 1985

ANNEX I

PROFILES OF THE DAI TEAM

ANNEX I

PROFILES OF THE DAI TEAM

THE PALESTINIAN-ISRAELI COOPERATION PROGRAM

Development Alternatives, Inc. (DAI) is a development consulting firm with 21 years of experience in implementing technical assistance programs worldwide. DAI has been selected by A.I.D. to research and analyze functional cooperation efforts in conflict environments, with a special emphasis on the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. DAI will facilitate two workshops to examine how the U.S. government might fund organizations committed to promoting cooperation between Israelis and Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza.

The DAI Team

Joseph Montville, Director of the DAI team, is a retired Foreign Service officer who now serves as Senior Consultant on Conflict Resolution at the Center for the Study of Foreign Affairs of the Foreign Service Institute. Mr. Montville is the editor of *Conflict and Peacemaking in Multiethnic Societies* (1990) and co-editor of *The Psychodynamics of International Relationships, Vol I., Concepts and Theories, Vol. II*, and *Unofficial Diplomacy at Work* (all 1990).

James Packard Winkler, Project Manager for this study, is the Deputy Director of Consulting Services at DAI. Dr. Winkler received M.A.L.D and Ph.D. degrees from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy and was a Peace Scholar at the United States Institute of Peace (1988-1989) for his outstanding doctoral research on conflict resolution and instability in the Third World.

David Altus Garner is a staff member of DAI with extensive experience in Asia and the Middle East. Since 1986, Mr. Garner has served as Chief of Party and Chief Planning Officer in Pakistan DAI's Afghanistan Agricultural Sector Support Project, which provides cross-border support to improve infrastructure and agriculture. He has lived and worked for extended periods over the last 20 years in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Yemen and has undertaken short-term assignments throughout the Middle East. Mr. Garner will contribute analysis and research to case studies for this project.

Melanie Wilhelm, a staff member of DAI, will serve as the editor of the project report and rapporteur for the workshops. Ms. Wilhelm has an M.A. degree from the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies with a concentration in Middle Eastern Studies. She has worked as a trainer, counselor, and conference planner in the United States, Morocco, and Yemen.

Mohammad Abu-Nimer is a Ph.D. candidate at George Mason University's Center for Conflict Analysis and Resolution. He holds B.A. and M.A. degrees from Hebrew University and has worked as a coordinator, trainer, and counselor for groups promoting Palestinian-Israeli dialogue since 1984. Mr. Abu-Nimer will contribute analysis and research to project reports with a special focus on Palestinian-Israeli cooperation.

Hugo van der Merwe is a candidate for a Ph.D. degree at George Mason University's Center for Conflict Analysis and Resolution. He holds a degree in African Studies from the University of Cape Town and has researched and taught on the subject of conflict resolution since 1989. Mr. van der Merwe will contribute analysis and research to project reports concentrating on the black-white cooperation efforts in South Africa.